Black & Bobbitt: "High Crimes & Misdemeanors"

“Treason” and “bribery” are crimes, whether committed by the president or by anyone else. Is the meaning of the phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” limited to ordinary crimes? Can a president lawfully be impeached and removed only for conduct which would also be punishable crime for anybody? Some have contended for this interpretation. It would be easeful to be able to adopt it, because the vague phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” would thus be lent all the precision of the statute book; agonized attempts properly to limit it, while at the same time leaving it properly ample scope, would be avoided. But I cannot think it remotely possible that this interpretation is right.

Black, Charles L., Jr. & Bobbitt, Philip, Impeachment: A Handbook, New Edition (pp. 30-31). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.

Impeachment: Tribe on the Dershowitz Argument

It's time to get back to impeachment.

Below is an article debunking the claim by Trump's celebrity defense lawyer, Alan Dershowitz, who argues that an actual law must have been broken by the President to justify removal from office. Wrong, as Laurence Tribe, of Harvard University Law School, and perhaps the foremost constitutional scholar during my time as a lawyer, argues. BTW, Tribe's argument accords with that his current Harvard colleague Cass Sunstein (CITIZENS GUIDE TO IMPEACHMENT) and with Black & Bobbitt's IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK, NEW EDITION, which I've quoted at length in earlier posts on the topic of impeachment.

Bogus arguments for a bogus client.

They should not be allowed to mislead the American public or the senators weighing his fate.

WASHINGTONPOST.COM

Opinion | Trump’s lawyers shouldn’t be allowed to use bogus legal arguments on impeachment

They should not be allowed to mislead the American public or the senators weighing his fate.

Better Know the Impeachment Process 12.18.19 "High Crimes & Misdemeanors, Ex Post Facto, & Bill of Attainder"

Now we come to the heart of the standard for impeachment: "treason, bribery, and high crimes & misdemeanors." I'm going to skip over treason and bribery for now and move to the third test, certainly the broadest standard and one that is much less apparent than issues of treason and bribery. Black writes about the decision to use this phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" at the Constitutional Convention: 

Mason’s ready substitution of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” indicates that he thought (and no voice was raised in doubt) that this new phrase would satisfactorily cover “many great and dangerous offences” not reached by the words “treason” and “bribery”; its coverage was understood to be broad. 

Black, Charles L., Jr.. Impeachment (pp. 27-28). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition. 

But a wide-open and general term could run afoul of the abhorrence among the Founders about bills of attainder and ex post facto (after the fact) laws. In other words, making something illegal after it's done. The Constitution specifically prohibits bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. About this, Black writes: 

When a congressman says, in effect, that Congress is entirely free to treat as impeachable any conduct it desires so to treat, he (or she) is giving a good textbook definition of a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law, rolled into one. Our Framers abhorred both these things, and we have never wavered from that abhorrence. It cannot be right for Congress to act toward the president as though these prohibitions did not exist. There may be no way to keep Congress from violating their letter or spirit, but the conscientious congressman has to feel them, in spirit at least, as bounding and confining the operation of the vague words, “high Crimes and Misdemeanors. 

I say “in spirit,” because the letter of these clauses cannot always apply. As pointed out above, in connection with the question of criminal character of the impeachment proceeding, the words “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” are themselves too vague to satisfy constitutional standards of reasonably clear warning, in criminal statutes as applied in the ordinary courts; in this technical sense, the application of the quoted phrase to concrete cases must often be “ex post facto” in practical effect. But the spirit and equity of the bill of attainder and ex post facto clauses can to a large extent be followed if we treat as impeachable those offenses, and only those, that a reasonable man might anticipate would be thought abusive and wrong, without reference to partisan politics or differences of opinion on policy. The approximation of this result necessitates exploration of some further issues.

Id. pp. 29-30. 

