Showing posts with label Frank Ankersmit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Frank Ankersmit. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 12, 2022

Thoughts 12 January 2022

 


Ever since a Supreme Court ruling in 1976, Buckley v. Valeo, the United States has adhered to the view that spending money is an act of free speech and thus cannot be regulated in any serious way. This view of speech, later affirmed and expanded in the notorious Citizens United decision of 2010, is held in no other advanced democracy on the planet, most of which routinely regulate how politicians raise and spend money—with no adverse effects on the quality of their free speech or democracy. As a result, at the heart of American government, there is a ceaseless series of quid pro quos—money raised for favors bestowed. The American tax code is one of the world’s longest for a reason. The thousands of amendments to it are what politicians sell when they raise campaign money.
Precisely.

And with the reductionist outlook goes determinism, the belief that if we knew enough about the position and momentum of every particle in the universe we could predict everything that happens from here on in, including your every thought, desire and belief. . . . Even if contemporary physics did not demonstrate that this is an impossibility, there is a problem with this kind of argument. Reductionists and determinists unerringly fail to take account of the fact that their own arguments apply to themselves. If my beliefs are ‘nothing but’ the mechanical products of a blind system, so are all views, including those of the reductionist. If everything is already determined, the determinist’s tendency to embrace determinism is also merely determined, and we have no reason to take it seriously (since we are all determined either to believe it or not already).

Creativity is the God problem. We have to come to terms, Bloom tells me, with these “material miracles” that are present at every stage of the evolution of the universe. For Bloom, science is best served when our sense of awe, wonder, and astonishment at the workings of nature is heightened.

Historical research refers to the historian’s analysis of the evidence the past has left us. It deals with the selection, interpretation, and analysis of historical sources and with how this analysis may help us explain causally (or otherwise) what the evidence has taught us about the past.
Historians & lawyers (trial lawyers, anyway) have a lot in common.

We should not delude ourselves into thinking that our historical narratives, as commonly constructed, are anything more than retro-fits. To contemporaries, as we shall see, the outcome of Western dominance did not seem the most probable of the futures they could imagine; the scenario of disastrous defeat often loomed larger in the mind of the historical actor than the happy ending vouchsafed to the modern reader.
An outcome can look deceptively certain in hindsight.

How is it—for example—that most American “conservatives” who proclaim their opposition to Big Government favor all kinds of military spending, and support the sending of more and more American troops into the midst of peoples and countries of which they know nothing?
Great questions.
Look at the dates of their—still revered and considered “seminal”—works: Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, 1948; Trilling, The Liberal Imagination, 1950; Daniel Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics, 1953; Potter, People of Plenty, 1954; Hartz, The American Liberal Tradition, 1955. Consider but the titles of their books. There is one thesis in all of them: that, unlike in Europe or elsewhere, in the United States there is only one intellectual tradition, a perennially liberal one. Now these books, with their general ideas and theses sweeping across the history of the American mental and political and intellectual and ideological landscape, appeared at the very time, 1948–55, when in the United States a popular antiliberal movement arose that began to name itself as “conservative.”

But in America, too, it is still conceivable that the universities will be destroyed, for the whole disturbance coincides with a crisis in the sciences, in belief in science, and in belief in progress, that is, with an internal, not simply a political, crisis of the universities.
Written c. 1970.

Of the 5,400 different species of mammals on the planet, humans are now the only ones to routinely have misaligned jaws, overbites, underbites, and snaggled teeth, a condition formally called malocclusion.

People think processed food is food, because it’s calories and macronutrients, but in fact processed food gets in and poisons those pathways instead.

“What was most important wasn't knowing the future—it was knowing how to react appropriately to the information available at each point in time.”


Friday, November 12, 2021

Thoughts 12 Nov 2021

 


Weber’s understanding of values was indebted chiefly to Nietzsche and that Donald G. Macrae in his book on Weber (1974) calls him an existentialist; for while he holds that an agent may be more or less rational in acting consistently with his values, the choice of any one particular evaluative stance or commitment can be no more rational than that of any other. All faiths and all evaluations are equally non-rational; all are subjective directions given to sentiment and feeling. Weber is then, in the broader sense in which I have understood the term, an emotivist and his portrait of a bureaucratic authority is an emotivist portrait. The consequence of Weber’s emotivism is that in his thought the contrast between power and authority, although paid lip-service to, is effectively obliterated as a special instance of the disappearance of the contrast between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations.

The defense would argue, citing Descartes, Aristotle, Kant, or Popper, that humans err by not reasoning enough. The prosecution would argue, citing Luther, Hume, Kierkegaard, or Foucault, that they err by reasoning too much.

The purpose of a hypothesis in science is to propose an explanation for what we observe, either in nature or in the laboratory (ideally, a testable hypothesis): Why did this happen and not that? The more observations a hypothesis can explain or the more phenomena it can predict, the better the explanation, the better the hypothesis. This insistence that we get fat because we overeat is not even wrong, as the legendary physicist Wolfgang Pauli, a man with a gift for memorably pithy criticisms, might have put it. It explains nothing.


