Saturday, September 5, 2020

Thoughts of the Day: 5 September 2020


There are two distinct types of feedback processes: reinforcing and balancing. Reinforcing (or amplifying) feedback processes are the engines of growth. Whenever you are in a situation where things are growing, you can be sure that reinforcing feedback is at work. Reinforcing feedback can also generate accelerating decline—a pattern of decline where small drops amplify themselves into larger and larger drops, such as the decline in bank assets when there is a financial panic.
The rebirthing of the second circuit is (relatively) complete when the Bottom Dog subject begins to seek, sincerely (not hypocritically) to win the approval of the Top Dogs. This, of course, only begins as play-acting; the skilled brainwasher knows that, and does not really object. With subtle reinforcement the play-acting becomes more and more genuine. Edmund Burke noted long ago, and every Method Actor knows, that you cannot make three dramatic gestures of rage in a political speech, without beginning to feel some real rage.
A good traveler has no fixed plans and is not intent upon arriving. A good artist lets his intuition lead him wherever it wants. A good scientist has freed himself of concepts and keeps his mind open to what is. Thus the  Master is available to all people and doesn’t reject anyone. He is ready to use all situations and doesn’t waste anything. This is called embodying the light. What is a good man but a bad man’s teacher? What is a bad man but a good man’s job? If you don’t understand this, you will get lost, however intelligent you are. It is a great secret.

The Mysteries of the 3 September Quote Revealed--Who Is X?

 In completion of my 3 September quote of the unrevealed author and the unrevealed subject: 


X = Adolf Hitler

The author: Hannah Arendt, in her review of Hitler's Table Talk, written in 1951. 

And who else might it have been about? I will continue to leave that to your imagination. 

Friday, September 4, 2020

Thoughts of the Day: Friday 4 September 2020

 "Speaking is also a form of action."

— Hannah Arendt

"Loneliness is not solitude. Solitude requires being alone whereas loneliness shows itself most sharply in company with others." — Hannah Arendt

Asimov said that "science gathers knowledge faster than society gathers wisdom," and it applies all too well today. Society will never have shared opinions, but it must have shared facts!

--Garry Kasparov

It is also reasonably clear that the existing structure of international institutions is inadequate to provide sufficient levels of cooperation, on issues from the drug trade to financial regulation to climate change.
What happens in wars between the strong and the weak when the weak side does as David did and refuses to fight the way the bigger side wants to fight, using unconventional or guerrilla tactics? The answer: in those cases, the weaker party’s winning percentage climbs from 28.5 percent to 63.6 percent. To put that in perspective, the United States’ population is ten times the size of Canada’s. If the two countries went to war and Canada chose to fight unconventionally, history would suggest that you ought to put your money on Canada.
Scarcity is not just a physical constraint. It is also a mindset. When scarcity captures our attention, it changes how we think-whether it is at the level of milliseconds, hours, or days and weeks. By staying top of mind, it affects what we notice, how we weigh our choices, how we deliberate, and ultimately what we decide and how we behave.

Thursday, September 3, 2020

Thought of the Day--Special Edition! A Challenge! Thursday 3 September 2020

Today, let's have a bit of fun with a contest. The quote--only one--will be a bit longer today, but juicy, I assure you. And about this quote, I pose three questions: 

  1. About whom is this quote made? Where the subject's name was mention in the text, I have substituted 'X.' So, in other words, "who is X?" 
  2. In addition to guessing whom X is, whom else might X be than your guess (or knowing answer)? Suggest one or more persons besides your best guess (or knowing answer) about who also might fit the criteria for X. (The quote is not by X but it's about X.) Extra credit for justifying your answers! 
  3. Who wrote this about X? 
N.B. I have also provided alternative verb tenses to veil whether X is a contemporary or a historical figure. I am conceding, however, by keeping certain pronouns, that X is male. 

You can--if you wish--post your answers in the comments below or on the Facebook post of this blog. No cheating by using Google! 

Your prize? Accolades from me. A shout-out? Whatever, it's for fun--and edification. I will reveal the identity of X and the author of the piece quoted tomorrow in a post to follow this one. As to alternative identities of X, there is no single "right" answer (the piece was written about a single individual), but some answers will prove more imaginative and appropriately provocative and will be so judged. 

