Showing posts with label religion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label religion. Show all posts

Thursday, July 21, 2022

Faith & Reason: Essays in the philosophy of religion by R.G. Collingwood. Edited with an introduction by Lionel Rubinoff

 

Early Collingwood on religion & philosophy


The essays in this book focus on pieces written by Collingwood early in his career. It borrows extensively from his first two books, Religion and Philosophy (1916) and Speculum Mentis (1924). The essays included were also written during this time period.
 
Rather than attempt an exposition of Collingwood’s thoughts manifest in this collection, I’ll simply proffer some observations. Having completed this collection, I’m now diving into Religion and Philosophy, which is the only work of philosophy by Collingwood that I haven’t yet read. My excuse for my tardiness is that it was an early work that commentators have generally slighted. However, my first observation is that it presages many of the themes that Collingwood will go on to explore in greater depth throughout his career. The several portions of Religion & Philosophy included in this collection reveal Collingwood’s concern with “forms of consciousness;” the mind as its activity; the importance of thought; distinctions between disciplines (art, religion, natural science, and history); and the relation of those disciplines to philosophy. We are also introduced to Collingwood addressing idealism and “the Absolute” more directly than what I recall in his later works. (“Realism,” on the other hand, while mentioned in these snippets from Religion and Philosophy and Speculum Mentis, gets a more consistent (critical) treatment throughout his career.)

Now for some more random observations and questions.

  1. Collingwood reveals a significant depth of knowledge and appreciation of Christian theology in his writings. How much of this did he receive at Oxford in classes and seminars, and how much of it came from his reading on his own?
  2. In reading Collingwood, one obtains the sense that these matters are not strictly a matter of professional interest and curiosity. And from probably the best single introduction to Collingwood now available, Fred Inglis’s History Man, we know that young Collingwood made a deliberate entry (Baptism and Confirmation) into the Anglican fold while a student at Rugby. I suspect this religiosity drives his formidable intellect in addressing the issues of God, existence, Atonement, the Absolute, and other theological and philosophical terms he considers in these selections.
  3. Collingwood addresses philosophical idealism more directly here than in any work I’d read previously. In the late 1930s, Collingwood bristled at being labeled an idealist by Gilbert Ryle. (The accusation really riled up Collingwood.)
  4. Collingwood refers to “the Absolute” on various occasions in this collection of works. It seems to me that the Italians, Croce, Gentile, and De Ruggiero, display their greatest influence on Collingwood during this early period. So far as I can discern, talk of “the Absolute” as a working term fades from Collingwood’s vocabulary after the early 1920s.
  5. Collingwood’s reluctance to be caught up in dichotomies is revealed early in his career. Although it's not until Speculum Mentis that I think that he overtly references a dialectical method for this thinking, I find the seedlings of this attitude are on display here. Yet, while he avoids easy dichotomies, he also reveals his penchant for sharp distinctions. For instance, distinctions between thought and feeling; will and thought; art, religion, science, and history; and so on. Collingwood wields his logical scalpel to reveal distinctions, without intending to sunder relationships that constitute the reality he’s investigating. Collingwood uses anatomy to enhance our understanding of the more important physiology.

I will stop here, as I’ve already begun my plunge into Religion and Philosophy for a complete, careful reading. I intend to provide a more careful consideration of Collingwood’s ideas set forth in that book (and then, I think, back for a second reading and consideration of Speculum Mentis). Before closing, I should say that Rubinoff has done an important service by providing this introduction to Collingwood’s early work at the intersection of religion and philosophy. This collection and commentary enhances our appreciation of Collingwood’s life-long project, and it provides deep insights into philosophy, religion, and Christianity.

Friday, November 8, 2019

The Super Natural: A New Vision of the Unexplained by Whitley Strieber and Jeffrey J. Kripal




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2016 publication

This book addresses a topic that neither author can quite explain and don't claim to understand. If you're looking for sure answers or reassurance, this book won't provide it for you. If you're looking for debunkers, this book won't please you. But if you're looking for an honest and diligent inquiry into events that seem just too damned weird by two men who seem--at least on the written page--quite rational and sensible (some really weird stuff notwithstanding), then you might enjoy this book. I did.

This book consists of alternating chapters that create a virtual dialogue between Streiber, who has experienced some really weird stuff, and Kripal, a scholar of comparative religion. Streiber was a fiction writer who lived in the Hudson Valley with his wife Anne in the late 1980s when "beings" (for lack of a more exact term) began to appear in his presence and do things to him and around him. As I said, some really weird stuff. Strieber, in collaboration with his wife, began to write about these experiences. Once published (and he was an established writer already), Streiber and his wife learned  that they were not alone in having experienced visitations from beings that defy any normal classification or description. The most value-neutral term that seems to apply is that Strieber experienced the "paranormal." And I repeat: in this book (I've not read his others), Strieber does not seem "crazy," although he reports crazy stuff happening to him.

Now there are various hypothesizes that one could generate to explain the "true nature" of Whitley's claims: a simple hoax (he sells a lot of books with his fantastic tales); a brain lesion that causes hallucinations (he checked for that--negative); something in the local water; disturbed "spirits;" and so on. And here is where Kripal comes in. Kripal, a scholar of comparative religion at Rice University, now concentrates his focus on the paranormal. (For a more thorough consideration of Kripal's back story, read my review of his book Flip.) Kripal has known Streiber for several years before writing this book and finds Strieber (in my words) a credible witness. But a witness to what? And by the way, what has this to do with religion?

Stop and consider what religions around the world share. The Scriptures of the Jews and Christians, the Quaran, tales of Greek and Norse gods, American Indian stories, tales of Hindu gods and avatars, Tibetan Buddhism, or Taoist tales. All religions have fantastic accounts that defy our current ideas about how "reality" works. No doubt much of this is the religious equivalent of sales puffery or the size of the fish that got away. And these accounts draw upon ancient ideas about science and reality that no longer receive credence in contemporary popular culture. Probably the most charitable and persuasive interpretation of religious narratives is that they serve as myths and metaphors from which we can draw guidance for our lives, as in Joseph Campbell's description of the Hero's Journey or Jungian archetypes that transcend our individual minds, in addition to the accounts of established religions. And in my lifetime, we have the phenomena of UFO sightings and accounts of visitors from "outer space." A version of mass hysteria? An uptick in UFO mania coincided with the Cold War. (And since the end of the Cold War and a change in focus in our primal fears, we've seen an uptick in zombie lore and tales that seem to capture the popular imagination.) All of these possibilities undoubtedly have some merit and truth in them, but do they (or like theories) exhaust the possibilities? Can any single theory account for Streiber's bizarre tales? Is this all about Streiber and his individual brain and mind? Or is there some other reality that has impinged upon Streiber's mind? If so, is this reality governed by contemporary popular ideas about physics and reality? If these experiences are all "in his head," where do they come from? His personal, fevered imagination? He's a writer--an artist!--after all, and he's written horror and speculative fiction. Is this an elaborate guise? Or is he subject to some mass psychosis?