Entropy is a measure of the deadness of a system. Negentropy or information is a measure of the liveliness of a system.

He ["Phaedrus"] felt that institutions such as schools, churches, governments and political organizations of every sort all tended to direct thought for ends other than truth, for the perpetuation of their own functions, and for the control of individuals in the service of these functions.

The great masterpieces of twentieth-century historical writing rarely mention dates. Think, in particular, of so-called cross-sectional studies, such as Fernand Braudel’s book on the Mediterranean world at the time of Philip II, which does not present us with a development over time but is instead content with describing what that world looked like at one specific temporal cross-section.

[John Ciardi:] In contrast with the turbulent complexity of Hell, Dante’s Purgatory is simple, regular, and serene. On the lower reaches below the gate are kept in exile for varying lengths of time those souls who, for various reasons and in various conditions, sought salvation at the last moment. Above, within Purgatory, we find not the multifarious crimes by which vice or sin manifests itself in Hell (or on Earth), but simply the seven Capital Vices that lead to sinful acts.

Tuesday, September 21, 2021

Thoughts for the Day: Tuesday 21 September 2021

 


The foundation of commanding hope is honest hope. It has the courage to fully acknowledge the dangers we face, so it’s informed by a thorough scientific understanding of those dangers and the likelihood of stark constraints in our future; yet it also welcomes the possibility of genuinely positive alternatives within those constraints.
They must believe that knowledge is knowable and facts are factual while also remembering that even the most obvious certainties might be wrong. They must commit themselves wholeheartedly to the Constitution of Knowledge while acknowledging its limits and the limits of those who uphold it.


So, what is left of you after you have left is character, the layered image that has been shaping your potentials and your limits from the beginning. Later years define this character more clearly as the repetitive stories and erotic fantasies, the nighttime vigils and the haunting searches through the halls of memory force the singularity of our character upon us.
Thought without speech is inconceivable; “thought and speech anticipate one another. They continually take one another’s place”...
Reason uses this discrepancy between intention and unintended results for the insidious realization of its own purposes; Hegel speaks here of “the cunning of Reason.” Half a century before Hegel the point had already been made most eloquently by Adam Ferguson: “Every step and every movement of the multitude, even in what are termed enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not of human design. Cromwell said, That a man never mounts higher, than when he knows not whither he is going; it may with more reason be affirmed of communities, that they admit of the greatest revolutions where no change is intended, and that the most refined politicians do not always know whither they are leading the state by their projects.” See A. Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767; repr., Cambridge, 1995), 119.
What grounds are there for supposing that the resentment against a meritocracy, whose rule is exclusively based on “natural” gifts, that is, on brain power, will be no more dangerous, no more violent than the resentment of earlier oppressed groups who at least had the consolation that their condition was caused by no “fault” of their own? Is it not plausible to assume that this resentment will harbor all the murderous traits of a racial antagonism, as distinguished from mere class conflicts, inasmuch as it too will concern natural data which cannot be changed, hence a condition from which one could liberate oneself only by extermination of those who happen to have a higher I.Q.?
Cf. Arendt's thought here with those on the same topic from Michael Sandel & Daniel Markovits.
Nasal breathing alone can boost nitric oxide sixfold, which is one of the reasons we can absorb about 18 percent more oxygen than by just breathing through the mouth.
The argument for the free market is that it is free. But freedom becomes superfluous if an enemy is threatening the very basis of all freedoms.
If reason is based on intuitive inference, what, you may ask, are the intuitions about? The answer . . . is that intuitions involved in the use of reason are intuitions about reasons.
Those who can write can write about anything. Especially when the author’s approach lies in interpreting the object of his attention as a kind of monad, something whose very existence reveals nothing less than the entire state of the world—present, past, and future. Therein lies [Walter] Benjamin’s method and magic. His worldview is profoundly symbolic: for him each person, each artwork, each object is a sign to be deciphered. And each sign exists in dynamic interrelation with every other sign. And the truth-oriented interpretation of such a sign is directed precisely at demonstrating and intellectually elaborating its integration within the great, constantly changing ensemble of signs: philosophy.
In Richardson’s list of magnitude-6 deadly conflicts, six out of seven were civil wars: the Taiping Rebellion (1851–64), the American Civil War (1861–65), the Russian Civil War (1918–20), the Chinese Civil War (1927–36), the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), and the communal slaughter that accompanied Indian independence and partition (1946–48).
Kissinger never paused in the long journey of his spectacular career to work out his ideas about politics, democracy, and the American way of governance. He was a historian and a statesman, not a political thinker. One of his Harvard professors reported that he “was only average in his abilities as a political philosopher.” But there was philosophy contained in his policies, and there were others, much above average, who may be said to have done his thinking for him, who reflected on the condition of the German-Jewish émigré, with all its complex and inevitable ambivalences, and thought deeply about the problems of democracy and modern society. Two in particular had an impress on political thought that has been as lasting—and as controversial—as Henry Kissinger’s impact has been on international affairs.
Gewen's "two in particular" are Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss.


