Wednesday, September 23, 2020

Politics & Hypocrisy

Politics demands a great capacity for self-deception, which rescues the politician from hypocrisy. He can normally manage to believe what he is saying for the time it takes to say it. This gives him a certain sincerity even when he is saying opposite things to opposite people. Since he loves to be pleased, he tries to please people back. He genuinely dislikes disagreements with anyone. It interrupts the reciprocal laving of egos; it puts grit in the butter bath.

Garry Wills, Confessions of a Conservative (1979), p. 178

But in reality the best one can ever do with hypocrisy is take a stand for or against one kind or another, not for or against hypocrisy itself. We might regret the prevalence of hypocrisy, but if we want to do anything about it we have to get beyond generalised regret, and try instead to identify the different ways in which hypocrisy can be a problem.


Runciman, David Political Hypocrisy (2018) Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.

         . . . .  

Hypocrisy turns on questions of character rather than simply coincidence with the truth. Likewise, though hypocrisy will involve some element of inconsistency, it is not true that inconsistency is itself evidence of hypocrisy. People often do, and often should, change their minds about how to act, or vary their principles depending on the situation they find themselves in. It is not hypocrisy to seek special treatment for one’s own children—to arrive, say, in a crowded emergency room with an ailing child and demand immediate attention—though it may be unrealistic or even counter-productive to behave in this way; it is only hypocrisy if one has some prior commitment not to do so. It is the prior commitment not to be inconsistent, rather than the fact of inconsistency, that generates the conditions of hypocrisy. That, of course, is one reason why hypocrisy is such a problem for politicians. 

Id.  

. . . .

From one perspective the act of concealment makes things worse—it simply piles vice on top of vice, which is why hypocrites are often seen as wickeder than people who are simply, and openly, bad. But from another perspective the concealment turns out to be a form of amelioration—it is, in Rochefoucauld’s timeless phrase, “the tribute that vice pays to virtue.” Hypocrites who pretend to be better than they really are could also be said to be better than they might be, because they are at least pretending to be good. 

Id.

. . . . .

Once we acknowledge that some element of hypocrisy is inevitable in our political life, then it becomes self-defeating simply to try to guard against it. Instead, what we need to know is what sorts of hypocrites we want our politicians to be, and in what sorts of combinations. Do we want them to be hypocrites like us, so that they can understand us, or to be hypocrites of a different kind, so that they can manage our hypocrisy? Do we want them to be designing hypocrites, who at least know what they are doing, or do we want them to be more innocent than that? Do we want them to expose each other’s hypocrisy, or to ameliorate it? 

Id.

. . . .

Clearly, a line needs to be drawn somewhere between the hypocrisies that are unavoidable in contemporary political life, and the hypocrisies that are intolerable. But it is hard to see where.

Id.


Son, in politics you've got to learn that overnight chicken shit can turn to chicken salad.  

Lyndon B. Johnson (perhaps apocryphal)

I share all of the above quotes--and there must be thousands of more like them I could have cited--because I'm perplexed by the issue of hypocrisy and politics. Of course, on a basic level, the politician isn't always enamored of the colleague or voter or donator with whom she or he has to have a photo taken with, big beaming smile and all. They can't really think all of those babies are cute or all those chicken dinners really delicious. Of course not, and even those of us who aren't politicians engage in these venial hypocrisies on a regular basis. So, as David Runciman notes, it's not hypocrisy in general that we can rail against, it has to be certain type or level of hypocrisy--if this is the right word at all--that strongly disapprove of. 