Kripal doesn't believe that any of the possibilities set forth above provide an adequate account of what's going on with Strieber. Like a lawyer building a case, Kripal takes his readers one (alternating) chapter at a time through his attempt to provide a coherent, rational way thinking about Strieber's experiences. This writing duette with its alternating chapters allows both authors to riff upon one another's way of approaching the issues. Also, it provides us with Strieber's accounts in small, tolerable doses; otherwise, I might have cast Strieber's account aside as so much gobbledygook early on. Kripal's methodical, rational investigation of the stories and how to we might understand them provided a needed imprimatur for me.

So where does this book come out? In fact, neither Strieber nor Kripal pretends to provide a definitive account of these (and other) bizarre events. While both men believe in the "reality" of the events that Strieber recounts, neither man conveys any sense of certainty about any conclusions. The only conclusion that I took away is that neither man believes these events "supernatural." Instead, as the title suggests, they believe these events are "super natural." That is, these events are uncommon and not easily understood, but neither are they manifestations of something from "another realm," at least not a realm of the "supernatural" as understood in popular religion. These (in some sense) miraculous events are not the result of divine intervention, but a part of the fabric of reality. And if you think that reality is only what we experience in our daily, hum-drum lives, go read a (reputable) book about quantum physics.

So what do I conclude? I'm not sure at all, but I intend to follow Kripal further down the rabbit hole. What we're perceiving in these accounts is a challenge to accept as credible, but even more so, how we understand these tales that we've been told is the challenging puzzle that intrigues me.

Finally, I must say that the words of a man who saw a ghost kept repeating in my head as I read this book:
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy
Perhaps Hamlet was right.

Monday, October 7, 2019

The Flip: Epiphanies of Mind & the Future of Knowledge by Jeffrey J. Kripal

Look at a photo of Jeffrey Kripal, and you’ll see a pleasant, teddy-bear- looking fellow (or the winner of a Karl Rove look-alike contest). He looks pleasant and friendly, and I suspect he is both. But behind this pleasant facade and seemingly easy-going demeanor is an intellectual daredevil. Let me provide a little background of what I know about this Clark Kent of scholars. 

Kripal was raised in a small town in southeast Nebraska and raised a Catholic. As he reached his teen years, instead of pursuing a the common family pursuit of athleticism, he marked himself off by becoming very thin via religiously-motivated--or so he thought--fasting. And after graduation from high school, he went off to a monastery in Missouri. There, his fellow monks worried about his appearance (thin), and they put him in psychoanalysis with a Benedictine monk. Kripal gained a great deal from this, not the least of which was weight. What he discovered in this process was that he has issues with sexuality that he was suppressing and that he was suffering (as he describes it) from anorexia. With this life-altering and intriguing knowledge, Kripal left that seminary and went to pursue a degree in comparative religion at the University of Chicago. Apparently not one to take the easy course, he concentrated in the Hindu tradition, studying under an acclaimed expert in that tradition, Wendy Doniger. (Surely he learned some Latin and Greek during his time in the Church and in a monastery.) But like Doniger, Kripal’s writings about Hindusim--especially about the sexuality of some Hindu gods and adepts--drew the wrath of militant Hindus, and this eventually drove him from the field. (It seems that writing about the sexuality of religious figures in an established tradition can yield death threats for such perceived transgressions. The same thing happened to Doniger while we lived in India, and her book, The Hindus: An Alternative History, was supposed to be pulled from shelves in India by her publishers--although I found it in Trivandrum, I’m happy to report.)  (Most of this information comes from a Youtube interview of Kripal conducted by science journalist John Horgan, which is well worth watching to get an overview of where Kripal is coming from and what he's up to.)

Karl Rove? No? Well, different thoughts, I'm sure, the likeness notwithstanding


So Kripal took his professional life in a new and no less provocative direction by inquiring into the “paranormal”--all the weird, seemingly impossible things that people report have happened both within and outside of established religions. What’s going on with reports of telepathy, precognition, near-death experiences, levitation, UFO abductions, conversing with spirits, and so on? Needless to say, this broad topic is fraught with challenges and skeptics from both religious and secular perspectives. Nevertheless, he persists, and happily so.

Flip is Kripal’s most recent venture into this field, and I think it serves as a summary of where he’s gone and what (often tentative) conclusions he’s reached so far. (In this, I’m speculating, because I’ve read only one of his earlier works in full, The Serpent's Gift: Gnostic Reflections on the Study of Religion (2006), but Flip certainly seems like a weigh station on his journey). In any event, Kripal provides a useful summary of his conclusions to date and how his thinking along these lines might continue. In the book, he addresses individuals and their “flip” experiences, and ideas about how weird reality might be made more comprehensible through contemporary thinking based on quantum physics and scientifically-informed philosophy. I should note that philosophy is called on in part because it is one the humanities (as opposed to a field in the natural sciences). In short, the humanities deal with the mind or consciousness. As Kripal notes, “Consciousness is the fundamental ground of all we know, or ever will know” (46) and the humanities involve “the study of consciousness coded in culture” (45). Later in the book Kripal reminds us again of the importance of the mind (consciousness) to scientific as endeavors as well as those of the  humanities: 

Mind or consciousness is the locus of all scientific practice and knowledge; that science, at the end of the day, is a function of human subjectivity and consciousness and not, as often assumed, a simple photographic record of the world of things and objects "out there." (15).

Kripal buttresses his arguments via quantum theory, drawing upon, for instance, international relations theorist-turned-quantum social science proponent, Alexander Wendt, along with others. He also draws upon contemporary philosophers such as Philip Goff and Bernardo Kastrup. But the most compelling aspect of the book isn’t the theory (interesting as it is), but in his choice of witnesses to the paranormal. For his testimonials, he draws upon scientists, physicians, a philosopher, and a rationalist--not a “religious” figure among them. A couple of his exemplars I found especially surprising: A.J. Ayer, the famed logical positivist philosopher and Barbara Ehrenreich, a cell biologist and journalist concerned about women’s issues and poverty. But she’s also the author of Living With a Wild God: An Unbeliever’s Search for the Truth about Everything (2014) that details a “flip” experience of her own that occurred in her youth. Another witness (as it were) is Eben Alexander III, a physician who suffered a near-death experience and an extended coma that flipped his perspective on "reality." I trust you get Kripal’s point: this isn’t the group of loonies that you might expect. (For a parody of those whom many would associate with paranormal events, see the SNL skits with Kate McKinnon as the renegade UFO subject whose reports aren’t sweetness and light but instead hilarious sexual shenanigans.) 

This book and Kripal’s project as a whole to inspect what’s under the hood of the paranormal or “super natural” is a careful and thoughtful--and needed--investigation into these undeniable phenomena. He’s fun to read and can hold the reader's attention much as we’d be held in thrall by a . . . well, a ghost story. 

Friday, June 16, 2017

St Paul: The Misunderstood Apostle by Karen Armstrong

28672094Karen Armstrong is among my favorite writers on the topic of religion, and this book only adds to my admiration. Armstrong is not a Biblical scholar nor an academic student of religion, but she’s someone who’s dived deeply into religious traditions and who brings her findings and observations back to the rest of us through thoughtful, carefully researched, and considered books. This book only adds to my admiration for her work.

