Showing posts with label Adam Gopnik. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Adam Gopnik. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 18, 2022

Thoughts 18 Jan. 2022

 

Dr. Iain McGilchrist


There is no one absolute truth about the world that results from this process, but there are certainly truths: some things we believe will be truer than others. A maximally open, patient, and attentive response to whatever-it-is is better at disclosing or discerning reality than a response that is peremptory, insensitive, or – above all – shrouded in dogma.

The idea of a Gestalt is central to this book: by it I mean the form of a whole that cannot be reduced to parts without the loss of something essential to its nature. Indeed, what I hope to offer in this book is just such a Gestalt – one that is based on an understanding of the import of the structure of our brains.

The point to be made for the purpose of the present discussion is that a philosophy of nature as organic must start at the opposite end to that requisite for a materialistic philosophy. The materialistic starting point is from independently existing substances, matter and mind. The matter suffers modifications of its external relations of locomotion, and the mind suffers modifications of its contemplated objects. There are, in this materialistic theory, two sorts of independent substances, each qualified by their appropriate passions. The organic starting point is from the analysis of process as the realisation of events disposed in an interlocked community. The event is the unit of things real. The emergent enduring pattern is the stabilisation of the emergent achievement so as to become a fact which retains its identity throughout the process.

We must observe the immediate occasion, and use reason to elicit a general description of its nature. Induction presupposes metaphysics. In other words, it rests upon an antecedent rationalism. You cannot have a rational justification for your appeal to history till your metaphysics has assured you that there is a history to appeal to; and likewise your conjectures as to the future presuppose some basis of knowledge that there is a future already subjected to some determinations. The difficulty is to make sense of either of these ideas. But unless you have done so, you have made nonsense of induction.
N.B. Whitehead is a favorite of McGilchrist.

“Jung came to understand that in this regard, we are all fragmented, and that the work of individuation is to fuse our disparate parts into a new, more competent whole; as he remarked years later “so-called normal people are very fragmentary . . . they are not complete egos.”

When the pioneers of Silicon Valley were thinking through the potential applications of the internet, they often turned to writers such as William Gibson and Neal Stephenson for ideas. Today, no discussion of the implications of artificial intelligence is complete without at least one reference to 2001: A Space Odyssey or the Terminator movies, just as nearly all conversations about robotics include a mention of Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? or the movie it inspired, Blade Runner.

A social psychologist, Jonathan Haidt, did the same and in The Righteous Mind (2012) found the typical conservative to be in better balance with life’s demands than the typical liberal. If so, we might reasonably wonder why conservatives at present can sound so angry. Perhaps the point is that conservatism is a category in politics, not social psychology.

The distinction that’s sometimes made between patriotism and nationalism is the essence of de Gaulle’s politics, as it had been in many ways of Disraeli’s. The patriot loves his place and its monarch and its cheeses and its people and its idiosyncrasies; the nationalist has no particular sense of affection for the actual place he advocates for (he is often an outsider to it) but employs his obsessive sense of encirclement and grievance on behalf of acts of ethnic vengeance.

If defense has a clear advantage over offense, and conquest is therefore difficult, great powers will have little incentive to use force to gain power and will concentrate instead on  protecting  what they have. When defense has the advantage,  protecting  what you have should be a relatively easy task. Alternatively, if offense is easier, states will be sorely tempted to try conquering each other, and there will be a lot of war in the system.

As for the idea that a healthy diet must be mostly plants, that it must include fruits, vegetables, whole grains, pulses, and legumes, we don’t have even the ambiguous 1960s-era studies to support it. We have no meaningful clinical trial evidence to support this idea, as Michael Pollan infers in In Defense of Food, the book that brought us the mantra “Eat food. Not too much. Mostly plants.” What we have instead, he notes, is the idea that people who eat a lot of plant foods tend to be healthier than people who eat the standard American diet (given the appropriate acronym SAD), that is, who eat at fast-food restaurants and buy the packaged, highly processed, sugary foods in the supermarket that Pollan aptly calls “foodlike substances,” food that health-conscious people naturally avoid.