The quote: 

The problem of X’s charisma is relatively easy to solve. It is/was to a great extent identical with what [an observer] calls the “fanatical faith this man has/had in himself,” and it rests/rested on the well-known experiential fact that X must have realized early in his life, namely, that modern society in its desperate inability to form judgments will take every individual for what he considers himself and professes himself to be and will judge him on that basis. Extraordinary self-confidence and displays of self-confidence therefore inspire confidence in others; pretensions to genius waken the conviction in others that they are indeed dealing with a genius. This is merely the perversion of an old and justified rule of all good society according to which everyone has to be capable of showing what he is and of presenting himself in the proper light. The perversion occurs when the social role becomes, as it were, arbitrary, when it is completely separated from the actual human substance, indeed, when a role consistently played is unquestioningly accepted as the substance itself. In such an atmosphere any kind of fraud becomes possible because there appears to be no one at all left for whom the difference between fraud and authenticity matters in the least. People therefore fall prey to judgments apodictically expressed because the apodictic tone frees them from the chaos of an infinite number of totally arbitrary judgments. The crucial point is that not only is the apodictic quality of tone more convincing than the content of the judgment but also the content of the judgment, the object judged, becomes irrelevant. . . . . To assess correctly this phenomenon of charisma in X’s case we have to remind ourselves that in present-day society it is not really all that difficult to create an aura about oneself that will fool everyone—or just about everyone—who comes under its influence. In this respect X behaved no differently than have many less talented charlatans. It goes without saying that under these conditions the rule of a good upbringing that says one must not blow one’s own horn has to be ruthlessly put aside. The more that the vulgar practice of unbridled self-praise spreads in a society which for the most part still adheres to the rules of good upbringing, the more powerful its effect will be and the more easily that society can be convinced that only a truly “great man” who cannot be judged by normal standards could summon the courage to break rules as sacrosanct as those of good breeding. In other words, X holds/held a far greater fascination for generals and other members of good society than he did for the “old fighters” who, like him, came from the mob strata of society.
In the prevailing chaos that inability to form judgments created, however, X’s superiority went/goes considerably beyond the fascination, the mere “charisma,” that any charlatan can emanate. The awareness of the social possibilities that the modern inability to judge offered, and the ability to exploit them, are/were supported by the vastly more telling insight that in the modern world’s chaos of opinion the normal mortal is yanked about from one opinion to another without the slightest understanding of what distinguishes the one from the other. X knew from his own most personal experience what the maelstrom was like into which modern man is drawn and in which he changes his political or other “philosophy” from day to day on the basis of whatever options are offered him as he whirls helplessly about. He is himself that . . .  [news-follower] of whom he says that “in a city [in which] twelve [news sources] each report the same event differently … he will finally come to the conclusion that it is all nonsense.” What distinguished X from this . . .  [news-follower] and his desperation was/is simply that he had discovered one fine day that if you really hang onto any one of the current opinions and develop it with (as he was fond of saying) “ice-cold” consistency, then everything would somehow fall back into place again. X’s real superiority consists/consisted in the fact that under any and all circumstances he had an opinion and that his opinion always fit perfectly into his over-all “philosophy.” In this social context (and only in this context) superiority is indeed increased by fanaticism because obvious and demonstrable errors can no longer undermine it. What immediately reasserts itself after any demonstrated error is the fact that one not only has an opinion but also embraces that opinion and is therefore capable of judgment. And in politics, where one constantly has to act and therefore constantly has to make judgments, it is indeed altogether correct in a practical sense and more advantageous to reach any judgment and to pursue any course of action than not to judge and not to act at all.


Wednesday, September 2, 2020

Thoughts for the Day: Wednesday 2 September 2020

 Erich Fromm: Love is an art form.

Theodor Adorno: Fidelity to love is the only means we have to resistance. Walter Benjamin: We must love without hope. Hannah Arendt: Why is it so hard to love the world? W.H. Auden: We must love one another or die.