And I have to admit that within certain limits or situations, I appreciate a degree of hypocrisy. Runciman cites the well-worn adage of Rouchcufould that hypocrisy is “the tribute that vice pays to virtue.” And I have to admit on the basis of this adage I've praised Richard Nixon as a better type of crook than Donald Trump because Nixon was at least a hypocrite. He at least tried to cover-up his wrong-doing, and his campaign theme and rhetoric (as opposed to his actions in office) were "bring us together" and other nobler sentiments. (N.B. Nixon was also a great deal smarter than Trump as a politician, as a statesman, and as the head of a government, although the bar of comparison has now been set ridiculously low by Trump.) Nixon was at least a hypocrite. One suspects, even with all of the spiders in his mind, that there was some sense of propriety, perhaps even shame, in Nixon, while Trump seems utterly without a sense of shame and immune to the opinion of others. Of course, these dynamics also play out in the actions of those around these two law-breaking, norm-destroying presidents. In 1974, Republican senators led by Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott and former presidential nominee Barry Goldwater went to Nixon and told him that he should resign because he would be removed from office if impeached. (Nixon resigned before he was impeached, as he certainly would have been had he decided not to resign.) It's hard to imagine from those who recall that time, but the public debate and the conduct of politics for the most part were in a better state under the hypocrite (and crook) Nixon than they are under Donald Trump, with his blatant scorn for law, norms, and principles. Chalk one up for hypocrisy.

Also, as Runciman also states, "though hypocrisy will involve some element of inconsistency, it is not true that inconsistency is itself evidence of hypocrisy. People often do, and often should, change their minds about how to act, or vary their principles depending on the situation they find themselves in. "

I don't think that this point can receive enough emphasis. We can and should and do change our minds--and so should politicians. Emerson--"A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds"--and economist Paul Samuelson--"Well when eve,nts change, I change my mind. What do you do?" (This quote is most often attributed to Keynes, but apparently this isn't correct.)  That politicians should and do change their minds makes them better, not worse, if they have sound grounds. That is, if they act on grounds other than deception and sheer expediency. However, the public is not quick to pick-up on such distinctions, and you will find politicians pilloried by a bamboozled electorate over changes of mind that were no more than parliamentary maneuvers. (Remember the ridicule aimed at John Kerry for his supposed "he was for it before he was against it" opinion about the Iraq War?) The public, if wise, would want elected leaders, especially legislators, who change positions as events--such as negotiations and novel incentives--change. But ask any experienced politician if she or he would want to try to finesse this point or educate the public about it, and I don't believe you'd find any takers. 

So now to the case in point, the most recent incident that has led to the concept and role of hypocrisy coming so loudly into my mind. I'm referring to the attitude of Republican senators on record stating that a Supreme Court vacancy shouldn't be filled in an election year. We have a large number of senators (all Republican) who've made statements to this effect. (The New York Times has conveniently cataloged their statements here.) And I've addressed this issue concerning my current Senator Cory Gardner (R-CO) and two senators from my native state of Iowa, Senators Charles Grassley and Joni Ernst. All of them have (as said of John Kerry) "flip-flopped" on this issue, to put in the kindest term possible. But because of the starkness of his statements, the brazenness of his reversal, and the convenience of Youtube, let's focus on Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC). Below are two clips of him, one from 2016 (during the refusal of the Republican Senate to consider the nomination Merrick Garland by President Obama) and the second came in 2018, during the Trump administration. 





(Staring at about the 21'30" mark for the second clip.)

Despite what he said in 2016 and in 2018, very soon after the death of Justice Ginsberg, Senator Graham announced that he would support Senate action on a replacement nomination by President Trump even though the nomination process is over and voting for president has begun in some jurisdictions. Graham stated: 

"After Kavanaugh, the rules have changed as far as I'm concerned," he told reporters, referring to the contentious confirmation for Justice Brett Kavanaugh. "We'll see what the market will bear if that ever happens."

Graham also said in a tweet on Saturday he "fully understands" Mr. Trump's desire to move quickly on filling the vacancy.

"I fully understand where President @realDonaldTrump is coming from," Graham wrote, referring to a tweet where Mr. Trump said Republicans had an "obligation" to fill the seat with "no delay."

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/lindsey-graham-indicates-he-supports-filling-ruth-bader-ginsburgs-seat-ahead-of-the-election/

N.B. The second Youtube clip posted above from The Atlantic Festival in 2018 occurred after the Kavanaugh nomination and hearings. In fact, if you, Kavanaugh hearing process was discussed at length in the immediately preceding portion of the conversation that I embedded above. 