Better Know the Impeachment Process 12.17.19 "Congress & Not the Courts Control" *& "Jobs for Lawyers"

The Final Responsibility of Congress

We are used to confiding (or to imagining we confide) all constitutional questions to the courts. I shall later maintain that “judicial review” has no part to play in impeachment proceedings. For now, it should be briefly pointed out that, if I am right, then Congress, in acting on the matters just discussed and on those to be discussed in the next chapter, rests under the very heavy responsibility of determining finally some of the weightiest of constitutional questions, as well as a great many important and difficult questions of procedure. For this purpose, and in this context, we have to divest ourselves of the common misconception that constitutionality is discussable or determinable only in the courts, and that anything is constitutional which a court cannot or will not overturn. We ought to understand, as most senators and congressmen understand, that Congress’s responsibility to preserve the forms and the precepts of the Constitution is greater, rather than less, when the judicial forum is unavailable, as it sometimes must be. 

Black, Charles L., Jr. & Bobbitt, Philip, Impeachment: A Handbook, New Edition (pp. 22-23). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.  

The Place of Lawyers 

Impeachment is a matter of law, foursquare and all the way, and lawyers must run the process, as surely as doctors must run the operating room. The Congress can get plenty of lawyers, and the money to pay them with. The position of the president is more problematic. Some may think that it is wrong for public funds to go to the financing of the defense of an impeached president, or of one threatened with impeachment. Yet, if we turn the question around and look at it from another side, do we want the outcome of this most important of proceedings ever to be affected by the president’s lack of adequate legal help? We must understand, also, that the participating lawyers are advocates, whose job is to take a side and present it with skill and vigor. Our entire legal system bets a great deal on the proposition that this “adversary” system is the least imperfect way to develop all the truth; the corollary is that we must look on partisanship not as an evil but as a part of the system’s working. No one, including the president, can be treated lawfully if he is not adequately represented by counsel committed to him. Intemperate public attacks on lawyers, for the positions they take as advocates, are really attacks on our adversary system of justice. Such attacks are particularly surprising when mounted by other lawyers while legal proceedings are pending. 

Id., p. 23.  

Better Know the Impeachment Process 12.14.19 "Hearsay at Trial"

One of the issues (faux issues, really) raised by Republicans against the use of "hearsay" may come up in the Senate trial also. Given the strategy that the White House and the Senate leadership are planning, to minimize any evidence at trial at all, we can expect a lot of "hearsay." But should that bother us? Black argues not, and I'm inclined to agree, although to assume that members of the current Senate are more prudent and insightful about the credibility of evidence strikes me as--well--a stretch. Here's what Black says on the subject: 

In an ordinary trial, for example, we exclude what we call “hearsay” evidence—testimony by one witness that another person, not a witness, told the witness that something had happened. We exclude evidence of the defendant’s character, unless he himself seeks affirmatively to establish his good character. And so on through a considerable range of technicality. Here, I think, the sensible answer comes clear. These technical rules of evidence were elaborated primarily to hold juries within narrow limits. They have no place in the impeachment process. Both the House and the Senate ought to hear and consider all evidence which seems relevant, without regard to technical rules. Senators are in any case continually exposed to “hearsay” evidence; they cannot be sequestered and kept away from newspapers, like a jury. If they cannot be trusted to weigh evidence, appropriately discounting for all the factors of unreliability that have led to our keeping some evidence away from juries, then they are not in any way up to the job, and “rules of evidence” will not help. 

Black, Charles L. & Bobbitt, Philip, Impeachment: A Handbook, New Edition  (p. 18). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition. 

Better Know the #Impeachment & Removal Process 12.13.19 "Standard of Proof"

A crucial issue--or what should be a crucial issue--in any Senate trial of impeachment should be the appropriate standard of proof by which to judge the evidence, as it is in any trial. The constitutional text about impeachment does not address the standard of proof, so sound judgment and legal reasoning must apply here. Black, writing in 1974, splits the baby as it were, suggesting that something more than a civil trial stanard of a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not) but less than proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" (the criminal standard) should apply. I think that this take makes the most sense. Black writes: 

[F]or example: “Did the official on trial perform an action because a campaign contribution was given, or was this a coincidence?” Either is possible; the “finding” of this “fact”—the “fact” of corrupt or blameless motivation—may entail the drawing of complicated inferences from circumstances; the circumstances themselves may be proven with more or less clarity. Before the “fact” can be “found,” the trier of fact must decide on a standard of proof. Should he find an impeached president guilty of corruption if it seems slightly more likely than not that a corrupt motive was present? Or should a finding of guilt have to rest, as in a criminal trial, on evidence which leaves no “reasonable doubt”? It makes a big difference, as the example I have just given shows. 