Armstrong is no stranger to challenging topics: the monotheistic tradition from its Judaic origins to the present (A History of God), Buddha, Mohammed, the Bible, the Axial Age, and religion and violence. But still, St. Paul can present a unique challenge. As Armstrong reports at the beginning of this book, she’d tackled the subject of St. Paul early in her career as a journalist and student of religion. She began that project, undertaken in the late 1970s, with the assumption that Paul took Christianity in a wrong direction, away from the legacy of Jesus. But as she learned more about this enigmatic and fascinating man (although in some ways we know little about him), she changed her opinion. Thus in 1983, she published The First Christian about Paul, whom she initially thought of as the source of misogyny, authoritarianism, and anti-Judaism in the Christian tradition. She reports that she changed her perception in the course of producing that book (and accompanying television series). This work, published in 2015, updates her quest to come to grips with this “misunderstood apostle.”

No one can doubt Paul’s influence. Indeed, I remember some years ago seeing a poll of scholars about the most influential persons in the Western tradition. In that poll, to my surprise at the time, some of the respondents rated Paul’s influence as greater than that of Jesus. I was shocked, but the explanation provided was that without Paul, the nascent tradition surrounding Jesus would have remained within the existing tent of Judaism. Paul, the Pharisee turned apostle after his vision on the road to Damascus, brought the “Good News” to the Gentiles. Paul's ministry caused chagrin to the Jesus movement in Jerusalem, led by James, the brother of Jesus, who intended to remain within the Judaic tradition, or who at least would have required Gentile converts to adhere to Jewish law and custom.


Another intriguing aspect of Paul’s story is the fact that his letters are the oldest documents to be included in the New Testament canon. (Aand I do mean his letters because some letters were later attributed to him by tradition.) Armstrong undertakes a vital project for her readers, in working to separate out what are certainly authentic Pauline letters and words from those later (inaccurately) attributed to him. Also, his authentic letters, epistles, were scrambled in what came to be the official versions, sometimes mixing letters and dates and subjects. Also, later editors would occasionally interject their own words. The Acts of the Apostles, attributed to Luke, comes after Paul’s letters and provides a different (and not especially accurate) account of Paul’s mission. In fact, some of the most controversial (by contemporary standards) passages in Paul’s letters are later interpolations, such as the injunction for wives to be submissive to their husbands, or (maybe) his injunction to defer to the political authorities. (However, Paul, like Jesus and other earlier followers, believed the end times were imminent, and therefore any injunctions were for a transitory period.) Armstrong notes that Paul’s real value was in his proclamation of the Good News to those outside of the Judaic tradition (although Paul was very much a part of that tradition and was never anti-Jewish). Paul's injunctions about love, justice, and equality became fundamental (if all too often ignored) aspects of the Jesus Movement and then Christianity. 

Even misreadings of Paul, such as those of St. Augustine and Martin Luther, have shaped the course of Christianity. How Christians understand, appreciate, and use the legacy of St. Paul remains as vital as ever to the Christian tradition, and Karen Armstrong provides a trustworthy guide to continuing that quest.  

Monday, March 13, 2017

Politics and the Occult: The Left, the Right, and the Radically Unseen by Gary Lachman

History, but not "just" history



Before I get to this book, please indulge me while I engage in a couple of brief tangents that I will tie into the book review in due course. First, I hear people say something to the effect that “people shouldn’t bring religion into politics,” or “in America, our Constitution says we should keep religion and politics separate.” I find these statements well-intentioned and understandable, but nevertheless absurd. Religion and politics have been conjoined since humans conceived of each, and they have been intimate since the dawn of civilization (agriculture and cities). One can argue that as a part of the modern project these concerns should be separated, and in some measure, they address different domains. But they are overlapping Venn diagrams, each claiming a common territory. Religion, broadly conceived, is the stuff of ultimate concerns: how we relate to those powers greater than us (e.g., God, gods, Nature, the Dharma, the Tao, etc.) and how we relate to each other (morality broadly conceived). Politics often addresses the mundane: “Where should we put this road?” and “How much should we levy for taxes this year?” (I was a city attorney for three decades.) In short, the “who gets what, when, and how” of Harold Laswell. But politics also addresses fundamental issues of life and death, such as definitions and punishments for murder, the legality of abortion, declarations of war—the big issues. In short, politics entails both the sacred and the profane; it involves the ethical and the practical. Thus, I can’t imagine keeping religion and politics separate. It’s impossible. On the other hand, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ..”  In other words, what it requires is the separation of church and state, the respective institutions of religion and politics. The First Amendment prohibits the state from interfering in religious belief and practice, regardless of whether conducted within an institutional framework (church, synagogue, mosque, temple, etc.) or arising from the beliefs and practices of any one person. This constitutionally mandated separation of government from religion provides an essential safeguard for the individual, and it protects both religious institutions and government.  Entanglements of church and state create problems for churches and states. 

My next digression involves some post-election communications about Trump and Clinton. In short, one person with whom I had some contact argued that Trump deserved to win over Clinton because Clinton was in cahoots (my term, not his) with “the Illuminati,” such as George Soros. What? I, in my Enlightenment bubble, thought that such nonsense was something that I’d encounter only among the truly wigged-out. Not so. There isn’t a bubble out there; there are more bubbles than we can begin to count. I prefer mine (and I hope that it doesn’t create too distorting a lens), but we need to pop some of these others.

Having allowed myself these two digressions, let me turn to this book and explain why I found my digressions fitting in the circumstances. Gary Lachman’s Politics and the Occult: The Left, the Right, and the Radically Unseen (2008) is about the intersection of religion (or spirituality, if you prefer a wider net) and politics. However,  instead of the usual roster of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, he’s writing about those who inhabit the fringes of those religions and some who draw upon entirely different creeds. If Lachman had shared any jokes in this book, they wouldn’t have set up with a “priest, a minister, and a rabbi walk into a bar,” but “a magician, an adept, and a charlatan walk into a bar.” But unlike the mainstream set-up, where perhaps a Roman collar and a yarmulke would help us distinguish who is who among the mainstream three, among the three occult figures, you couldn’t know who is who from any first glimpse. (N.B. Don’t take this analogy too far; we can’t necessarily tell who is a charlatan in the occult group and only by process of elimination can we identify the minister in the first. Protestants can be so nondescript in public.) The occult has its roots in many of the mainstream traditions, Christian, Jewish, and Islamic, in addition to other traditions (Gnosticism, Hermeticism, etc.), but by definition, the occult remains out of sight and the esoteric reserved for the few. Lachman argues that the occult traditions became more secretive with the advent of the modern world when science and materialism (Newton’s interests notwithstanding) became the dominant ideology. With this tidal shift in culture, concerns about the soul, mind, and consciousness became suspect and began to migrate underground. Thus, the shadow side of religion becomes, even more, a matter of fear and fascination.