So, is the change in position taken by Senator Graham (and representative of many of his Republican colleagues) hypocrisy or something else?  Does anyone contend that this is a fully justified, principled change in position? If it's hypocrisy, is it the venial kind or is it a more deadly sin?  If it's something more than hypocrisy, does it constitute a lie? Does it constitute an abuse of power? Or is it--or should it be--"just politics" where power (as control) is the entire game and the devil take the hindmost?  

I'm going to adjourn my essay at the enod of the paragraph and ask any reader who would kindly do so to weight in on this topic. I have a tolerant attitude toward most hypocrisy, including that of politicians. (My understanding and appreciation of American politics is greatly influenced by the brilliant early works of Garry Wills, political reporter-classicist par excellence, especially his Confessions of a Conservative (1979) quoted above and Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man (1970). Wills's arguments about elections, bureaucrats, do-gooders, good-doers, and politicians appreciate the political process, including the sometimes maddening foibles of politicians.) Thus, I need to determine how to characterize the actions of the Republican senators. Should I have believed Senators Grassley and Graham and the others? (Their excuses, disclaimers, and "events changed" arguments have all come post facto.) Should I--should all of us--become more cynical? How big a sucker was I to expect some principled consistency (assuming, as I do, that the excuses offered by the Senators are not principled but mere rhetorical figleaves). Do these actions help or hurt the democratic process? To what extent do these actions by these senators represent a degneration of the quality of the democratic process (or not)? Let me know your thoughts. How do we explain, justify, or condemn these positions? 

Thoughts of the Day: Wednesday 23 September 2020

Nota Bene: Today, I'll only quote from one piece of writing, the source of our "deeper dive" with Hannah Arendt. I'll be quoting again from Arendt's "Understanding & Politics," published in 1953 in Partisan Review. I'm jumping ahead a bit here, but in reviewing my notes, these remarks near the conclusion of the essay struck me as quite striking. I'll add some comments after the quotes: 


If we wish to translate the biblical language [King Solomon's prayer for an "understanding heart"] into terms that are closer to our speech (though hardly more accurate), we may call the faculty of imagination the gift of the “understanding heart.” In distinction from fantasy, which dreams something, imagination is concerned with the particular darkness of the human heart and the peculiar density which surrounds everything that is real. In distinction from fantasy, which dreams something, imagination is concerned with the particular darkness of the human heart and the peculiar density which surrounds everything that is real.
. . . .
True understanding does not tire of interminable dialogue and “vicious circles,” because it trusts that imagination eventually will catch at least a glimpse of the always frightening light of truth. To distinguish imagination from fancy and to mobilize its power does not mean that understanding of human affairs becomes “irrational.” On the contrary, imagination, as Wordsworth said, “is but another name for . . . clearest insight, amplitude of mind, / And Reason in her most exalted mood” (The Prelude, Book XIV, 190–92).
Imagination alone enables us to see things in their proper perspective, to be strong enough to put that which is too close at a certain distance so that we can see and understand it without bias and prejudice, to be generous enough to bridge abysses of remoteness until we can see and understand everything that is too far away from us as though it were our own affair.
. . . .
Without this kind of imagination, which actually is understanding, we would never be able to take our bearings in the world. It is the only inner compass we have. We are contemporaries only so far as our understanding reaches. If we want to be at home on this earth, even at the price of being at home in this century, we must try to take part in the interminable dialogue with the essence of totalitarianism.
Arendt, Hannah. Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954 (p. 322-323). Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. 
SNG: What caught my eye is Arendt's emphasis on "imagination" as an essential faculty of mind is so widely shared by other significant thinkers. Upon reading this, one thinks of Kant, Coleridge (who shares Kant as a common ancestor with Arendt), Owen Barfield, R.G. Collingwood, and the thinkers and commentary in Gary Lachman's Lost Knowledge of the Imagination. And this is a shortlist. All of these thinkers--and many others--realize that we can't gain understanding without the use of imagination. And we need imagination and understanding more than ever--even more than knowledge--as much as we sorely need further knowledge to address our current challenges.