. . . . 

What is the right standard for judging guilt in an impeachment proceeding? Of course we don’t know the answer with any sureness; we have to work it out for ourselves. As with so many constitutional questions, we have to ask what is reasonable, and the reply is here far from obvious. Removal by conviction on impeachment is a stunning penalty, the ruin of a life. Even more important, it unseats the person the people have deliberately chosen for the office. The adoption of a lenient standard of proof could mean that this punishment, and this frustration of popular will, could occur even though substantial doubt of guilt remained. On the other hand, the high “criminal” standard of proof could mean, in practice, that a man could remain president whom every member of the Senate believed to be guilty of corruption, just because his guilt was not shown “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Neither result is good; law is often like that. 

. . . . 

Weighing the factors, I would be sure that one ought not to be satisfied, or anything near satisfied, with the mere “preponderance” of an ordinary civil trial, but perhaps must be satisfied with something a little less than the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard of the ordinary criminal trial, in the full literal meaning of that standard. “Overwhelming preponderance of the evidence” comes perhaps as close as present legal language can to denoting the desired standard.

Black, Charles L., Jr. & Bobbitt, Philip, Impeachment: A Handbook, New Edition (p. 16-17). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition. 

Better Know the Impeachment Process 12.11.19 "Is Impeachment a Criminal Proceeding?"

IS IMPEACHMENT, WITH TRIAL THEREON, A “CRIMINAL PROCEEDING”?  

The president is impeachable for “Treason, Bribery, and other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Treason is a crime. Bribery is a crime. It would seem that a “high Crime” must in some sense be a crime. What about a “misdemeanor” or “high misdemeanor”? It seems unlikely that such a phrase, in such a string, abruptly changes the subject. Nevertheless, some have contended that impeachment, and Senate trial, are not criminal proceedings at all.

 . . . .

It makes no difference whether we call impeachment a “criminal” proceeding or not, any more than it makes any difference whether we call it a “judicial” proceeding or not. What does make a difference is ascertaining those things in the impeachment process that should be treated like the same things in a criminal trial, and what things need not be. On this question, or set of questions, much can usefully be said. 

Let us take first the question of proper attitude toward the facts, and toward the problems of proof, and of burden of proof. As a simple, and typical, factual question, let us take, “Did the president, on a given day, and at a given time, say ‘X’ or ‘Y’?”

Black, Charles L., Jr. & Bobbitt, Philip, Impeachment: A Handbook, New Edition (p. 15). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition. 

Better Know the Impeachment Process 12.10.19 "Later Criminal Prosecution & Two Questions: Facts & Significance"

Two topics today, since I've been off of posting (guests) but things are happening. 

No “further” punishment of any kind may be imposed, though the removed officer, including an ex-president, may later be tried and punished in the ordinary courts, for the very offenses that were grounds of removal. 

First, if the Senate votes in favor of removal from office, can further steps be taken? In short, but the Senate and Congress, "no," but by the courts after removal, "yes." This must weigh quite heavily on Trump's mind, to the extent that he can think that far ahead and strategically. 

On a different topic, and going back a step in the process, here are the two key questions that each senator will be called upon to answer. In some sense, it's simple. But as we go forward, we'll dive more deeply into "high crimes and misdemeanors," although the "bribery" provision may apply in Trump's case in dealing with Ukraine. (As we'll learn from other sources, the distinction between bribery and extortion is not an easy one to draw, and to some extent, they are flip sides of the same coin.)  

In voting on each Article of Impeachment, each senator, acting in a capacity combining those of judge and jury, is registering his best judgment “on the facts” and “on the law.” This means that he is answering two questions together: “Did the president do what he is charged in this Article with having done?” “If he did, did that action constitute an impeachable offense within the meaning of the constitutional phrase?”

Black, Charles L., Jr. & Bobbitt, Philip,  Impeachment: An Handbook, New Edition (p. 14). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition. 

Better Know the Impeachment Process 12.04.19 " Counting the Votes & Passing Power"

After all evidence and argument have been heard, the Senate must vote. The vote is separate on each Article of Impeachment. If no Article registers a two-thirds vote for conviction, a judgment of acquittal is pronounced and recorded. If one or more Articles of Impeachment receive a vote of two-thirds or more, then the president is convicted, and judgment of conviction and removal is pronounced by the chief justice. 