Tuesday, November 30, 2021

Thoughts 30 Nov 2021

 



It was a quirk of [Hans] Morgenthau’s analytic style always to break down a subject into components—for example, three aspects, four features, five elements—and in the case of Kissinger’s doctrine he saw four parts. First, and most important, was the goal of minimizing the risk of nuclear war; no objective was more important than this one. The second was creating and maintaining a balance of power that would serve the first goal and also reduce the possibility of conventional war. The third component, related to the second, was acknowledging that, like the United States, other nations had their own vital interests, which a rational foreign policy was bound to respect. Finally, Kissinger’s fourth goal was to seek to intertwine the vital interests of the various nations into a peaceful status quo so that “the institutionalization of common interests must gradually take the sting out of surviving hostile confrontations.”

While there's much to criticize in HK's actions, the principles seem reasonably sound to me. 


There are reasons for hope on this score: things are already happening that may slow our skyrocketing need for ingenuity. Birth rates are falling around the world, which in time will bring our population growth to an end; people are coming up with ingenious technologies for lowering our consumption of natural resources, which will lessen the burden we are imposing on the planet’s environment; and there are some well-developed, albeit controversial, ideas for dampening the volatility of international capital flows.
This is Homer-Dixon's last "20th-century book," & it's optimism expressed here (more tempered elsewhere in the book) seems a bit naive. His observations are not so much wrong as inaccurately waited (at least as a stand-alone quote).

We can offset this kind of falling resource quality by using more resource quantity— by digging up and processing more iron ore . . . . But this response damages more of the planet’s surface, which further harms biodiversity; and if it requires us to use more carbon-based energy in the process of seeking energy (a terrible irony), it also worsens global warming.
In some ways, it's this simple.

Change was afoot in the land of his [Sri Aurobindo's] birth [India], and it wasn’t long before this bright young Indian inserted himself right into the middle of the independence movement. A natural orator with a sharp tongue and sharper intellect, Aurobindo rose rapidly in the movement, eventually becoming its political leader, decades before Gandhi would assume that role. Once referred to as “the most dangerous man in India” by his British overlords, Aurobindo was focused on political revolution rather than spiritual evolution. His religious career didn’t even begin until a fateful encounter, at the age of thirty-four, with a yogi.

“This isolation has left Americans quite unaware of the world beyond their borders. Americans speak few languages, know little about foreign cultures, and remain unconvinced that they need to rectify this. Americans rarely benchmark to global standards because they are sure that their way must be the best and most advanced. There is a growing gap between America's worldly business elite and cosmopolitan class, on the one hand and the majority of the American people on the other. Without real efforts to bridge it, this divide could destroy America's competitive edge and its political future.”
I don't know whom FZ is quoting here, but I think FZ agrees. I know I do. We Americans are often terribly small-minded.


For the archaeologist, these things are not stone and clay and metal, they are building-stone and potsherds and coins; debris of a building, fragments of domestic utensils, and means of exchange, all belonging to a bygone age whose purposes they reveal to him. He can use them as historical evidence only so far as he understands what each one of them was for.

Different groups, liberals are said to have long insisted, should be forged together by practical politics into a single umbrella unit and asked to look past their specificities. By contrast, intersectional politics say that we should look at our specificities and unashamedly recognize and assert them in our politics.
Without some shared beliefs, values, and interests, no polity can survive. We must start with the common ahead of our differences.

The absence of thought I was confronted with [at Adolf Eichmann's trial] sprang neither from forgetfulness of former, presumably good manners and habits nor from stupidity in the sense of inability to comprehend—not even in the sense of “moral insanity,” for it was just as noticeable in instances that had nothing to do with so-called ethical decisions or matters of conscience.
Arendt often seems to conflate two types of thought: one, what I'd label "ordinary thought" as evidenced by its absence in Eichmann, and what I'll label "meaningful thought," as evidenced by Socrates. But here point viz. Eichmann is the more crucial insight.

The world of everyday life is not only taken for granted as reality by the ordinary members of society in the subjectively meaningful conduct of their lives. It is a world that originates in their thoughts and actions, and is maintained as real by these.
Thought, in this sense, creates our world.

What I do maintain is that success can only be one ingredient in happiness, and is too dearly purchased if all the other ingredients have been sacrificed to obtain it.