The list of occult groups identified and discussed by Lachman is impressive. From early modern times, we get the Rosicrucians, the Freemasons, and the Illuminati. All of these groups clothed themselves in secrecy, which, in addition to practical concerns about repression by ruling authorities, makes each organization more attractive to members (exclusiveness) and more fascinating to outsiders. Also, one can’t help but note that these groups seem to be populated by the elite, not simply (or even primarily) the aristocracy, but the educated elite as well. For instance, both Descartes and Leibniz are associated with the Rosicrucians. (An aside: isn’t Leibniz one of the most brilliant minds of all time?) The elite membership in these organizations certainly enhanced both their prestige and popular resentment of against them.

But how influential—or even powerful—were these early modern occult groups? In the end, the pyramid with the eye on the dollar bill and George Washington’s well-known Freemasonry membership notwithstanding, these groups were not that influential. If you want to gauge the thoughts and beliefs that guided the American Revolution and Founding, you’d do better to study Locke, the Scottish Enlightenment, Montesquieu, the Atlantic Republican tradition, and the English Whig tradition than  Freemasonry. Add the political economy of slavery (as sadly one must), and you have a strong sense of the thinking behind America’s political origins.  Occult organizations also had their fingerprints on the French Revolution, on both the Right and the Left (the time in which these terms emerged), but no group (occult or not) was in control completely or for long until Napolean put an end to the chaos. The ideas behind sea-change of the French Revolution have more to do with Voltaire and the philosophes and their arch-critic Rousseau than any occult dogma or action.

The intersection of the occult and the political continued into the 19th century. At the level of individuals and events, adherents to occult organizations and beliefs have a role, but in the more encompassing mix of culture and political beliefs, their effect is hard to discern. The ideas of Marx and Mill and mainstream religions and philosophies are the most influential. Of course, many small sectarian groups, both political and occult (and sometimes overlapping) populate history since the French Revolution. Zionists and anti-Semitic schemers, utopian socialists and free-love advocates, syndicalists and social welfare groups—experimenters (good and ill) of all types abound as society goes through continued upheavals. As Lachman notes, inquiries into the spiritual, the non-material, and consciousness preceded modernity (and are as old as human culture), but in times of great change and turbulence, these concerns become acuter and more widespread. And beginning in the late 18th century, the turmoil of politics, the wildfires of revolution, the conflagration of wars, imperialism and colonialism, along with changes in technology and culture, vastly increased the total wealth of Western nations and altered the composition of society while dramatically changing the culture. This level of change was—is—unprecedented in human history. But in contrast to the headlong changes in our lived environment, changes in shared consciousness, particularly at the deeper individual levels, seems to move at a much slower pace, taking the course of epochs, not months and years. Thus, to any extent that the occult or esoteric beliefs and practices might have had an effect would, by definition, be limited to an elite and could only disburse slowly through society. By contrast, changes in some religious practices can spread like wildfire through society, for instance, the changes of the Protestant Reformation and the Great Awakening, to provide just two examples. Thus, whatever legitimate hopes initiates might hold in times of great change, the odds are against any significant influence—not to mention control—over events. Thus, for all of the aspiration, the influence of the occult and esoteric remains limited.

But despite the limited influence, the role of occult and esoteric thinkers remains intriguing. Within periods that I’m acquainted with, the footprints bear following. Madame Blavatsky and the Theosophists were proponents of Indian independence at the beginning in the late 19th century. In Romania, the great scholar of religion, Mircea Eliade, had sympathies with Romanian fascist and nationalist groups through the Second World War. Finally, at present, the president’s aide Stephen Bannon cites Julius Evola (along with Lenin) as an intellectual mentor. Evola was an Italian esoteric thinker and critic of modernity who promoted Italian fascism. Thus, while esoteric and occult thinkers certainly have not guided events nor have they been at the forefront of the intellectual currents shaping modern life, neither have their beliefs and personages been negligible. And contemplate this: you may conclude that Stephen Bannon is not the president and that his beliefs, no matter how seemingly fringe or outrageous, are of little consequence. But understand that the man he serves is marked by an extreme intellectual vacuity, and the contents of the House of Horrors that fill Bannon’s mind will undoubtedly—have undoubtedly—streamed in to fill that vacuum.

Before I conclude my review, I need to admit something. I feel a bit guilty about reviewing this book. The guilt comes from the fact that while reading it—and other books and articles by Lachman—I find myself mumbling “hum-hum," making an electronic note of a “yes” to a passage, and generally finding that his comments—never intrusive and or heavy-handed—reflect many of my beliefs and conclusions. I enjoyed this book, like the others, because he channels and expresses so many of my thoughts and perceptions. It’s reassuring the find someone who shares many of your viewpoints, but it may take the edge off of my criticism. If so, so be it; you’re forewarned. 

To illustrate this point, let me quote from his conclusion, where, as in the Introduction, Lachman allows himself to comment more extensively. In the “Last Words” he writes:

Clearly, for anyone who thinks life should be about something more than reality TV, celebrity gossip, and having the “F” word misspelled on your clothes, the secular Western world leaves much to be desired. I include myself in this group. Like many people, I find much about the modern world unappealing. It's for this reason that I find critics of it like Julius Evola and René Guénon [both “Traditionalists”] and others of their sensibilities disturbing—not because of Evola's obvious fascist sympathies or Guénon's elitist ethos, but because many of their criticisms hit the mark. Unless a more moderate rethinking of modernity comes up with something soon, the more extreme alternatives offered by Guénon and others like him will seem attractive. Notwithstanding Evola's repellent racist views, it's not surprising that some of his readers appreciated his belief that the only thing left was to “blow up” everything. Thankfully, the majority take this as a metaphor, and I'd bet that many of us feel something similar at times, although, again thankfully, we have the presence of mind not to succumb to this “purifying” release. To want to knock everything down and start anew has been a part of the human psyche for ages, probably from the beginning. It's a form of metaphysical impatience, and most spiritual practices are aimed at learning how to curb it. But no society or nation can practice Zen or any other discipline; only people can. So it's up to us to refrain from indulging in the delightful and stimulating exercise of smashing everything up.
Lachman, Gary. Politics and the Occult: The Left, the Right, and the Radically Unseen (p. 232). Quest Books. Kindle Edition.

While I’m not well enough acquainted with either Evola or Guenon to endorse their critiques of modernity, I appreciate the sentiment. (See my review of William Ophuls’s book Requiem for Modern Politics and my review of Ian McGilchrist's The Master and His Emissary--also a Lachman favorite--for examples.) But as someone who’s trying to figure out how he can call himself a “Burkean revolutionary” (I’m still working out how I can transform this from a blatant oxymoron into a revealing paradox), I share Lachman’s appreciation of the critique and his desire not to destroy the world in order to perfect it. I didn’t think Donald Trump would be elected president because I didn’t believe enough American were willing to (even metaphorically) “blow up the system,” which Trump is attempting to do.

