Andrew Yang, Collingwood, Technology, Prospero, & the Sorcerer's Apprentice: Random Thoughts & Questions

Micky, the Sorcerer's Apprentice, eases his burden & all seems good 

Just thinking out loud after listening to an interview of Democratic presidential candidate Andrew Yang by Ian Bremmer and then coming upon the quote bellow from R. G. Collingwood.
Consider this quote:

I knew that for sheer ineptitude the Versailles treaty surpassed previous treaties as much as for sheer technical excellence the equipment of twentieth-century armies surpassed those of previous armies. It seemed almost as if man’s power to control ‘Nature’ had been increasing pari passu [with equal step; hand-in-hand] with a decrease in his power to control human affairs.  

R. G. Collingwood, Autobiography (1939)

Regarding the second sentence of the quote, please consider & comment upon the following questions and propositions:

1. Do you agree or disagree with Collingwood's assessment?

2. Collingwood lived during the First World War & the Treaty of Versailles (he worked in the Admiralty during the war), and he wrote this piece on the eve of the outbreak of the Second World War. Do you think if he was writing today, his conclusion would be different? State the grounds that support and that challenge your answer.

3. Has humankind displayed "moral progress" throughout history? Or, as Rousseau contended, have our morals declined from those of "noble savages?"

4. Are you optimistic about the ability of continued technological change to improve the lot of humankind, or do you fear for the future because of the increased powers that it places in human hands? Explain and justify your conclusion.

5. Prospero the magus in Shakespeare's "The Tempest", decided to "abjure" his "magic" (power) and

"break my staff,

Bury it certain fathoms in the earth,

And, deeper than did ever plummet sound,

I’ll drown my book."

Gielgud as Prospero: could we "break our staff" & "drown our book" even if we wanted to? 

Could humankind, or at least a thoughtful majority, simply bury our technological magic or even just the most lethal possibilities that it creates? Or are their constraints that prevent us from taking this action as a species? Provide the grounds for your conclusion.

6. I have referred to technology as a form of magic. Is this an appropriate means by which to describe technology? Is this an appropriate metaphor or analogy, or is the relationship inherent in our understanding of what constitutes magic? State your grounds for agreeing or disagreeing with the designation of technology as magic.

7. The "Sorcerer's Apprentice" (think Micky Mouse in "Fantasia") loses control of his

magical technology (the hands-off floor cleaner). The apprentice loses control of the process because he doesn't know the proper spell to stop it. The run-away process is only brought to a halt when the wizard returns and provides the proper incantation to break the spell. If humankind is Micky, who is the Wizard? God, Nature, Enlightened Humanity? Or is there a Wizard or higher power that can rescue us from any folly that we might perpetrate with our technological magic? And if a "higher power" intervenes, will that higher power act as gently and beneficently as the Wizard does toward Micky, or will the Wizard (for instance, "Nature") respond in an angry, aggrieved manner? Consider and respond to these propositions.

Happily, no one has qualified me as a teacher, and if you've read to the end of this, I"m surprised and I'm more than happy that you've done so. Hell, I'd give you an "A" for simply getting this far. And if it's caused you pause to stop and think a bit, all the better. Enjoy the day.

The Wizard returns, peeved but no punitive. Will we be so lucky?

Every Nation For Itself by Ian Bremmer

Ian Bremmer’s Every Nation for Itself: What Happens When No One Leads the World (2012/2013 new preface) shows why even seasoned observers of international politics and trends might have a hard time in the book publishing business. (I bought my copy at a remainder store). Events outrun the ability of their books to keep up. History, in contrast, deals with the past and allows reality to create the future. But for prognosticators like Bremmer, attempting to discern how current circumstances will affect tomorrow’s headlines is a very iffy business.