To be precise, the ‘condition’ which is thus ‘selected’ [as 'the cause' of an event] is in fact not ‘selected’ at all; for selection implies that the person selecting has before him a finite number of things from among which he takes his choice. But this does not happen. In the first place the conditions of any given event are quite possibly infinite in number, so that no one could thus marshal them for selection even if he tried. In the second place no one ever tries to enumerate them completely. Why should he? If I find that I can get a result by certain means I may be sure that I should not be getting it unless a great many conditions were fulfilled; but so long as I get it I do not mind what these conditions are. If owing to a change in one of them I fail to get it, I still do not want to know what they all are; I only want to know what the one is that has changed.
From this a principle follows which I shall call ‘the relativity of causes’.
Remember this statement when any starts talking about 'the cause' of an event.
[William Graham] Sumner’s defense of elites was not the defense of a class. Going one further than Rehberg, who thought some aristocrats unfit to rule, Sumner took the line earlier taken by the British liberal Lord Acton that every class was unfit to rule. All interests sought to capture government. The rich tended to rent-seeking, and tariffs were there to pamper uncompetitive industries. Sumner’s belief in the primacy of free markets was robustly stated but not always easy to live up to. When the Progressives took aim at the business and banking trusts in the name of competition, Sumner, a conservative anti-Progressive, sided with the trusts.

Sunday, September 19, 2021

Thoughts for the Day: Sunday 19 September 2021

 


93. Whether believers or not, we are agreed today that the earth is essentially a shared inheritance, whose fruits are meant to benefit everyone. For believers, this becomes a question of fidelity to the Creator, since God created the world for everyone. Hence every ecological approach needs to incorporate a social perspective which takes into account the fundamental rights of the poor and the underprivileged. The principle of the subordination of private property to the universal destination of goods, and thus the right of everyone to their use, is a golden rule of social conduct and “the first principle of the whole ethical and social order.” The Christian tradition has never recognized the right to private property as absolute or inviolable, and has stressed the social purpose of all forms of private property.

95. The natural environment is a collective good, the patrimony of all humanity and the responsibility of everyone. If we make something our own, it is only to administer it for the good of all. If we do not, we burden our consciences with the weight of having denied the existence of others. That is why the New Zealand bishops asked what the commandment “Thou shall not kill” means when “twenty percent of the world’s population consumes resources at a rate that robs the poor nations and future generations of what they need to survive.”

As the late, renowned American psychologist Charles R. Snyder summarized, even on a personal basis, “high-hope persons consistently fare better than their low-hope counterparts in the arenas of academics, athletics, physical health, psychological adjustment, and psychotherapy.”

Oxfam estimated that the wealth of just sixty-one people equaled all the wealth of humanity’s poorest half, nearly four billion people.
Richard Holmes, the ‘romantic’ biographer of Coleridge and Shelley, put it memorably when he described biography as a broken bridge into the past: You stood at the end of the broken bridge and looked across carefully, objectively, into the unattainable past on the other side … For me, it was to become a kind of pursuit … You would never catch them; no, you would never quite catch them. But maybe, if you were lucky, you might write about the pursuit of that fleeting figure in such a way as to bring it alive in the present.
The philosophy of history now has its home in the Anglophone world, thanks mainly to Collingwood, who acted as a kind of trait d’union between German (and Italian) philosophy of history on the one hand and its contemporary practitioners in the Anglophone world on the other. Without Collingwood the discipline might well be dead by now and we should be profoundly grateful to him for having prevented the discipline’s premature death. Nevertheless, a price had to be paid for this. Not being able to read German, Collingwood had an only rudimentary grasp of what had been achieved by German philosophers of history. And since most Anglophone philosophers of history have come to the discipline via Collingwood, several of the latter’s blind spots were unfortunately passed on to the contemporary Anglophone philosophy of history. Above all because Collingwood’s writings are the Anglophone philosopher of history’s customary introduction to the discipline’s main problems.
I question Ankersmit's contention that Collingwood was not able to read German. The article in The New World Encyclopedia indicates that he read German, and this comports with my memory from other sources (that I won't take the time to check now). Ditto with the contention that RGC had "only a rudimentary grasp of what had been achieved by the German philosophers of history." Has Ankersmit read The Idea of History?
On a neurological level, the anticipation of failure is stress.
The boundaries of the reality-based community are fuzzy and frothy, not hard and distinct, and the same is true of knowledge itself. What has and has not been validated? Who qualifies as an expert reviewer? Who is doing good science or journalism, who is doing bad science or journalism, and who is not doing science or journalism at all? Distinguishing science from pseudoscience and real news from fake news and knowledge from opinion will never be cut and dried.
With the rise of postmodern values comes a rejection of what are seen as the stale materialistic values of modernism and the chauvinistic and oppressive values of traditionalism.
“Truth, for Goethe, is “a revelation emerging at the point where the inner world of man meets external reality.... It is a synthesis of world and mind, yielding the happiest assurance of the eternal harmony of existence.”