I also share Lachman’s conception of politics and political thinking:

Politics deals with the possible, not the ideal; it inhabits the messy world of becoming, not the stable world of being. Ideas from the world of being can inform the politics of becoming, but they cannot take its place, which means that as long as the world is the world, there will always be change. Attempts to force some ideal, whether it be right or left, into existence will fail, or success will come at such a cost that failure would have been preferable. While watching the collapse of his beloved Russia during the Bolshevik Revolution, P. D. Ouspensky had deep insight into what he called “the impossibility of violence,” “the uselessness of violent means to attain no matter what.” “I saw with undoubted clarity,” Ouspensky wrote, “that violent means and methods in anything whatever would unfailingly produce negative results, that is to say, results opposed to those aims for which they were applied.” This, Ouspensky said, wasn't an ethical insight but a practical one. Violence simply doesn't work. History, I think, bears Ouspensky out. If humankind and society are going to become “better,” it's not going to happen overnight. As the I Ching counsels, “Perseverance furthers.” And that, as I say, takes patience.

Lachman continues:

            Given that the political world isn't an ideal one, if I was asked which I preferred, the modern world—which allows for shopping malls, dumbed-down culture, and consumer consciousness—or a variant of the spiritual authoritarian theocracies encountered in this book, I'd have to come down on the side of modernity. With Leszek Kolakowski, I'm conservative because I believe that there is much to conserve and that the new is not always better than the old. But with Ernst Bloch I'm a radical, because I believe in the promise of the new, the potential for something that doesn't yet exist to arrive. The challenge, of course, is how to combine the two until we find the Goldilocks-like state of having things “just right.”

Id.

To all of the above, I say “Amen.” Lachman is not only a knowledgeable guide in the field of the occult, the esoteric, and of consciousness studies, but he also proves himself a responsible thinker in the quotidian world of politics. To borrow from the candidates, “I approve this message.”  

One final point. In a year-end blog post, in addition to announcing a new book scheduled for publication this spring about the imagination (including more on Owen Barfield), Lachman announced the receipt of a new commission. He reports:

I’ve also just received a commission from my US publisher, Tarcher Penguin, now Tarcher Perigee, for Dark Star Rising: Magick and Power in the Age of Trump. The book will look at the influence ‘mental science’ and ‘positive thinking’ has had on Trump’s rise to power, and will explore the links between the new ‘alt.right’ movement within the political far right and the political philosophy of the Italian esotericist Julius Evola. I will also look at the influence Alexandr Dugin, a radical political theorist influenced by Evola, ‘chaos magick’ and Martin Heidegger, has on the Russian President Vladimir Putin. In different ways both Trump and Putin seek to destabilize the west and reshape the political and economic map of Europe. With this in mind I will look at the possible connection – if any – between the European Union and a strange political philosophy that began in the late nineteenth century and according to some reports had a hidden but effective influence on European politics. This is what is known as Synarchy, the complete opposite of anarchy. Anarchy means no government; Synarchy means total government. I write about Synarchy in Politics and the Occult  and Dark Star Rising will pick up my account of the occult influence on modern politics from where I left it in 2008.
To borrow a term that I picked up from Lachman, I’m “chuffed” at this prospect. (I hope I’ve used that correctly.) I also hope that by the time of publication that it’s not as topical as it is at the moment, but I’m not banking on that. And even if we are so lucky, we’re going to be trying to discern what happened for some time, and Lachman is sure to provide fascinating insights into our unsettling course of events.



Wednesday, November 2, 2016

Quotes from Ophuls, Pt. 2

Despotism may govern without faith, liberty cannot. Religion is much more necessary in the republic which they set forth in glowing colors than in the monarchy which they attack; it is more needed in democratic republics than in others. How is it possible that society should escape destruction if the moral ties not strengthened in proportion as the political tie is relaxed? And what can be done with the people who are their own masters if they are not submissive to the deity?

Alexi de Tocqueville 29

[M]arx, as much biblical prophet as political philosopher, brokes decisively with Hobbes and the Enlightenment mainstream by brining religion back into politics. The Marxist sovereign has the duty to . . . end the class domination and social oppression that has marred all previous history. When this overweaning objective is joined to the general enlightenment drive for social perfection, the result is an ideological crusade for an earthly paradise – in effect, a secular religion. By resurrecting the eschatological element that Hobbbes had tried to exclude from politics, Marx unleased a new era of quasireligous warfare, both withing and between states. . . . As a political doctrine, Marxism therefore combines the autoritariansim of Hobbes with the very worst aspect of premodern politics: the religious element that Hobbes tried so hard to get rid of. 42


The usual way of putting it is to say that women have escaped an anomalous and inferior status to take their rightful place in the modern world. But it would probably be more accurate to say that capitalism has finally succeeded incorporating the last major class to resist the blandishments of the market system. 52

Wednesday, November 6, 2013

Saving God: Religion After Idolatry by Mark Johnston--Yes, Again





I've reviewed this book here, and I've quoted from or or referenced here, here, and here. If you get the impression that I think this book worthwhile, you'd be right. I recently completed reading it again. I was into thinking more deeply about our human dilemma, our finiteness, our cussedness. This book addresses this problem. Indeed, it's at the heart of the work. Below are quotes from the books which you can use as little meditation pieces, a sort of lectio divina for meditation on what the great monotheisms are about. So whether all at once, or in pieces, here you go.

Saving God is saving God from us, from our lazy and self-satisfied conviction that our conventional patterns of belief and worship could themselves capture God.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (p. 1). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.  



The best thing a believer can say in response to the question “Do you believe in God?” is “I can only hope that I do. I can only hope that I actually stand in a tradition in which God has genuinely revealed himself.” Think of this essay as an exploration of how things look when that hope seeks understanding.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (p. 10). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.



So, for example, when Baruch Spinoza in the Ethics calls the one substance that is the Cosmos “Deus sive Natura,” that is, “God or Nature,” this is not idle because Spinoza finds within the Cosmos a definite path to salvation, a condition that he calls the intellectual love of God, a condition in which one experiences freedom from the bondage of destructive emotions and inadequate ideas. Otherwise, Spinoza’s appropriation of the term “God” would be a forced addition to his philosophical monism, the thesis that everything is a manifestation of the one substance.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (p. 12). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.



. . .  the three monotheisms— Judaism, Christianity, and Islam— are essentially religions of salvation history, religions whose revelations purportedly show God in search of humanity, in order to save that peculiar creature. Monotheism is in part the extraordinary idea that we matter that much to the Highest One. The very idea of salvation history is thus extraordinary; in fact it is utterly shocking, and so it is clearly not guaranteed by the idea of God as such. That God is our salvation is monotheism’s shocking and very substantial claim, which is to say that it does not follow from the meaning of “God,” the title or descriptive name whose meaning is best understood as given by a description like “the Highest One.”

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (p. 12). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.


In offering a first pass at a neutral account of salvation, we might begin with the idea of spiritual materialism. “Spiritual materialism” is a term from the sixties, used then to denote the consumerist attitude of self-described “seekers” who were always on the lookout for the latest, most fashionable guru or meditation technique or method of self-transformation. The implied criticism was that the spiritually “materialistic” seekers had undergone no fundamental change in their orientation to life but had simply taken up the hobby of self-improvement, with its endless opportunities for self-worship. The ordinary unredeemed self remained at the center of things; the same lust for advantage and desire for power that drive people in ordinary life were simply projected onto the supposedly spiritual realm disclosed by LSD or Zen or Vedanta or Buddhism or Transcendental Meditation. It was a charge of religious fraudulence in some ways akin to the old charge of idolatry made by the monotheisms as they defined themselves against their own polytheistic and henotheistic origins. What makes one religious orientation fraudulent and another authentic? In the context of monotheism the primary conception of religious fraudulence has centered on idolatry, that is, worshipping the wrong god, or the right god in the wrong way.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (pp. 14-15). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.