But having said this, Bremmer’s primary point, that we have no one single nation currently dominant on the world stage, is undoubtedly true and will remain so for some time in the future. The U.S. remains the single most powerful nation, but its position is no longer as predominant as it was at the end of the Cold War.  Bremmer doesn’t posit this as a matter of absolute decline but as a matter of the realization of limits generated by internal political realities (a sharply polarized electorate and elites) and concerns about spending limits. In recognizing America’s relative decline, he sounds much like Fareed Zakaria in The Post-American World: Release 2.0 (International Edition) (2011), who emphasizes changing circumstances and not an absolute decline of the U.S. But here’s where I think that Bremmer’s analysis shows signs of instant aging. His emphasis on debt—remember he first publishes around 2012—seems much less imperative today. Of course, the U.S. must mind its financial house and avoid mounting indebtedness, but (relatively) strong economic growth has at least taken the edge off of financial limits to American power. What I hope is a more important reason for increasing American hesitation is a sense of the dangers of imperial (or hegemonic, if you prefer) overreach. President Obama’s sense of limits and attempts to avoid unnecessary or entangling engagements are the embodiment of what may be a coming of age of American sensibilities (whatever the merits of any one decision, such as Syria). Of course, part of a growing American forbearance is a general fatigue and reluctance on the part of the voting public to go deeper into foreign engagements, especially military. The negative flip side of this attitude, however, is a growing willingness to walk away from trade agreements and other forms of international cooperation. These factors, much more than debt, seem to me to drive current U.S. reluctance and limits concerning international leadership.

The other factor that Bremmer identifies---and that remains important—is the limited ability of any other nation to step up as a dominant leader. China continues to grow in power and prestige, but the leadership’s concern with internal issues and a lingering Chinese reluctance to venture too far abroad remain substantial impediments to China taking a more aggressive leadership role on the international stage. Russia, on the other hand, seeks a restoration of its past role, but Putin’s aggressive stances are now constrained by weak oil prices and a sagging economy, not to mention a limited popular appeal (Donald Trump, excepted, of course). The Soviet Union was able to gain some traction on the world stage as the embodiment of a utopian ideal, although that patina faded as the truth came out over the drip of time. But Putin’s Russia holds no allure as a model, except for aspiring dictators. The EU, another possible player, remains reeling from its failure to recover from the 2008 economic crash, the influx of Middle Eastern refugees, Islamic terrorism, and now Brexit. The EU was never much of a coherent foreign affairs presence (outside of trade considerations), but now it must focus all of its energy on attempting to retain internal coherence.

Bremmer also notes that some regional powers, like Brazil and Turkey, might step up to prestige and power, but this shows the perils of his endeavor. Since publication, both nations have encountered serious political instability and retain a strong potential for unrest. Brazil has just impeached their president. After having survived a coup attempt, President Erdogan of Turkey has taken the opportunity to consolidate his power, to the long-term detriment of Turkey.

Another area that Bremmer failed to foresee is the uptick in terrorism in Europe, and how that will affect the political balance there. The increasing votes that right-wing parties are garnering reflect anxieties arising from economic stagnation, immigration worries, and terrorism. Of course, some threats, like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, bring nations together (e.g., Allied Powers, NATO), but others, such a trade and immigration, can pull them apart. All of these factors are important in the U.S., too. Who wants to make any prediction about the future course of U.S. policy and conduct if (Heaven forbid!) Donald Trump is elected president?

What Bremmer has produced here, as others like him do, is a snapshot of our current state of affairs, and a fairly accurate one, I think. But imagine a snapshot of the world taken in 1909 (and perhaps Norman Angell’s The Grand Illusion might serve as such a snapshot). Then look at the world after the gunshot in Sarajevo fired on 28 June 1914. That one, almost random event, turned the Eurasian landmass (and beyond) into a great battlefield between 1914 and 1945 (with no real resolution until 1989). Of course, some predicted war, in contrast to Angell, but they may have been more lucky than prescient. (If “lucky” is an appropriate about such a macabre topic.) Society—the everyday world in which we live—is a complex system in which seemingly random, Black Swan events, even those of seemingly little consequence, can send the world careening into an abyss of violence. The snapshot is useful, but to make decisions, it’s best to consult the long panorama of history. 

