Islam & the West: A Review of The West & the Rest: Globalization & Terrorist Threat by Roger Scruton

I admit that I’d been reluctant to read this book because it was published in 2002, and I feared that it might be another ill-considered rush to publication in the wake to 9/11. (It turns out that my concerns about Scruton’s credentials were based on the erroneous assumption that he was new to the field. In fact, Scruton published a book about Lebanon in 1987.) Besides, Scruton is a high-end philosopher and a conservative. Some so-called conservatives have a propensity to rant. However, as I noted in arecent post, I’d read an essay by Scruton that I found persuasive, so I decided to give this book a try, and I’m glad that I did—despite the false advertising. 

False advertising? Well, the title—the most important advertising a book ever receives—misleads. Despite an opening discussion of Samuel Huntington’s “the clash of civilizations” hypothesis, Scruton only focuses on two civilizations: “the West” (with its Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, and Greco-Roman genealogy) and Islamic civilization. Scruton doesn’t address China, Japan, India, or Russia (with its roots in Orthodox Christianity and Marxism). Neither does Scruton spend much time addressing terrorism as such, its sociology and ideology. Others have explored the roots of terrorists, such as Scott Atran, for only one example. Finally, Scruton doesn’t spend much time on globalization as an economic reality. So what does Scruton write about that makes this book worthwhile? He writes about the characteristics of Islam society and political thinking contrasted with that of Western institutions, and he does so well and thoroughly. 

In his preface, Scruton notes a contrast that will remain a recurring theme throughout the book, that between the contemporary West and Islam: 

Islamic civilization involves a common religious belief, based on a sacred text whose law may be misapplied but never altered. It defines itself in terms not of freedom but of submission. Islam, salm, and salaam—“submission,” “peace,” and “safety”— all derive from the verb salima, whose primary meaning is “to be secure,” “unharmed,” or “blameless,” but which has a derived form meaning “to surrender.” The muslim is the one who has surrendered, submitted, and so obtained security. In that complex etymological knot is tied a vision of society and its rewards far different from anything that has prevailed in modern Europe and America. 

Western civilization also grew from a common religious belief and a sacred text, and, like Islam, originated in a religious movement among Semitic people— albeit people living under an imperial yoke, for whom submission was already a day-to-day reality. Western civilization has left behind its religious belief and its sacred text, to place its trust not in religious certainties but in open discussion, trial and error, and the ubiquitousness of doubt.

Scruton, Roger (2014-05-13). The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat. Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Kindle Edition.

It is the uniqueness of modern Western institutions and beliefs that set off the West against the traditions of Islam. Even when Christianity was the dominant cultural fact in the West (such as in the High Middle Ages), the theory of the Two Swords—of both ecclesiastical and secular rulers exercising authority—differs from the ongoing practice in the lands of Islam. Scruton details how Roman law and even Greek drama differentiate the sacred and secular realms. Over the course of Western history, ideas of contract and eventually social contracts—governance based on the consent of the governed—began to take root. Scruton goes on to consider the proposition that “we” (as in “We the People”) is a basis of Western polities. Based on his analysis, the nation-state becomes a crucial instrument in fostering and maintaining a sense of community that allows the existence of a self-governing polity. After the Thirty Years War and the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), Europe effectively established the nation-state as legal and international reality and put most (but by no means all) of its religious strife about control of the public realm behind it. (The French Revolution and “The Troubles” of Northern Ireland among the significant exceptions.) Also, the nation-state, through the vehicle of nationalism, came to supplement—if not supplant—the idea of God, which following the Enlightenment became more of a matter of the head than of the heart. Scruton summarizes his argument: 

The point that I wish to emphasize is that the emergence of the modern Western state, in which jurisdiction is defined over territory, supported by secular conceptions of legitimacy , and associated with the rights and duties of citizenship, has also coincided with the emergence of a special kind of pre-political loyalty, which is that of the nation, conceived as a community of neighbors sharing language, customs, territory, and a common interest in defense.

Scruton, Roger (2014-05-13). The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat (pp. 46-47). Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Kindle Edition.

From this history, (much of) the West developed ideas of citizenship, that, especially in the U.S., were crucial for incorporating immigrants from far-flung lands. Scruton argues that this attitude contrasts with the traditional ties still dominant in Islamic countries: 

A modern democracy is perforce a society of strangers. And the successful democracy is the one where strangers are expressly included in the web of obligation. Citizenship involves the disposition to recognize and act upon obligations to those whom we do not know. The comparative absence of this disposition from the Islamic countries in the Middle East has had catastrophic consequences, as attitudes shaped by religion and family ties try to adapt themselves to a world made by strangers. The clatter of industrial progress, the remorseless technological change, the constant uprooting, pillaging, and tearing down , the tireless glare of the media, the irresistible invasions by the state and its agents— all this amplifies the desire to seek refuge in family, tribe, or religion, and to divide the world into friends and foes.