Black, Charles L. Jr. & Bobbitt, Philip, Impeachment: A Handbook, New Edition (p. 13). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition. 

 So if the Senate approves a single article of impeachment--by a two-thirds (66/100) vote--then the Chief Justice would pronounce conviction and removal. While in the current circumstances it seems unlikely that enough Republicans would vote to convict, if this should happen (and what's now impossible in politics?), then what would happen to the office of the presidency? Would the vice-president wait outside the Senate chamber to take the oath from the Chief Justice? What would constitute an orderly transfer of power? Of course, all the talk of a "coup" is horse-hockey. The vice-president is selected by the president and is also a Republican. But still, Trump has no sense of party loyalty or continuity, unlike Richard Nixon, who did not hesitate (at least publically) about allowing Gerald Ford to become president without any question about Ford's legitimacy to ascend to the office. 

Better Know the Impeachment Process 12.03.19 "Here Comes the Judge"

John Roberts, Chief Justice of the United States

On any procedural question, including admissibility of evidence, the chief justice will make a ruling, but that ruling may be reversed by a majority vote of the senators present. After all evidence is in, argument will take place. 

Black, Charles L., Jr..& Bobbit, Philip, Impeachment: A Handbook, New Edition (p. 13). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition. 

Two crucial points here. First, how will Chief Justice Roberts conduct himself in the anticipated impeachment trial of Trump? I wager that he'll try to make himself as inconspicuous as possible. He's never been a trial judge, and here we're talking about a trial as opposed to oral arguments before an appellate tribunal. Trials can be wild and wooly; appeals much less so. However, I do think that Roberts, despite his conservative pedigree and disposition, will strive to appear fair and impartial. He's shown in the past his concern for the Supreme Court as an institution and for the rule of law in general, so I have some hopes for him. However, remember that I had similar thoughts about William Barr and how misinformed those hopes were. 

Second, no matter what Roberts might rule, in the end, Mitch McConnell runs the show. He and a (Republican) majority can vote to override a ruling by the Chief Justice. For instance, suppose that Republicans want to bring in Hunter Biden and Joe Biden to try to connect them to Ukranian corruption, the dearth of evidence in support of such a finding notwithstanding. (Facts haven't been getting in the way of Republicans of late, following the example of their Dear Leader.)  In a normal trial (and this ain't gonna be no normal trial), a judge would likely exclude such evidence as irrelevant. The Chief Justice could rule that such evidence is not relevant to the issue of whether President Trump acted wrongly in attempting to coerce an investigation of the Bidens regardless of what they'd done or not done. (A correct and sensible ruling, in my opinion.) But Mitch and the gang could overrule the CJ. Would they? I'd never accuse McConnell of being shy about unending norms and grabbing power. So this will be something to watch. 

Better Know the Impeachment Process 12.01.19

Here's where it gets tricky; where the ideals of the Founders clash with the realities of our foibles, especially pronounced at this time. Black writes: 

The Constitution says, in Article III (the Judiciary Article), that “the trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . .”; the implication is that the impeachment trial is a “trial” much like others, except that a jury is not to be used. The special oath which senators take has already been mentioned. The Senate is to “try” all impeachments, not simply vote on them; the word “try” is a word used almost invariably in regard to judicial trials. Political good sense points the same way; a judicial or quasi-judicial trial is simply one that inquires into the facts and the law, without partisan or narrow political bias, and proceeds to judgment accordingly—these things are obviously what we want in impeachment proceedings. In function, then, the “trial” in the Senate is, as its name implies, at least quasi-judicial. The important thing is not the name given but the thing desired—total impartiality, at least resembling that of a faithful judge or juror.

Here a difficulty arises—one which can be solved only by great and self-insightful integrity. It must almost always be the case that many senators find themselves either definitely friendly or definitely inimical to the president. In an ordinary judicial trial, persons in such a position would of course be disqualified to act, whether as judges or as jurors. It cannot have been the intention of the Framers that this rule apply in impeachments, for its application would be absurd; a great many senators would inevitably be disqualified by it, and it might easily happen that trial would be by a quite small remnant of the Senate. The remedy has to be in the conscience of each senator, who ought to realize the danger and try as far as possible to divest himself of all prejudice. I see no reason why this cannot produce a satisfactory result. [Emphasis added.]