"...how vulnerable is the whole texture of facts in which we spend our daily life; it is always in danger of being perforated by single lies or torn to shreds by the organized lying of groups, nations, or classes..." Hannah Arendt

"Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever..." — Hannah Arendt

(All of the above from scholar Samantha Rose Hill via her Twitter feed: @Samantharhill)

Honor mattered because character mattered. And character mattered because the fate of the American experiment with  republican government still required virtuous leaders to survive. Eventually, the United States might develop into a nation of laws and established institutions capable of surviving corrupt or incompetent public officials. But it was not there yet. It still required honorable and virtuous leaders to endure. Both Burr and Hamilton came to the interview because they wished to be regarded as part of such company.
“For there was no doubt in Bundy’s mind about his ability to handle... the world. The job was not just a happenstance thing; he had, literally and figuratively, been bred for it, or failing this, Secretary of State. He was the brightest light in that glittering constellation around the President, for if those years had any central theme, if there was anything that bound the men, their followers and their subordinates together, it was the belief that sheer intelligence and rationality could answer and solve anything.”

Reflections on Gary Lachman's "Trickle Down Metaphysics: From Nietzsche to Trump"

 I posted the following as a "comment" (one heck of a long comment) on Gary Lachman's website where he posted "Trickle Down Metaphysics: From Nietzche to Trump." He also posted it at Academia.edu, a website for posting academic papers. Take your pick: Word doc or HTML. Either way, it's an important read. I recommend you pick your format and read Lachman's piece first. 

Gary, 

Thank you for posting your excellent paper, "Trickle Down Metaphysics: From Nietzche to Trump". As usual, you've provided an excellent map of some intellectual high-country for those of us like me who've not explored it in the detail that you have. In this, your account prods me toward wanting to explore more of this terrain, although I must say that you only reinforced my standing conclusion that it's not worth the coin to attempt to summit Mt. Heidegger and some of the other terrain that you discuss. But regardless of my attitude toward some of the thinkers that you discuss, I found your paper helpful and provocative. As to the provocative (in the good sense), I'd like to share some random thoughts and observations that occurred to me as a result of reading this paper, although some of these thoughts--perhaps more in the way of hunches or suspicions--have been brewing in the back of my mind for some time. 

The most prominent thought that your article arises from the implication in your article that certain trains of thought can be traced from Nietzche to Heidegger to Sartre to Derrida to Trump, although you--I'm sure accurately--point-out that Trump probably hasn't the foggiest about who most of these individuals are or what ideas they propounded. While some of the influences in this chain are unquestionable and well-documented (such as Nietzche on Heidegger and Heidegger on Sartre), the question arises for me about the extent that these highly literate, sophisticated (and sometimes obtuse) high-culture ideas exert an influence on popular culture down to the rungs at which Donald Trump, Trumpists, and his supporters reside. I fear that those of us who explore and value ideas may overestimate their importance in the wider world. And yet, all humans are full of ideas of one sort or another, many of which have no doubt filtered down from "on high." For example, the "literary elite" who wrote the Gospels and other writings in the New Testament and then Christian writers and theologians on down through history provide compelling examples of the power of ideas filtered down to the less educated public. 

I don't subscribe to the Marxist contention that all ideas are ideologies that arise from the economic substructure of society, Instead, it seems to me that there is a dance undertaken between the world of ideas and the material world--economic, social, and political--in which these ideas are spread like seeds. Some sprout while others seem to wither or remain dormant for long periods. Indeed, much of your career and efforts have been spent exploring the Secret History of Consciousness," The Secret Teachers of the Western World, Caretakers of the Cosmos, and The Lost Knowledge of the Imagination. Why did these many ideas, which admittedly run from the far-out-there to the mainstream, not create a greater effect upon society and popular thought? While I don't find the concept of "causes" in history very useful (too mechanical, too certain, too direct), I do contend that we can identify tributaries that contribute to the flow of history, the rivers of historical events and realities. In this river metaphor, the terrain, the mountains, plains, forests, and so on, constitute the material and social base through which streams of ideas must flow; some flows are cut off from the mainstream, creating solitary lakes, perhaps deep and beautiful, but outside of the flow of time. Other ideas end up in backwaters that stagnate in whirlpools that go nowhere until some random event--an earthquake, a storm--releases those waters to flow back into the mainstream. Or, in some cases, the rain never comes and those isolated ideas simply dry-up into oblivion. 