World Order by Henry Kissinger

Plain cover, deep interior

Old yes, but a master-student

Henry Kissinger has been a public official (National Security Adviser and Secretary of State), a private consultant, and a college professor. At age 91, Kissinger has donned his professorial hat to take the student on a grand tour of international relations. But this IR course doesn’t start with the world of today. Professor Kissinger recognizes the deep roots of history, and he begins with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). There in time and space begins the tour, moving through the establishment of the European balance of power international system, the French Revolution, the Congress of Vienna (about which he wrote a definitive work), and through to today. After Europe, he takes us on historical and contemporary tours of China, Russia, the Middle East (especially Iran), India, and the rest of Asia. Only then does he turn his attention to the U.S., which he dubs the “reluctant superpower”. He comments extensively on the growth of balance of power political perspectives first promoted on the world stage by Theodore Roosevelt, and the international idealism (and institutionalism) of Woodrow Wilson. The two traditions sit uneasily (and sometimes alternatively) as guiding principles of U.S. foreign relations. Kissinger notes the tension and ambiguity that the two traditions represent. He notes that Richard Nixon, who would seem the epitome of an international realist in power, chose to hang a portrait of Woodrow Wilson in his White House. Nixon heard the song of idealism even if he did not answer it. 

For all of the revealing history and perspective, I found Kissinger’s remarks about technological changes addressed to the present and immediate future some of the most interesting insights of the book, contained in his chapter on “Technology, Equilibrium, and Human Consciousness”. (Pretty hip for someone publishing at age 91!) Whatever one’s judgments about Kissinger’s actions as an office holder, one cannot question his credentials as an unparalleled master teacher of the system. 

My have only two brief criticisms. First, he slights political economy. We do live in an increasingly interdependent world, although some want to ignore this. To what extent this has affected and will affect international actors doesn’t receive much (if any) scrutiny. Second, he doesn’t peer into the future and the possible repercussions of climate change or perhaps a new global pandemic (I don’t think that Ebola is a likely candidate, but something new could be). How resilient is this system? He talks about the challenges in terms of the current alignments and threats, but I think that this ground is shifting. Nuclear weapons are a huge concern, but an unlikely threat if the current system remains intact. But if the current system breaks down, then  . . . . 

I’m keeping this review short because there are already some fine reviews out there: former Secretary of State (and possible future president) Hillary Clinton, Ian Bremmer (Eurasia Group president and author), and Amitai Etzioni (GW prof & public intellectual) to list three that I found useful.

Niall Ferguson on State Captialism

Niall Ferguson sometimes gets it wrong in his commentary on current affairs, but I think that his wide-angle historical lens provides some very good insight into this issue of political economy. A lot of folks have suggested that China's current brand of "state capitalism" is ascendent and superior to the market capitalism championed by the U.S. and which served as the basis for the "Washington consensus". Ferguson provides a useful "hold on a minute perspective" on the contention that this "state capitalism" now holds the key to the future.

Ferguson notes the contention of Ian Bremmer that China is the premier example of state capitalism that could fundamentally change the way the world economy works. But as Ferguson notes, China's brand of capitalism is a varied amalgam of government intervention and very free markets. (Neither does he mention the role of corruption, but I understand from 1HP that this factor looms too big to ignore, especially in a system in which the state looms so large.) Ferguson, citing the likes of Adam Smith and Peter Thiel, acknowledges the importance of government institutions in any capitalist system. Issues of the environment in which the economic system operates are crucial. Ferguson argues that the key lies on how and in what ways the state deals with the economy, a point well-taken. In conclusion, he writes:

The real contest of our time is not between a state-capitalist China and a market-capitalist America, with Europe somewhere in the middle. It is a contest that goes on within all three regions as we all struggle to strike the right balance between the economic institutions that generate wealth and the political institutions that regulate and redistribute it.

The character of this century -- whether it is "post-American," Chinese, or something none of us yet expects -- will be determined by which political system gets that balance right.