Black, Charles L., Jr. & Bobbitt, Philip, Impeachment: A Handbook, New Edition (pp. 11-12). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition. 

Better Know the Impeachment Process 11.24.19

The final role of the House of Representatives is to appoint “managers” to present in the Senate the case for conviction and removal on the Articles of Impeachment. The House, in effect, is the prosecuting party at the Senate trial, and the managers are the House’s counsel. 

Black, Charles L., Jr. & Bobbitt, Philip, Impeachment: A Handbook, New Edition (p. 10). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition. 

This is a brief quote but a crucial subject. The appointed representatives of the House (and the text discusses how they may be chosen) make the case for removal from office. At this point, the president has been impeached and the issue is removal from office. In the current impeachment investigation, if the House votes to impeach (which I consider likely), then the managers appointed by the House will act as prosecutors in the Senate trial. I anticipate House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff will be one of the appointees. I anticipate his chief counsel, Daniel Goldman will serve in some capacity as well. Both the Chairman and his Counsel have conducted themselves quite well during the hearings and both appear to know their case and the issues quite well (a crucial ingredient of their success). The choice of case managers in the Senate trial will prove one of the crucial tactical decisions in the impeachment process. The case managers will have to attempt to persuade 2/3 of the Senate, which means that they would have to persuade a bunch of Republican senators to abandon the party line. But of greater importance will be the task of proving to the American people the validity of their case. If they do this, they could fail to remove the president by impeachment, but nevertheless prevent his reelection in the fall. 

Better Know the Impeachment Process 11.22.19

One thing that both the committee and the House leadership will try to avoid is a close vote along party lines—a vote whereby Republicans and Democrats divide as such. An impeachment voted that way would go to the Senate tainted, or at least suspicious, and would be unlikely to satisfy the country, because party motives would be suspected. This desire for bipartisan backing will expectably result in there existing some leverage on the part of the minority members of the committee and of the House—in our times the Republican members. In other words, some compromise will be sought which can win the adherence of at least a fair number of them.

Black, Charles L., Jr. & Bobbitt, Phillip, Impeachment: A Handbook, New Edition (p. 10). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition. 

My, how 1974 seems like a dream to us now, almost idyllic, as Republican Senators, led by Barry Goldwater, went to the White House and told Nixon that he would be removed in an impeachment trial. Nixon resigned two days later. 

Better Know the Impeachment Process 11.18.19

The committee to which this task is confided [by the House of Representatives] must hear evidence—great masses of it in a complicated case. At this stage it seems certain that no technical “rules of evidence” apply. (Indeed, I shall argue later that they do not apply even in the Senate trial.) Evidence may come from investigations by committee staff, from grand jury matter made available to the committee, or from any other source. Testimony before the committee, and the production of documents or other objects, may be compelled by subpoena—which is an order for appearance, or production, under the threat of criminal penalty. In addition to evidentiary matters, the committee must also consider whether the acts shown probably to have been committed are “impeachable” within the meaning of the constitutional text (of which much more will be said in Chapter 3). What part is to be played at this stage by lawyers of the person under investigation would seem to rest in the sound discretion of the committee. Where the committee concludes, on the facts and on the law, that one or more impeachable offenses are shown with sufficient clarity to justify trial, the committee reports, to the full House of Representatives, its recommendation that one or more “Articles of Impeachment” be adopted.

Black, Charles L., Jr. & Bobbitt, Phillip, Impeachment: A Handbook, New Edition (2018) (pp. 8-9). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition. 

Better Know the Impeachment Process 11.16.19

The Senate “tries” all impeachments—it determines, on evidence presented, whether the charge in each Article of Impeachment is true, and whether, if the charge is true, the acts that are proven constitute an impeachable offense. Such an affirmative finding is called a “conviction” on the Article of Impeachment being voted upon. A two-thirds majority of the senators present is necessary for conviction. 

Black, Charles L., Jr. & Bobbitt, Phillip, Impeachment: A Handbook, New Edition (pp. 7-8). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition. 