Thus, I think that we must be careful not to blame the train of thought that you've identified for Trump and Trumpism. That these ideas in some ways help water the trends and instincts that guide Trump and his followers (we can't really contend that he has "ideas" can we?), the stream of contribution is probably quite small. Trump has many forebearers: tyrants, dictators, demagogues, authoritarians, fascists, and grifters. He draws on them not so much for their ideas but instinctively, as a huckster-salesman, a flim-flam man models himself on the traits of others of his ilk. Indeed, I suggest that we all should give thanks daily that this man is so politically naive and ignorant. A person with a will to political power and a modicum of knowledge about politics combined with Trump's refined reptilian instincts would prove a much greater disaster. Someone with ideas--even crack-pot ideas--like white supremacy, anti-Semitism, or religious fundamentalisms--could (and have) done much, much worse to the world that Trump has (so far, anyway). Trump and his camp followers aren't especially new or unique in American history, or in the history of the wider world. So why did his "ideas" (such as they are) catch on now? Here I think that we have to look at the current environment, economic, social, and political, that allows such a deadly virus of ideas (or more accurately, attitudes, prejudices, cliches) to spread sufficiently to allow this man to gain and keep power. Here's where I think that developments such as economic inequality, fear of loss of status, wide-spread economic insecurity, and cultivated resentments all come into play (and this is just to round-up the usual suspects). Also, we should note that the themes and appeals that Trump and Trumpists play upon, such as racism, white supremacy, and resentment of elites, have existed within the U.S. for most of its history. Not all of U.S. history, not everywhere, not everyone, but nevertheless there, sometimes dormant, sometimes active. Yes, like a virus that we can't seem to irradicate but against which we must develop herd immunity. 

Now for a few nit-picky items. 

You identify Norman Vincent Peale, as you did in Dark Star Rising, as an influence on Trump. (And for anyone else reading this, if you haven't read this Dark Star Rising, you really should.) Peale is "the power of positive thinking" and Trump--at least at his father's behest--did attend Peale's church and no doubt heard Peale preach his blend of New Thought positive thinking and Christianity. And while New Thought, with its emphasis on the imagination and creating reality certainly could have influenced Trump's outlook, the New Thought movement on the whole, and Peale in particular (I believe), remained close to traditional Christianity and traditional values. These values would have put a brake--if he was really listening--on Donald's less seemly (i.e., greedy, lusty) aspirations. (Query: Did Trump ever have any admirable aspirations? Anyone? Anyone?)  The true artist of the dark arts that effected Trump was Roy Cohn, the man who creates one degree of separation between Trump and Joe McCarthy. Cohn was a seething bag of contradictions and a man who thrived in the underside world of politics, money, and fame and who provides the template for Trump's modus operandi. 

Also, referring back to Heidegger, you mentioned his student and lover, Hannah Arendt. I admit that I've held an intellectual crush on Hannah Arendt since I was introduced to her work as an undergraduate (oh, so many years ago!). Arendt was a student of Heidegger, and for a period, his lover. But they parted ways, both personally--and more importantly--in their thinking. Arendt was Jewish, and Heidegger did have a period of infatuation with the Nazi cause in the early 1930s while Arendt was forced to flee Germany after having been arrested early in the Hitler regime. Arendt went her own way in the ensuing years and had no contact with Heidegger until after the war. Even then, she remained respectful but wary. After leaving her studies (and personal relationship) with Heidegger, she studied with Karl Jaspers, another German existentialist, although much less well known than Heidegger. Arendt never missed an opportunity to praise Jaspers and his influence upon her. Although I've not explored his thought, based on her high praise, and my high estimation of her, I suspect that exploring Jasper's work might prove worth the time and effort. 

But all of the above is not the most important point about Hannah Arendt. Unlike Heidegger, whose head remained in the clouds (or buried in arcane poetry), Arendt went on the become one of the most--and in my opinion--the most important political theorist of the twentieth-century. Unlike Heidegger, Arendt used her career to delve deeply into the political world and to provide a vision of politics that provides some dignity to this most human endeavor. (after having plumbed the depths of totalitarianism, a new phenomenon in politics that arose in the twentieth-century). And while Arendt doesn't make for light or easy reading--I think of reading her as reading by lightning flashes of insight--she's not the convoluted writer and obtuse thinker that Heidegger is noted for Being. And in the age of Trump, there is no single thinker that we can turn to for more insight and guidance than Arendt. If we can think of Heidegger as a Trump-precursor or enabler, we can think of Arendt as the anti-Trump, the inoculation that we so desperately need. 