Tuesday, November 16, 2021

Thoughts: 16 Nov. 2021

We may not always think about our death, but we sense death constantly on a cellular level. Evolution gave us this morbid gift. We are built to propagate the species. Every hormonal response, reflex, sensation and cognitive ability exists to serve this purpose. Every emotion, from fear, love and happiness to sadness, ambivalence and ennui, confers critical information that helps us stay alive.
The push of stayin' alive. But what about the pull? What are we stayin' alive for? To listen to the Bee Gees?

This is not to dismiss the potential risks that may arise from rising global temperatures, but simply to suggest that obsessive discussion of those risks in 2019 and early 2020 led to myopia. For the average American on the eve of the pandemic, the chance of dying from an overdose was two hundred times greater than the chance of being killed by a cataclysmic storm, and the chance of dying in a motor vehicle accident was fifteen hundred times higher than the chance of being killed by a flood. The threat of climate-related disaster lay in the future; the threat of pandemic was proximate. In 2018, the number of Americans killed by influenza and pneumonia (59,120) was substantially higher than the number who died in car crashes (39,404). 

Per the immediately preceding quote, we have a strong instinct to stay alive, but we're often quite deluded about the relative levels of threat from a wide variety of sources. 


Does all this suggest that psychological reasons, whether “implicit” or conscious, have no reality whatsoever, that they are a pure construction? No, reasons are indeed constructed, but under two constraints that ensure that they have some degree of both psychological and social reality. The reasons we invoke for justification have to make psychological sense. Talk of reasons need not—in fact, we have argued, cannot—provide an accurate account of what happens in our minds, but it tends to highlight factors that did play a causal role. Reasons are typically constructed out of bits of psychological insight.
Ah, yes, our strength of reason isn't what we'd like to to be, and comes from unreliable places.

Increasingly, in our current system, the public only gets to choose which oligarchic faction they support. And they’re turning off in droves – that is, when they’re not enraged. By pioneering a life for ourselves beyond the competition delusion, we could make our way once again towards the ancient Athenian vision of democracy as a system in which every citizen takes turns in ruling and being ruled.

Colin Wilson’s approach lies somewhere between the passive receptivity of the Jungian work and the strenuous super-efforts of Ouspensky. He argues that it is essential to realize that our conscious attitudes have a powerful effect on how we see the world.


“What’s new?” is an interesting and broadening eternal question, but one which, if pursued exclusively, results only in an endless parade of trivia and fashion, the silt of tomorrow. I would like, instead, to be concerned with the question “What is best?,” a question which cuts deeply rather than broadly, a question whose answers tend to move the silt downstream.

The first argument is an argument from experience. Those societies that glorify militarism almost invariably lose wars.
If you get in a lot of fights, you're gonna lose some. Simple. Ask the U.S. military. No one individual or entity is invincible. Ask Michael Jordan.

There was a pervasive sense that, in the phrase Margaret Thatcher famously used to shut down debate over free-market economics, “there is no alternative.” She used the slogan so much that some of her cabinet colleagues began to call her “TINA.” That phrase captured the spirit of the times, an almost Marxist idea of historical inevitability—except that capitalism, rather than socialism, was the ideology lying at the “end of history.” And it wasn’t just Thatcher.
This line of thinking, of "no alternative," of "invincibility," is deluded when applied to any plan, institution, or ideology. And markets are not the least exception: some work well, some horribly. But all require constant attention and inputs of energy (such as regulation).


Friday, November 5, 2021

Thoughts: 5 November 2021

 


The upshot [of Say's Law]: Depressions are impossible. The very act of producing forecloses the possibility that a society will be unable to afford the fruits of production. The overall standard of living might be high or low, but it depends on how efficiently the society makes use of its resources. Unemployment cannot be a significant factor. 

But depressions are real, and Say’s Law is wrong. People don’t spend all of their incomes, and what they save is not automatically converted into other spending by anyone, now or later. In the classical worldview, banking was supposed to ensure that savings aligned with investment through the establishment of interest rates ensuring that the money people wanted to save would be profitably invested in new projects. [Keynes's] A Treatise on Money had tasked central banks with handling this duty. By cutting interest rates, central banks could make it more attractive for firms to borrow the money needed to expand production and discourage people from putting money in the bank, where it would earn a lousy return. Keynes argued that although this might work—he remained to the end of his days an advocate of low interest rates and cheap money—it very well might not.

Carter, Zachary D..The Price of Peace (pp. 261-262). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. 