Scruton, Roger (2014-05-13). The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat (p. 53). Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Kindle Edition.

After this point in the book, Scruton wanders off into criticisms of multiculturalism and feminism, which, while not without merit, tend to go carry on about excesses instead of considering common practices and beliefs. However, Scruton is right about the values that give us the political and legal system that we have is worth defending. The Western ideas about the public realm do contrast markedly from the totalizing demands of Islam and these differences do create problems that we in the West have a hard time understanding. The nation-state in the Middle East, Iraq, for instance, just doesn’t seem to work. Some do, such as Turkey and Egypt, but not without some significant conflicts between the secular authorities and Islamic fundamentalists. 

Scruton digs more deeply into the contrast between Islamic law and the secular law of the West to show the different beliefs and assumptions of the two systems. This history and appreciation of the two contrasting legal and cultural systems gives the reader a much greater appreciation of the source of differences between our views of the world. Finally, Scruton has a chapter on globalization, but it’s mainly about the encroachment of a Western-dominated world into Islamic lands. For instance, Scruton, who has published extensively about aesthetics, writes about the destruction of traditional Islamic architecture in the name of modernizing cities. 

Scruton closes with this remark, which reveals a measured and thoughtful response to our predicaments: 

When people enjoy the benefits of citizenship they treat the world in an open and enterprising way; they become careless of the sacrifices on which sovereignty depends, and oblivious of the corrosive force of human contact. And this state of mind, which seems like good-natured toleration in the one who has succumbed to it, may be seen from outside as intolerable hubris, calling down judgment from the gods.

 Nevertheless, we are rational creatures, and nothing prevents us from thinking through alternatives to the habits that have placed us in so much danger. Unless we are prepared to do so, the idea of a “war against terrorism” makes little sense. Terrorism is not, after all, an enemy, but a method used by the enemy. The enemy is of two kinds: the tyrant dictator, and the religious fanatic whom the tyrant protects. To act against the first is feasible, if we are prepared to play by the tyrant’s rules. But to act against the second requires a credible alternative to the absolutes with which he conjures. It requires us not merely to believe in something, but to study how to put our beliefs into practice.

Scruton, Roger (2014-05-13). The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat (p. 161). Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Kindle Edition.

Therefore, if you’re interested in the particulars of regimes in the Middle East or the particulars of where terrorists come from, you should look elsewhere. But if you want an appreciation and understanding of fundamental differences about how the West and Islam view and work in the world, this is a well-considered effort to consider those issues.

A Couple of Trailers—Book Trailers: Kissinger & Fukuyama

I don't often write a review of a review or of a blog post based on an upcoming book, but I’m going to make an exception. Both Henry Kissinger and Francis Fukuyama have books coming out in September, and both will come to the top of my “to read” list. 

For many, including me, the name of Henry Kissinger conjures up a lot of contrary thoughts and ambiguity. Some think of him as amoral, others as immoral, and still others as the devil incarnate. Of course, he’s also a Nobel Peace Prize winner, so go figure. Without question, his tenure as National Security Advisor and later as Secretary of State in the Nixon and Ford Administrations provides plenty of reasons to question his judgment, not to mention the morality of his actions. But set aside that period of this life and consider the role that he played both before and after his time in office: that of historian and theoretician to international relations. (With Kissinger, the roles of historian and theoretician don’t seem at all separated, which I believe makes his work all the more compelling and insightful.) I first read Kissinger as an undergraduate when Professor David Schoenbaum assigned A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822 for his 19th Century Europe class. That book is a study of the Congress of Vienna and the effort led by Prince Metternich to establish a stable political order in Europe following the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars. Later, on my own, I read a large chunk of his memoir of the Nixon Administration, a large chunk of his book Diplomacy (quite intriguing), and the entirety of this On China, which I found informative and fascinating  (and which I’ve now got on deck to read again). As a scholar, Kissinger writes well and he has terrific insights. Thus I’m I ready—eager—to set aside doubts arising from my uncertainty about his actions as a statesman to appreciate his scholarship. (Great figures, whether judged good or ill, are rarely simple and never unalloyed.) Now past 90 years of age, he still garners respect. (Just look at his 90th birthday party list from 2013: the Clintons, John Kerry, Valery Giscard D’Estaing, Donald Rumsfeld, James Baker, George Shultz, and John McCain. None were political allies of Kissinger, but all came, I assume, came out of a sense of respect.)