I also want to note that your article addresses only continental thinkers. Where are the Brits and their English-speaking off-spring? My conjecture is that such an inquiry shows that English-speaking philosophy, on the whole (and with a lot of help from the Austrians), became rather shallow with their "realism," "logical positivism," "analytic philosophy," and "ordinary language " takes upon philosophy. Not that these endeavors had no value or purpose, but these developments were aimed short and small, concerned more with the technical, the empirical, and the quotidian. Reading much of English-speaking philosophy for succor and insight during the twentieth-century would be like anticipating a high-tech weapons display and getting only firecrackers. But of course, my genealization is not universally true, and as the realist-logical positivist-analytical-linguistic analysis branch was coming into ascendency, there were others outside of this trend, such as Samuel Alexander, Alfred North Whitehead, Michael Oakshott, and my personal favorite, R.G. Collingwood. Collingwood is sometimes classed as the last of the British idealists (Green Bosanquet, Bradley), but this inaccurate, as Collingwood made quite clear to "Ryle" in an exchange of letters about an article in which Gilbert Ryle described Collingwood as an "idealist." Indeed, Collingwood is hard to classify--and the more power to him for it. He left no school of thought, but his mind ranged widely and with great insight. He's best known (and rightly so) for his work in the philosophy of history, but his work also addressed ethics, politics, metaphysics, and art (including language) in useful and imaginative ways. The final work published before his untimely death at age 53 in 1943, was The New Leviathan, a work about politics built from the ground-up modeled on (but not so pessimistic as) the Hobbes original. It was a work intended to provide an intellectual grounding for what the Allies were fighting for and against in fascism. Like Arendt, Collingwood provides guidance and insight into our time of troubles. (For an initial (and as yet uncompleted) comparison of Collingwood and Arendt, go here

I'll conclude these reflections with a "what if?" reference, and how the flow of ideas might have taken a different course. Ray Monk, a biographer of Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, and J. Robert Oppenheimer, wrote an insightful and tantalizing piece about Collingwood and what might have transpired in the world of philosophy--and the analytical versus continental divide in philosophy--had Collingwood been able to continue is work and remained in his influential position at Oxford (where he was succeeded by Gilbert Ryle.) One can't argue that had Collingwood lived long enough to complete all his projects and to continue to explore his thoughts that the world, even the world of philosophy, would have now been all hunky-dory, but . . . . what might have been is always tantalizing. But to borrow a rare coherent thought, "it is what it is." But at least we have thinkers like Collingwood, Arendt, and Lachman (and those he champions), to provide us guidance, the self-knowledge of history, with which we can light our way. 

Tuesday, September 1, 2020

Thoughts for the Day: Tuesday 1 September 2020

 

“Practical men,” supposedly said John Maynard Keynes, this century’s most influential economist, “are usually slaves of some defunct economist.”
It is not the past as such that is the object of historical knowledge, but the past in the form of present evidence.
I am ashamed to think how easily we capitulate to badges and names, to large societies and dead institutions.
Wilson’s Outsiders are individuals who occasionally worked well, with the result that they perceived the self-evident meaningfulness of existence. The problem was—is—that they didn’t know how to perceive it at will.
The reality of time, novelty, and change; the persistence of particularity; the intrinsic, constitutive nature of relationships; the perspectival nature of experience—taken together, these several presuppositions that ground the Daoist worldview and provide Daoism with its interpretative context set the terms for optimizing our experience.

Monday, August 31, 2020

Thoughts for the Day: 31 August 2020

 

There have always been people who saw that the true ‘unit of thought’ was not the proposition but something more complex in which the proposition served as answer to a question. Not only Bacon and Descartes, but Plato and Kant, come to mind as examples. When Plato described thinking as a ‘dialogue of the soul with itself’, he meant (as we know from his own dialogues) that it was a process of question and answer, and that of these two elements the primacy belongs to the questioning activity, the Socrates within us.
"...the lie did not creep into politics by some accident of human sinfulness. Moral outrage, for this reason alone, is not likely to make it disappear." Hannah Arendt
The rise and fall of the dukes of Buckingham and de Guise graphically illustrates the dangers of extreme inequality for the social order. Rampant inequality feeds into the perception of the extant social order as unjust and illegitimate, and creates excellent breeding conditions for the rise of revolutionary ideologies. In the early modern period, these ideologies took the religious form. Later, the dominant revolutionary ideologies were nationalistic and Marxist. Today, we are seeing the rise of religious-based revolutionary ideologies again, such as the Wahhabism. There are huge differences between the English Puritans, the French Jacobins, the Russian Bolsheviks, and the Islamic Al Qaida, but there is at least one common thread running through all these ideologies and movements associated with them—a burning desire for social justice.
"Political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind." ― George Orwell
"The result of a consistent and total substitution of lies for factual truth is not that the lie will now be accepted as truth and truth be defamed as a lie, but that the sense by which we take our bearings in the real world ... is being destroyed." Hannah Arendt