Genuine or true religion must be genuinely directed upon what religion is for. There are certain large-scale structural defects in human life that no amount of psychological adjustment or practical success can free us from. These include arbitrary suffering, aging (once it has reached the corrosive stage), our profound ignorance of our condition, the isolation of ordinary self-involvement, the vulnerability of everything we cherish to time and chance, and, finally, to untimely death. (Yes, death can be a release, but only when suffering or corrosive aging has already undermined the goods that an untimely death would have otherwise destroyed.) The religious or redeemed life is a form of life in which we are reconciled to these large-scale defects of ordinary life.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (p. 15). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.


[S]till, the idea of salvation says that even in the face of such things there must be a way to go on, keeping faith in the importance of goodness, and an openness to love. Now there are certain virtues (i.e., beneficial dispositions of character) that religious practice deepens. The virtues in question somehow reconcile us to the large-scale defects of human life. Herein lies the distinction between the “ordinary” and the so-called theological virtues. Ordinary virtue— self-confidence, flexibility, openness, self-directed irony, perseverance, fair-dealing, moderation, and good judgment— takes life on its own unredeemed terms and makes the most of it by way of these dispositions of character often so beneficial in ordinary life. By contrast, the so-called theological virtues change the terms of life. Thus, in the Christian tradition, faith, hope, and love are cited not merely as intensifications of ordinary virtue, but as the conditions of a transformed or redeemed life. That might help us understand the charge of spiritual materialism, even as it applies outside the theistic religions. The spiritual materialist is inauthentic in his engagement with religion, and with his spiritual quest or search, precisely because he simply turns his ordinary unredeemed desires toward some supposedly spiritual realm. However intense his experiences, they do not deepen in him the theological virtues that constitute the change of orientation that makes for a new life. Salvation, understood as the goal of religious or spiritual life, is a new orientation that authentically addresses the large-scale defects of human life, and thereby provides a reservoir of energy otherwise dissipated in denial of, and resistance to, necessary suffering. Salvation, so understood, is not the mere feeling or conviction that you are “saved.” It is a new form of life.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (pp. 15-16). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition. 



Belief in God is not a matter of believing in the proposition that he exists; it is an orientation in which the Highest One comes into view, with salvific effect.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (p. 16). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.



If I speak in the tongues of men and of angels, but have not love, I am only a resounding gong or a clanging cymbal. If I have the gift of prophecy and can fathom all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I have a faith that can move mountains, but have not love, I am nothing. If I give all I possess to the poor and surrender my body to the flames, but have not love, I gain nothing.
Nothing? The immanent and heroic form of first-century Christian life is nothing? Yes, nothing, zero, a waste, if it is not animated by agape. Are we not here reminded of the guiding rule for serious thought about religion, the rule so well articulated by Karl Barth, when he wrote that religion is faithlessness; or, as we might put it, that religion’s natural character, even at its humanly heroic best, is to be a form of substitution of the inessential for the essential, the god for God? As Barth puts it, “true religion” is like “redeemed sinner”; even after redemption the sinner remains a sinner, and even if a religion is true, it will be naturally filled with the inessential and the false. If there is any religion that is true, then this is because of something wholly extraneous to it, namely, God’s activity in animating the religion. 1

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (p. 19). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.


Where it is not simple worship of lifeless idols, idolatry is an attempt to domesticate the experience of Divinity, to put it to some advantage in a still unredeemed life. And then the true God slips away.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (p. 20). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.  



There is a massive consensus, across the major religions, that salvation crucially requires overcoming the centripetal force of self-involvement, in order to orient one’s life around reality and the real needs of human beings as such. Given the strength of the centripetal force, it is too easy to invent objects of worship that instead serve as echo chambers for our individual self-worship, or for the collective self-worship of our nation, tribe, or religious group. So the idolater, in declaring fealty to his idolized god, is typically persevering in his own willfulness.
Idolatry is, then, invariably the attempt to evade or ignore the demanding core of true religion: radical self-abandonment to the Divine as manifested in the turn toward others and toward objective reality.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (pp. 23-24). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.



[T]he very ideas of religion as essentially supernaturalist, and of God as essentially a supernatural being, are idolatrous conceptions. The idolatrous religions degrade their putative experience of Divinity by entirely wedding it to the passing and adventitious worldviews of their founding fathers. So the hard work of reexpressing the experience of Divinity within a more plausible worldview does not get done, because elements of the outdated worldview have come to provide crucial secondary compensations for those who would use their religion as a venue for spiritual materialism.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (p. 39). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.



The idea of the Fall, the idea of original sin, is minimally the idea that there is something deeply problematic that comes with the condition of being human. Yet in falling, Eve exhibits just two faults, a certain self-will, manifested in her disobedience, and a longing for wisdom— knowledge of good and evil— from the tree. Why does that combination entail her, and our, expulsion from Paradise? What moralists sometimes call “self-love” or “self-will,” the tendency to seek premium treatment for oneself at significant cost to others, has its roots in the very structure of consciousness. One’s own consciousness, the arena of presence and action in which and out of which each one of us lives our lives, presents itself as a fundamental context for the worldly happenings that make up the details of one’s life. So long as we are alive, we ourselves are always around; every time we wake up in a chair or in bed, there we are, coeval with the appearance and reappearance of the world. And so we operate as if the world just wouldn’t be the world unless we were HERE, as it were, at the center of it. In this way it can seem as if we are the fountainhead of the very reality we inhabit. To probe a little more into this: each one of us finds him- or herself at the center of an arena of presence and action. This arena can be thought of as a composite psychological field, consisting of one’s perceptual field, the field of bodily sensation, and the field of imagination and thought.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (p.82- 83). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.



Let us now consider the question of the Fall. What happens when that peculiar thing, the human animal, makes its appearance on earth? What happens when an extended capacity for self-consciousness, an extensive symbolic memory, and an impressive capacity for practical deliberation to action are added to this basic orientation of animal consciousness? How do these enhanced capacities interact with the experienced arena, and with the basic evaluative asymmetry between “HERE” and “THERE”? One thing that emerges is a developed sense of one’s own life as extending out of a remembered past into an anticipated future, a future that is sensed as capable of being shaped by one’s practical deliberation toward action. This brings with it a sense of one’s life as something to be lived; that is, shaped according to some conception of the worthy or the good— some conception that would provide at various times in one’s life more or less consistent reasons to continue to live one’s life in a certain way, and so allow for meaningful deliberative effort in life, rather than just living by whim. Such conceptions of the worthy or the good can initially be absorbed only from those around us. They are validated by our community to the extent that those conceptions dovetail with our community’s interests, indeed with the interests of the various communities we inhabit. The conceptions must then be, or appear to be, partly other-regarding conceptions of what is worthy or good; that is, they must be conceptions that represent some putative ways of benefiting others as themselves good, worthy, even demanded. Some sense of the prima facie legitimacy of other-regarding demands— some kind of conscience— is thus a widespread feature of the human form of self-consciousness. This has two notable causes. One is our felt demand to give some direction to our lives, to shape our lives to some degree by some conception (it might in fact be confused or perverted) of what is worthy, a conception that we can consult at various moments of deliberation to action, whatever variation in our whims and fancies might occur across those moments. The second is our initial lack of originality when it comes to such conceptions; we have no choice but to absorb them from the others, and what they have on offer will invariably be conceptions of the good that are to some extent other-regarding.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (pp. 85-86). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.