A preview review of the book by Jacob Heilbrunn in the National Interest praises Kissinger’s upcoming World Order. According to Heilbrunn, Kissinger argues that the nation-state system of balance of power and interest politics established by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) remains relevant in the contemporary world. Kissinger is a master of this area of history (see his work Diplomacy for an existing example). In an era where China is on the rise and playing a larger role on the world stage; Russia remains an assertive—even aggressive—player; and the U.S., Japan, and Europe, all have significant and varying interests and roles to play, Kissinger’s insights will bear close consideration. Heilbrunn praises Kissinger for his lucid and incisive prose, and his use of diplomatic history, now often shunted aside in the study of IR (international relations). Along with examining the structures of international relations through the centuries, Kissinger also notes the importance of individuals, from Cardinal Richelieu to Metternich to Teddy Roosevelt, who ushered the U.S. on to the world stage. Of course, Woodrow Wilson and Richard Nixon receive consideration as two presidents who highlight the U.S. tension between idealism and realism in American foreign affairs. (Aside: Heilbrunn reports that Kissinger admires Nixon and offers the opinion that “Nixon’s solitary nature meant that he had read widely, a trait that Kissinger avers made him the best-prepared incoming president since TR on foreign policy.” Interesting angle.) 

The review essay is worth reading as a summary of what Kissinger has written and it provides a good summary of the history of his influence, especially within the context of the Republican Party. 

The other short piece that I read was by Francis Fukuyama. He had a new blog entry after about a year and an essay in Foreign Affairs, both based on parts of this forth coming Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy that will come out at the end of September. I’m embarrassed to report that I haven’t read volume one (encouragement from the Glamorous Nomad notwithstanding), but I plan to dive right into volume 2. His Foreign Affairs essay on the decline of American political institutions is insightful (and depressing). His updating of his mentor Samuel Huntington on political society will certainly prove thought provoking. I find Fukuyama one of the most insightful political commentators writing today. Like Kissinger, he comes out of the academy, but he's worked for the State Department and Rand Corporation, so he’s been in a position to influence events as well as write about them from the outside. Also, like Kissinger, he draws freely and extensively upon history in his analysis. History is the ultimate laboratory for social science experiments, and it provides much greater insight than modeling and theorizing can provide on their own. 

I’m looking forward to both of these books, and it’s great to have these previews to guide my way into them. Like a good movie trailer, they make me want to take in the whole feature. Get out the popcorn! (Well, no, too greasy on the pages—even electronic pages.)

The World Has Changed--And It Hasn't: Part 2

I hadn’t planned a follow-up to my most recent post, but reading today has added some thoughts and points of view worth sharing. 

Roger Cohen

Roger Cohen in NYT writes about the participation in ISIS by volunteers coming from Europe. He writes: 

More than 500, and perhaps as many as 800, British Muslims have headed for Syria and Iraq to enlist in the jihadi ranks. In France, that number stands at about 900. Two adolescent girls, 15 and 17, were detained last week in Paris and face charges of conspiring with a terrorist organization. The ideological appeal of the likes of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is intact. It may be increasing, despite efforts to build an interfaith dialogue, reach out to moderate Islam, and pre-empt radicalization.

Cohen quotes a Brit who works with those (men mostly—of course) who might make this jump: 

“One minute you are trying to pay bills, the next you’re running around Syria with a machine gun,” said Ghaffar Hussain, the managing director of the Quilliam Foundation, a British research group that seeks to tackle religious extremism. “Many young British Muslims are confused about their identity, and they buy into a narrow framework that can explain events. Jihadists hand them a simplistic narrative of good versus evil. They give them camaraderie and certainty. ISIS makes them feel part of a grand struggle.”

Anticipating what Roger Scruton has written (see below), Cohen states: 

Perhaps racked with historical guilt, European nations with populations from former colonies often seem unable to celebrate their values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Meanwhile, in the Arab world the central hope of the Arab Spring has been dashed: that more open and representative societies would reduce the frustration that leads to extremism.

Cohen concludes: 

[T]he deepest American and Western defeat has been ideological. As Hussain said, “If you don’t have a concerted strategy to undermine their narrative, their values, their worldview, you are not going to succeed. Everyone in society has to take on the challenge.”