Sunday, August 30, 2020

Thoughts for the Day: Sunday 30 August 2020

It [the "fall" of China to the Communists] caught this country psychologically unprepared. It was natural for a confused country to look for scapegoats and conspiracies; it was easier than admitting that there were things outside your control and that the world was an imperfect place in which to live.
The further back you can reach in imagination, the more extended you become.
Whether we are bound by the original understanding depends on whether we conclude, on principle, that we should be bound by the original understanding. Those who reject originalism believe that our constitutional order is far better if we conclude that we are not bound. They believe that at least with respect to individual rights (where circumstances and values change), and perhaps with respect to constitutional structure more broadly (where again, circumstances and values change), we do much better to follow the text and pay respectful attention to the original understanding—without being rigidly constrained by it. In my view, that’s Justice Kennedy’s best argument. He is claiming that our system of rights is better if we take the Constitution to set out broad principles whose particular content changes over time.
They all follow these three Socratic steps: 1) Humans can know themselves. We can use our reason to examine our unconscious beliefs and values. 2) Humans can change themselves. We can use our reason to change our beliefs. This will change our emotions, because our emotions follow our beliefs. 3) Humans can consciously create new habits of thinking, feeling and acting. These three steps are, in essence, what CBT teaches.

There are a host of other differences, but they can effectively be boiled down to two things: fear and reality. Amateurs believe that the world should work the way they want it to. Professionals realize that they have to work with the world as they find it.

— The Difference Between Amateurs and Professionals (Courtesy of Farnum Street blog newsletter)

Saturday, August 29, 2020

Thoughts for the Day: Saturday 29 August 2020

 

Charismatic authority is constructive only when it builds order from chaos. When it tries to supersede continuing forms of authority, it destabilizes despite itself. The more insistent became Kennedy’s personal call to follow him, the less compelling was any order that did not issue directly from him. The nontransferability of such personal authority was evident in the refusal of many Kennedy followers to treat President Johnson as fully legitimate. Johnson’s authority came from procedures and legal precedent, not from the personal charisma of his predecessor.
...on April 11, 1951, President Truman relieved MacArthur of his military command for making statements contradicting the administration’s policy. On substance, Truman stressed the containment concept: the major threat was the Soviet Union, whose strategic goal was the domination of Europe. Hence fighting the Korean War to a military conclusion, even more extending it into China, was, in the words of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, a combat leader in the war against Germany, “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”
Though none of us is responsible for the misfortunes that befall us, we are, thankfully, responsible for how we use those misfortunes. We cannot alter past events, it’s true. Not having been responsible for them, we cannot take responsibility for them. But we are responsible for the effect they have upon us—for the meaning we assign to them and the way we remember them. And we can learn and grow from them.
“It is of the first importance...not to allow your judgment to be biased by personal qualities...The emotional qualities are antagonistic to clear reasoning. I assure you that the most winning woman I ever knew was hanged for poisoning three little children for their insurance-money, and the most repellant man of my acquaintance is a philanthropist who has spent nearly a quarter of a million upon the London poor.” (Holmes; The Sign of the Four)
“If this were so; if the desert were 'home'; if our instincts were forged in the desert; to survive the rigours of the desert - then it is easier to understand why greener pastures pall on us; why possessions exhaust us, and why Pascal's imaginary man found his comfortable lodgings a prison.”