Psychologically opposed to this, each one’s extended self-consciousness makes explicit the fact that he or she is at the center of an arena of presence. Constantly finding oneself at the center, one finds oneself to be privileged— as something to be protected, as something to be prized. Thanks to our extended self-consciousness and our capacity to articulate what we find, what was in the higher animals merely an organizing form of animal self-protectiveness now becomes something more. It becomes a more or less explicit deliberative theme, a default starting point in one’s practical reasoning: one’s own interests just seem paramount. Hence self-will, the tendency to put one’s finger on one’s own side of the scales, a tendency whose real motto is “I am to be given premium treatment.” The psychological urgency of self-interest sits uneasily with the other-regarding conceptions of the good that one has absorbed. Neither is stably experienced as a wholly appropriate object of the will; and so there is the familiar cycle of self-will, obedience to “the Law,” guilt at failure, effort at improvement, and the inevitable lapse into self-indulgence. One is a secret, or not so secret, betrayer of the very good one has internalized. At the same time “the Law”— the conception of the good one has internalized from the others— is likely to be compromised in fundamental ways. First, it is likely to be “averaged out.” In order to be commonly available from the others and for all, it must prescind from the detailed lineaments of this or that temperament, personality, or character; in the worst case it is a pair of pants meant to fit all, which in fact produces close to universal discomfort. (Or it evades this problem by enormous flexibility, by turning a blind eye to near universal defection in a variety of circumstances, so that those who passed the conception of the good on to us seem either impossibly lax or hypocritical.) Second, the conception of the good on offer from the others is likely to have the unquestionable character of an embedded natural conviction, something that they know to be the right way of going on, a knowledge that each defends by pointing to what is commonly taken as obvious. So it can present itself in the guise of an unquestionable necessity. And third, a conventionally available conception of the good needs to be collectively defended. For it functions as an answer that can silence the question “How am I then to live?”— a question that would be terrible if left unanswered, because then we would have no practical way of responding to the demand that we live our life. Without some such conception, we are left to face the terror that there may be no way to live our life, nothing worth doing between now and the moment of our death. Because adhering to the conception reduces the threat of this terror, the conception will be defended with a certain violent intensity, an intensity that comes not from the reasoned sense that there is after all something to be said for it, but from repressed anxiety: without this way to live our lives there may be no way to live our lives. This terror of conscience, the felt but unanswered need to live one’s life out of some conception of the good, is a kind of existential threat; it threatens the very possibility of our existing as deliberative, and hence as human, beings. Here we have the natural source of the idolatrous element in “works righteousness” or respectability; an adventitious and compromised conception of the way to live is rigidly held to, and treated as an absolute, because of an inability to face the terror that might come from challenging it. One sign of this repressed existential anxiety lies in the violence associated with the policing of the common conception of the good; the stigmatizing of those who have found other ways to live; and the cathartic scapegoating of the transgressors. (About which, more later, in the discussion of René Girard’s theme of the cathartic function of symbolic sacrifice.) This means that the common conception of the good, even though it may in fact be a conception of intrinsic goods, things that are indeed worthy of pursuit in themselves, can actually function as mostly instrumental, in that it mainly serves to block a terrible, and still unresolved, anxiety about how to live. So part of our fallen condition consists in the fact that what we rely on to silence the call of conscience, the question of how to live our life, is an internalized adventitious conception of the good that is compromised in at least three ways: in its averageness, in its appearing as a false necessity, and in its functioning as a defense mechanism against existential anxiety. Original sin, the sin that comes with the condition of being human, is thus not just the self-will that resists the other-regarding demands built into one’s internalized conception of the good. It is self-will combined with a covetous and violent protection of the compromised fruit we have plucked from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Here, then, is an interpretation of the myth of the Fall. Paradise is not for us because we are by our natures caught in an oscillation between self-will and false righteousness. Neither is a happy resting place.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (pp. 86-88). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.
You can become more respectable without approaching the ethical life any more closely. The ethical life does not consist in the triumph over self-will by way of moral effort directed at the conventionalized good. That triumph is not so much a way of breaking out of the cycle of self-will, obedience to “The Law,” guilt at failure, effort at improvement, and the inevitable lapse into self-indulgence, as a way of locking oneself into one stage in the cycle, obedience to “the Law.” And there is considerable evidence that the triumph of moral effort over self-will— for example, in what is called “the authoritarian personality”— is far from costless when it comes to the virtues of flexibility, openness, self-directed irony, and an appreciation of the festive character of life. (Think of Luther the monk, and his grim and idolatrous religiosity, as he himself confesses it.) That is one sign that the rigorously respectable life is not the ethical life. What of the no doubt attractive, and even to some degree excellent, life of a person who has the ordinary virtues of self-confidence, flexibility, openness, self-directed irony, perseverance, fair-dealing, moderation, and good judgment? Is this not the ethical life? All would have been well with this, it seems, had it not been for the apparently authoritative announcement that the Reign of God is at hand, and the associated commands, expressed for example in Mark 12: 30– 31:
Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength: this is the first commandment. And the second is like unto this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.
The claim of the life of ordinary virtue to be the ethical life is nullified by such an announcement and such commands, at least if they are truly authoritative.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (p. 89). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.



The truly ethical life is a life in which you encounter yourself as one person among others, all equally real. This means that the legitimate interests of others, insofar as you can anticipate them, will figure on a par with your own legitimate interests in your practical reasoning— that is, in your reasoning as to what you should do and what you should prefer to happen. Inevitably, given that each one of the others counts the same as you in your practical reasoning, the interests of others often will swamp your interests in your own practical reasoning as to what you should do and prefer. For you will find yourself to be only one of the others, the one you happen to know so much about, thanks to being him or her. Here I follow Thomas Nagel in identifying the ethical life with a life whose guiding principle is radical altruism or agape. 8 As many have pointed out, the ethical life in this sense is madly demanding, and one of the things that it puts in jeopardy is the very ability to live a meaningful life, in the ordinary sense of that term.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (p. 90). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.



The closing of the book:


This world, properly seen, is the outpouring and self-disclosure that is the Highest One. This outpouring and self-disclosure, this kenosis or self-emptying of Being that envelops everything, is the site of the sacred. So we are “already on holy ground.” A saved human being is just a finite manifestation of the kenosis, filled with an awareness of itself as such, an awareness made manifest in that human being’s turn toward reality and the real needs of others.

For one who is saved, the glory that is negates the necessity of the glory to come. There need be no next world. There need be no heavenly antechamber where the decisive events of spiritual history occur. These ideas may just be leftovers from the superstitious and idolatrous attempts to placate spiritual powers and principalities. 
There is, however, another world— it is this world properly received.