So Cohen seems to conclude that we’re losing a battle for the hearts and minds of young men (mostly) who may have a connection (tenuous, as we’ll see below) to Islam. 

In this piece from TNR, writer Mehdi Hasan writes about the seeming weirdness of ISIS recruits and other would-be Islamic terrorists: 

Sarwar and Ahmed, both of whom pleaded guilty to terrorism offences last month, purchased Islam for Dummies and The Koran for Dummies. You could not ask for better evidence to bolster the argument that the 1,400-year-old Islamic faith has little to do with the modern jihadist movement. The swivel-eyed young men who take sadistic pleasure in bombings and beheadings may try to justify their violence with recourse to religious rhetoric— think the killers of Lee Rigby screaming “Allahu Akbar” at their trial; think of Islamic State beheading the photojournalist James Foley as part of its “holy war”—but religious fervour isn’t what motivates most of them.

Hasan continues: 

In 2008, a classified briefing note on radicalisation, prepared by MI5’s behavioural science unit, was leaked to the Guardian. It revealed that, “far from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practise their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and could ... be regarded as religious novices.” The analysts concluded that “a well-established religious identity actually protects against violent radicalisation,” the newspaper said.

For more evidence, read the books of the forensic psychiatrist and former CIA officer Marc Sageman; the political scientist Robert Pape; the international relations scholar Rik Coolsaet; the Islamism expert Olivier Roy; the anthropologist Scott Atran. They have all studied the lives and backgrounds of hundreds of gun-toting, bomb-throwing jihadists and they all agree that Islam isn’t to blame for the behaviour of such men (and, yes, they usually are men).

This means we have to think outside many simple parameters (“It’s Islam”) that seem so easy and direct but that simply wrong (because simple). Hasan quotes Atran: 

Atran pointed out in testimony to the US Senate in March 2010: “... what inspires the most lethal terrorists in the world today is not so much the Quran or religious teachings as a thrilling cause and call to action that promises glory and esteem in the eyes of friends, and through friends, eternal respect and remembrance in the wider world.” He described wannabe jihadists as “bored, under¬employed, overqualified and underwhelmed” young men for whom “jihad is an egalitarian, equal-opportunity employer ... thrilling, glorious and cool.”

Roger Scruton

Yesterday I got into reading Roger Scruton’s The West and the Rest: Globalization & the Terror Threat (2002). This heavy-duty philosopher (aesthetics, music, Spinoza, Kant, etc.) is also is an outspoken “conservative” in the Burkean tradition (he's not one of the “all Hayek, all day” stations), and he’s a fine essayist. In this book, he contrasts the doctrine and culture of Islam with those of the Greek, Roman, and Judeo-Christian West (many rivers flow in to the Western basin). He argues that the West has developed some fundamental tenants, especially since the Enlightenment, which sets it off from Islam. Some of the key differences go back much further, but because one can argue that the Enlightenment was the most significant change in Western culture in about two millennia, I think that Scruton rightly focuses on differences arising from the Enlightenment. For instance, that’s when Western Christianity—Protestant and Catholic—began to play a different role in public life. Scuton doesn't think that the West has done enough (in arugment) to defend its values and traditions in the face of criticisms and that this lack of an energetic defense only serves to inflame and energize would-be attackers.

What I get from Scruton (so far) focuses not so much on background of terrorists and would-be terrorists, as (for example) Atran does, but instead Scruton focuses on the high cultural differences, especially in politics and law. One might at first glance think that he contradicts those such as Atran cited in the TNR article by Hasan, but I don’t think so. What I think that the significant cultural differences establish is that immigrants to the West, especially from Islamic countries, may have a greater disjunction between their native culture (so defined by religion) and the culture that they find in the West. (Some other non-Western cultures, for instance, Chinese, would not suffer the same degree of culture shock.) Because of the depth of the difference, a deeper, more threatening sense of alienation can develop. Of course, this needn’t be true, as many from Islamic countries emigrate successfully to the West (U.S., U.K. Europe, Australia, etc.). But if alienation develops, as it can so easily in young males, then you have a recipe for disaster because of the compelling claims that they can recover from Islamic tradition. From reading today, one gets a sense of “cradle” Moslems prone to violence and steeped in fundamentalist Islamic culture are sought out by those who use Islam as a vehicle into a violent and totalizing movement.

 Thus, you have two different groups and sets of motivations to consider when thinking about how to counteract the threats that they pose.