Friday, August 28, 2020

Thoughts of the Day: Friday 28 August 2020

 

If you have a seemingly unsolvable problem forget about it. If you wish, imagine you have a note with your problem written on it. Next imagine you put it in a bottle and throw it behind you 'into your subconscious.' Get on with your life and sooner or later the solution will present itself when you least expect. Relax. The subconscious/unconscious is fully capable of solving problems when you focus on something else. It doesn't need the help of the conscious mind which is far too limited for such a task.
“Never has our future been more unpredictable, never have we depended so much on political forces that cannot be trusted to follow the rules of common sense and self-interest—forces that look like sheer insanity.” Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism
“The truth doesn’t change according to our ability to stomach it emotionally.” - Flannery O’Connor ​​
If it is true that love is the pursuit in another of qualities we lack in ourselves, then in our love of someone from another country, one ambition may be to weld ourselves more closely to values missing from our own culture.


Shar

The pragmatists wanted a social organism that permitted a greater (though by no means unrestricted) margin for difference, but not just for the sake of difference, and not even because they thought principles of love and fairness required it. They wanted to create more social room for error because they thought this would give good outcomes a better chance to emerge. They didn’t just want to keep the conversation going; they wanted to get to a better place.

Thursday, August 27, 2020

Thoughts of the Day: Thursday 27 August 2020

 "A million years ago, during the George W. Bush administration, a White House official dismissively told journalist Ron Suskind that people like Suskind lived in “the reality-based community,” meaning that they believed solutions to the nation’s problems came from studying reality and finding answers. “That's not the way the world really works anymore,” the official told Suskind. “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality…. We're history's actors...and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.”

--Heather Cox Richardson. (N.B. Not all thoughts offered here are those that I agree with but sometimes "bad thoughts" (like examples of hubris) can spur deeper and, one hopes, better thoughts. 


In many indigenous societies, the deeper instructive and affective connections skip a generation. Since both grandparents and grandchildren are partly marginalized, the young fantast joins the old eccentric against a common opponent, the adult generation between them.

All our historical sources are based in this way on testimony: all testimony tells us not what happened but what its author wanted us to believe, or wanted to believe himself. In this way the uncertainty of history is contrasted with the certainty of perception and memory. But neither the criticism nor the contrast is well founded.
"Under conditions of terror most people will comply but some people will not…" — Hannah Arendt
"Before mass leaders seize the power to fit reality to their lies, their propaganda is marked by its extreme contempt for facts as such, for in their opinion fact depends entirely on the power of man who can fabricate it." ― Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism

Wednesday, August 26, 2020

Thoughts of the Day: Wednesday 26 August 2020

 “Never let yourself be persuaded that any one Great Man, any one leader, is necessary to the salvation of America. When America consists of one leader and 158 million followers, it will no longer be America.” 

--Dwight D. Eisenhower

Above all, don’t lie to yourself. The man who lies to himself and listens to his own lie comes to such a pass that he cannot distinguish the truth within him, or around him, and so loses all respect for himself and for others.
In Secular Cycles (2009), the Russian historian Sergey Nefedov and I have examined in detail eight such waves of instability, brought on by the loss of cooperation: the civil wars of the late Roman Republic and the collapse of Roman Empire, the Hundred Years War and the War of the Roses in medieval England and France, the French War of Religion, the English Civil War, the Time of Troubles in Russia, and the Russian Revolution and Civil War that ended the Romanov dynasty. In each case, we found that unraveling cooperation was a lead indicator of social collapse.
So self-betrayal —this act of violating my own sensibilities toward another person—causes me to see that person or persons differently, and not only them but myself and the world also. When I ignore a sense to apologize to my son, for example, I might start telling myself that he’s really the one who needs to apologize, or that he’s a pain in the backside, or that if I apologize, he’ll just take it as license to do what he wants.

Wednesday, August 12, 2020

Collingwood's The Idea of History: A Reader's Guide by Peter Johnson

 


Collingwood in summary and in-depth


A preliminary observation: reading R.G. Collingwood is not a chore; in fact, it's a pleasure. Collingwood made a point of making his work accessible, and he succeeded. He addressed the issue of writing style in his Essay on Philosophical Method, where he argues that philosophy needn't--shouldn't--be difficult to read and fathom. Now, having read all of his major works at least once, I can attest to his writing acumen. But, make no mistake, what Collingwood writes requires close attention and a determined effort on the part of the reader to match Collingwood's mind. And he wrote a lot. The Oxford paperback copy of The Idea of History (rev. ed.) runs to 496 pages of text. In such a case, a guide can prove quite useful; someone who identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the book's arguments in a succinct and organized manner. Peter Johnson's Collingwood's The Idea of History: A Reader's Guide does just this, and by doing so, he provides an indispensable guide for anyone wanting a better grasp of Collingwood's thought about history as a discipline. 