Implicit here is the idea--or at least my idea--that depressions make no sense. They are creations of the system and not of Nature. In the Great Depression, the U.S. had not lost factories or suffered great crop failures, etc. It was a failure of the human-created system, not of some "law." My thought anyway, but I think Keynes was there way ahead of me. 


The North Vietnamese were not hooked on the idea of economic growth determination (which was one of the great hang-ups of Rostow), but were determined to extend their regime’s control to the entire country rather than maintain their industrialization. That was what motivated them, and that was what they considered their unfinished business. They had invested a great deal in it and they would continue to invest in it; no North Vietnamese government could afford to do less.
If you don't understand your adversary's incentives--or more fundamentally, your adversary's values--you don't understand your enemy & you'll surrender your ability to persuade, and even to coerce, your adversary.

Without Dynamic Quality the organism cannot grow. Without static quality the organism cannot last. Both are needed.
A polarity? A dialectic? Being & Becoming? Many possibilities but a basic insight with any label.

To be sure, we are still aware that thinking calls not only for intelligence and profundity but above all for courage.
We need more courage.

Modern Medicine and Big Pharma remain caught in a vicious cycle: doctors need Big Pharma because they’re taught to treat rather than cure or prevent; but the reason they don’t know any better is because medical education has been co-opted by Big Pharma itself. And so the cycle repeats.
How to break the cycle?

The [G. K.] Chestertons and [Patrick] Deneens of the world, insisting that liberalism destroys values, tend to overlook the overwhelming liberal assertion of the primary human value of pluralism because to them pluralism is simply not a value.

Another related speculation has even less evidence to support it but has a certain a priori likelihood. Nearly all writing about chance before modern times was in terms of fortune, fate, the goddess Fortuna, and the Wheel of Fortune.
And while numbers and quantification are useful, those metaphors and personifications are still of value. In a sense, we don't know (unknown unknowns) and can't know (known unknowns) some things.
When we survey the biological worlds, we find only two groups of organisms that practice large-scale warfare: human beings and ants.
Ants aren't that bright; what's our excuse?

The French Revolution, Tocqueville wrote, was like Islam in that it ‘flooded the earth with its soldiers, apostles and martyrs’.
In short, the modern ideology of the Revolution (and its successors) are function in some ways very much like a religion.


Tuesday, November 2, 2021

Thoughts: 2 Nov 2021

 

2021 publication


America’s political dysfunction is ultimately a cultural problem whose solution lies at the level of values. So as we come to discover new methods for promoting the growth of values, the collective goal of cultivating cultural evolution on every front of its development will begin to seem increasingly desirable and achievable.
True but not at all easy or guaranteed to take-off.


The past two centuries have been a period of astonishing material and social progress for much of humanity—why should the future be different from the past? As the late Julian Simon, one of the optimists’ standard-bearers, wrote in 1995, “Almost every absolute change, and the absolute component of almost every economic and social change or trend, points in a positive direction, as long as we view the matter over a reasonably long period of time. That is, all aspects of material human welfare are improving in the aggregate.”
But has the neo-Malthusian Paul Ehrlich really been defeated (in his bet with Simon)? Homer-Dixon argues that we may very well face ingenuity gaps that we will not quickly or certainly close. Carbon capture, anyone?

Because American progressivism is, alongside French conservatism, the most schismatic of all faiths, with lifelong resentments governing everyone in turn and new schisms springing up every minute, Rustin had to exert a full court press to bring everyone together.
See the current Democratic Congress as a reference.

A body politic is a non-social community which, by a dialectical process also present in the family, changes into a society.
RGC sees a "society" as a voluntary group composed of consenting individuals, as a social contract theory and business law.

What had taken its place was logic, and logic was the weapon of the totalitarians, who began with a fundamental premise from which everything else followed. (“If you believe A, then it necessarily follows that you must believe B . . . ,” and so on, down to the deaths of millions.)
Channeling Hannah Arendt in the quote.

Karl Popper, described, “The method of science is the method of bold conjectures and ingenious and severe attempts to refute them.”

Aretê implies a respect for the wholeness or oneness of life, and a consequent dislike of specialization. It implies a contempt for efficiency—or rather a much higher idea of efficiency, an efficiency which exists not in one department of life but in life itself.