Better Know the Impeachment Process 11.14.19

A fundamental guide

Strictly speaking, “impeachment” means “accusation” or “charge.” The House of Representatives has, under the Constitution, the “sole Power of Impeachment”—that is to say, the power to bring charges of the commission of one or more impeachable offenses. These charges are conventionally called “Articles of Impeachment.” The House “impeaches” by simple majority vote of those present.

Black, Charles L., Jr. & Phillip Bobbitt, ImpeachmentA Guide, New Edition. (p. 7). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition. 

Better Know the Impeachment Process 11.12.19

[W]e ought to try to take the same stance of principled political neutrality that we hope to see taken by the House and the Senate as they go about their work. This is not easy, particularly as to questions that have no certain answers; it is always tempting to resolve such questions in favor of the immediate political result that is palatable to us, for one never can definitely be proved wrong, and so one is free to allow one’s prejudices to assume the guise of reason. The best way to combat this tendency is to ask ourselves whether we would have answered the same question the same way if it came up with respect to a president toward whom we felt oppositely from the way we feel toward the president threatened with removal. One further point: it is the cardinal principle at least of American constitutional interpretation that the Constitution is to be interpreted so as to be workable and reasonable. . . . Applying it to doubtful questions regarding impeachment, in this book for the laity, I shall give chief emphasis to arguments of a practical cast.

Black, Charles L., Jr. Impeachment: A Handbook, New Edition (p. 5- 6). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition. 

The Better Know the Impeachment Process Post 11.11.19: Black & Bobbitt

The Better Know the Impeachment Process Post 11.11.19

From Phillip Bobbitt's preface to the New Edition about the importance of Black's work:

Allowing Black’s book to gather dust on the library shelves would be far more than simply a loss for the literature on impeachment, which in any case would build on his insights. It would remove a foundation stone from the intellectual edifice that is perhaps the most important advance made in constitutional law during my lifetime: the development of what might be called the “standard model” that enables legislators, citizens, and journalists as well as judges to resolve constitutional questions when there is no authoritative judicial precedent, and to assess judicial opinions when there is a precedent. Black’s tour de force is as important to this development as Weinberg and Salam’s equations are to the Standard Model in physics.

Black, Charles L., Jr. & Bobbitt, Phillip Impeachment A Handbook, New Edition, Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.

Better Know Your Impeachment Process: Black & Bobbitt, Pt. 1

Better know your impeachment process episode # . . . whatever.

Today I'm going to start sharing quotes from some of the outstanding legal scholars who have addressed the topic of impeachment. I'll start with "Impeachment: A Handbook, New Edition," by Charles Black (1974) & Phillip Bobbitt (2018). The late Charles Black was an outstanding constitutional scholar back when I was in law school. He wrote the original edition of this book in 1974, as Richard Nixon was nearing impeachment (he resigned before he was actually impeached). In 2018, constitutional scholar Phillip Bobbitt (Columbia) updated Black's work, keeping Black's original text intact but updating in light of the Clinton impeachment and other legal developments. I'll regularly share pertinent quotes from this & other works to allow readers to get an overview of the parameters of the impeachment process from some of the best minds who've written on the topic.

The following is a quote from Black's original 1974; thus, the "I" is Black and the president to whom he refers is Richard Nixon:

To countervail (as I hope) my lifelong political set against just about all of this president’s positions, I confess to a very strong sense of the dreadfulness of the step of removal, of the deep wounding such a step must inflict on the country, and thus approach it as one would approach high-risk major surgery, to be resorted to only when the rightness of diagnosis and treatment is sure.

Black, Charles L. Jr.. Impeachment (p. 4). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.

Black next considers the role of we citizens in this process. Read & consider his words carefully:

This book is for the citizen. What part ought the citizen to play in the process of impeachment and removal? My own answer would be that, for the most part, our attitude as to any impeachment ought to be that of vigilant waiting. The impeachment process, whether “judicial,” “nonjudicial,” “criminal,” or “noncriminal,” resembles the judicial criminal procedure in that it is confided by the Constitution to responsible tribunals—the House of Representatives and the Senate—and in that these bodies are duty-bound to act on their own views of the law and the facts, as free as may be of partisan political motives and pressures. In this process, a snow of telegrams ought to play no part.

Id., p. 5.