Johnson's book only addresses Collingwood's The Idea of History and related texts in the revised edition of IH (OUP, 1993), not the entire body and development of Collingwood's thought. Johnson's text is relatively short at 196 pages, which includes a glossary of terms. Collingwood's terms, like "re-enactment," "encapsulation," and "inside/outside," for instance, are not terribly difficult to comprehend, but Collingwood deploys these terms in very specific ways, so the glossary proves useful. Indeed, the glossary defines its terms by quoting Collingwood directly. Johnson also provides a very detailed bibliography ("Reading Guide") of secondary works, both in general and relating to specific topics. This work was published in 2013, so the bibliography and reference to secondary works are reasonably up-to-date and quite thorough. 

The best aspect of this book, among its many merits, come from Johnson's splendid job of laying out Collingwood's main ideas with deftness and economy. He mixes quotes from Collingwood with his own concise summaries and comments about Collingwood's arguments. He also addresses criticisms of Collingwood's positions with the same sense of thoroughness and with an admirable degree of impartiality. Johnson (who's written an early book on Collingwood) is obviously an admirer, but he also sees the weaknesses or points of contention raised by other qualified readers. Collingwood, a careful and precise thinker, doesn't need a great deal of help in defense, although his inability to oversee the publication of IH (published posthumously) and his other ideas about history in the manner in which he planned, did leave some uncertainties and ambiguities about his positions, although the discovery and release of previously unpublished works, such as Collingwood's draft of The Principles of History (1999), have done much to alleviate this problem. 

The only slight criticism I have of Johnson's work is that he doesn't address Collingwood's use of res gestae, which I believe is necessary to fully understand--or at least not misunderstand--Collingwood's contention that "all history is the history of thought." It seems that some readers of Collingwood, including some otherwise perceptive and sympathetic, come to the conclusion that "all history is the history of thought" means that history is only a matter of intellectual history or the history of ideas. But this is not so, as Collingwood's use of res gestae demonstrates. Older lawyers (like me) will recognize the term res gestae is a part of the phrase the "res gestae exception to the rule against hearsay." The literal translation is "thing done." In short, Collingwood acknowledges that "things done" reflect the thought of the actor and therefore provide evidence of the actor's thought. "Thought" as Collingwood uses it in IH isn't limited to formal thinking, concepts, or such, but the everyday workings of the human mind as it attempts to solve problems and take action. Collingwood first references res gestae in IH here: 

What kind of things does history find out? I answer, res gestae: actions of human beings that have been done in the past. Although this answer raises all kinds of further questions many of which are controversial, still, however they may be answered, the answers do not discredit the proposition that history is the science of res gestae, the attempt to answer questions about human actions done in the past.

Collingwood, R. G.. The Idea of History. Albion Press. Kindle Edition. 

In short, res gestae are those thoughts that humans have turned into actions. Thus, the scope of human history as Collingwood defines it consists of those thoughts that have been turned into actions as established by evidence available in the present. The wishes, daydreams, private, unrecorded thoughts, sensations, perceptions, and emotions that leave no mark in the world (via some res gestae) are not a part of history as Collingwood defines it because these unrecorded or unacted upon thoughts leave no traces in the present, although such states of mind certainly existed in the past. Johnson spends some time addressing Collingwood's exclusion of emotions from history, as emotions serve as the fuel of human action. However, Collingwood is not quite as dogmatic and abrupt in his distinction between "thought" and "emotions" as he may seem in IH. In his Principles of Art Collingwood considers the emotions more thoroughly and with, I think, a greater appreciation of the sliding scale in the mind between emotion and thought that binds them together in some measure. 

In sum, Peter Johnson has written his own "indispensable" guide to Collingwood's The Idea of History, one of the seminal works--perhaps the seminal work--about history written in the twentieth century. To return to the beginning, there's no compelling reason not to read Collingwood's book, but then to experience it again with the aid of an accomplished and informed guide is a genuine boon. I appreciate Collingwood's masterpiece even more after having considered it again with Johnson's guidance. 

sng
12 August 2020