Johnston, Mark (2011-07-11). Saving God: Religion after Idolatry . Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.

As long as this post is, it's only a glimpse of what is in the book. By the way, I really enjoy the way he skewers the "undergraduate atheists".


Monday, April 22, 2013

Be Afraid, Be Very Afraid---Or Better Yet, Don't



I want to share some random thoughts on recent convergences between events and my reading. The events have to do with injury and death, and the reading primarily, concerns and NNT’s Antifragile, as well as some blog sites.
The attack on the Boston Marathon and the subsequent pursuit and capture of the bombers has taken a total of four lives, with a number of other people critically or seriously wounded some suffering horrible injuries that will alter the remainder of their lives. At Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut last December, 27 persons, including teachers and children, lost their lives. In Aurora Colorado last summer, 13 people lost their lives at the hands of the lone gunman. Finally, around the time of the events in Boston, a plant exploded in Texas taking 14 lives. One never wants to fall into the logic of Stalin’s cruel adage that “a single death is a tragedy, a million is a statistic”, but we do need to look carefully at what mortally threatens us.

Although it’s too early to know yet the full extent of whatever arsenal the Boston bombers held, it was surely significant given the firefight that they entered into with the authorities. Yet, immediately before those events, the U.S. Senate, despite polls showing overwhelming support, refused to take any action to limit or control access to firearms. The huge disconnect between the threat of firearms in our society and the willingness of the federal government to address this issue is truly frightening.

What we learned from the firearms debate, as well from other debates over a number of other issues, that our political system is broken. It is broken because the Senate refuses to alter the antiquated and anti-democratic practice of the filibuster; it is broken because a minority of the population and often a minority of the minority of the population) can effectively veto any legislation; and finally, our system is thoroughly corrupted by our campaign financing system. I personally decided to get involved with rootstrikers.org as a way to try to get the issue of political corruption addressed (I’ll be more writing more about this soon).

We also have to consider the stories that we will attribute to Boston. Was it an act of “terrorism”? Was it at an act of jihad, or was it a Columbine-like act? I think it is too early to say, but what I fear we are seeing is a fusion of the two lines of terror. If we limit the definition of terrorism to overtly political acts planned and perpetrated with some ultimate political goal in mind, then we still can’t be sure if the Boston bombers qualify. However, if we broaden the definition to include acts like those at Sandy Hook, Aurora, and Columbine High School, then surely we have encompassed possible motives for the Boston bombers. What do the actions of those who perpetrated Columbine, Aurora, and Sandy Hook have in common with those of the Boston bombers? All were the actions of young males. It may be that the Boston bombers intended to give some patina of jihadism them to their attacks, but we may be missing a much more fundamental phenomena. If history has taught us anything (and I warily use that tired cliché), it is the volatility and danger of young men. In India, we see it in some bombings, but most commonly in acts of horrific violence against women and children. The way the acts of disaffected young men play out varies, but the inclination—even preference—for violence is marked. Cliodynamics expert Peter Turchin suggests that we will see an upswing of violence sometime within the next 10 years. I hope he’s wrong, but events of the last year suggest he may have some insight.

Boston may show, and it’s my theory in general, that Islam, and jihadism in particular, are often simply vehicles for disaffected young men acting out their violent resentments. Religion (and this can include Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism, among others) can give form and meaning to the violent proclivities we observe, but none of these belief systems intrinsically promotes this attitude. Indeed, the vast majority practitioners and doctrines in each religion prefer peace and compassion.



The photo above (taken from Stephen Walt’s blog) is perhaps the scariest image of the week. All of us owe thanks to law enforcement officials who quickly identified and apprehended these violent criminals. (These young men committed criminal acts—whatever motives we attribute to them—and they should be prosecuted as such). More importantly, however, it’s the lock down and manhunt in Boston should give us pause. During that one day, Boston approached a police state. The radical gun proponents seem to think that their rights are going to be taken away by a liberal-dominated government seeking to take away their weapons (a fantasy if there was one), but it’s our desire as a nation  to assure absolute safety that makes it much more likely that we’d fall prey to authoritarian government. I’ve said many times before that war is the greatest enemy of democracy; a war on crime or terrorism is perhaps an even greater threat than wars undertaken abroad. I say this not as a criticism of any elected officials or law enforcement officials who acted this week in Boston, but as a general warning. We have to keep the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and our historic and long-standing system of criminal procedure intact. Shame on Senators Lindsey Graham (R. South Carolina) and John McCain (R. Arizona) for seeking to undermine and denigrate our criminal justice system.

The other very troubling aspect of the Boston shut down was the message that it sent to other would-be criminals, whether whatever their motivations. We have sent the message that a major American city can be shut down by a single violent criminal at large. Granted, he was dangerous and should have been treated by both the law enforcement and civilians with the greatest of caution, but were we wise to send this message? Although there a lot of precedents that I would not look to Israel for guidance about, its attitude towards terrorist actions (or criminal actions) is to go about life as normally as possible. These are the words that Obama uttered, but they are not the actions that officials in Massachusetts took.

Largely missing from the news because of how it fit into the events in Boston, was the explosion of a plant in Texas. This is Texas that prides itself on its lack of regulation of businesses (“intrusive or burdensome regulations”) and so-called tort reform (price controls on tort recoveries). I can’t help but think of India when I think of Texas, as India has this unregulated Wild West aspect to it. In assessing risks and where to live, two things I would consider are a state (or nation’s) gun laws (the more restrictive the safer the locale) and the strength of their regulatory and legal system. If potentially dangerous entities are regulated and subject to legal sanctions when they endanger people, then a locale is safer. To paraphrase Lincoln Steffens (who really got it wrong about the Soviet Union), “I have seen the future, and it doesn’t work”.

We need to sort out the risks in our lives. We cannot be absolutely safe, and as NNT argues in Antifragile, attempts to do so can actually prove counterproductive. This dictum applies to terrorism, it applies to crime, it applies to gun regulation, and it applies to other types of regulations. Finding the optimal mix of regulation and control is the challenge. It’s going to take some hard, clearheaded thinking. It’s going to involve taking some risks and realizing that the more we attempt to make ourselves absolutely safe, the more we endanger ourselves.

Here are some discussions of the situations that I’ve found worthwhile: 

E.J. Dionne: https://www.readability.com/articles/cie4zdi5 “They Way Forward on Guns”


Robert Wright: https://www.readability.com/articles/vksvrwqd “Drone Strikes and the Boston Marathon Bombings”

NYT: https://www.readability.com/articles/zncm1fti “Legal Questions Riddle the Boston Marathon Case” 

John Cassidy: https://www.readability.com/articles/ckmkklcx “Terrorist Hunt Sends America Over the Edge”

Rick Perlstein https://www.readability.com/articles/gf0frysx “Our Politics of Fear”

Jack Goldstone, https://www.readability.com/articles/txgthswo “Tragedy in Boston”

Bill Minutaglio, NYT http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/20/opinion/in-the-texas-plant-explosion-history-repeats-itself.html 
"Texas on Fire, Again and Again"