Friday, October 29, 2021

Thoughts: 29 October 2021

 


[T]he gap between infinite human desires and finite biological resources is at root a moral problem—How and where shall we place a controlling power on human will and appetite?—not something that can be bridged by merely technical or material measures. Hence the solution must be spiritual or religious lest it be nakedly political. 

Many will balk at this bald statement, believing along with the Enlightenment philosophes that religion has no place in the political realm. But in fact we do have a guiding myth of eternal progress through technological prowess and a tacit religion in the form of a secular ideology tantamount to a religion—namely, an absolute faith in the efficacy of instrumental rationality. The problem is that this “faith” lacks a moral core—in other words, anything that would moderate human self-seeking or the insatiable quest for more wealth and power. Its credo is that humankind must use rational means to become the master and possessor of nature and then use that power to achieve personal and national wealth. The overly rationalized and morally unrestrained world in which we find ourselves was created by this quasi-religion and cannot be reformed with more of the same, only by metanoia. That is, by a conversion to a radically different metaphysical stance that restores humanity’s relation to the infinite and provides guidance and practical support for living well on the earth without devouring it.

My initial reaction to reading this? To yell "Amen! Amen! Amen!" We can't heal our political divisions until we have a sense of the common good, a morality, a new sense of being in the world. Truly, a "metanoia," a "conversion"--a change in our heart-mind-- is required if we are to survive, let along thrive.


Morris Berman and Stephen E. Toulmin chronicle the development of the modern mindset: Berman sees revived participation as the necessary response to the disenchantment of the world; Toulmin’s revisionist history suggests that we would have done better to ground modern science on Montaigne rather than Descartes, for this would have lead us earlier to an ecological worldview.
Where Western Civ too a wrong turn.

Although it was rarely clearly articulated or even fully realized by the contrarian artists and intellectuals themselves, the liberal values of modernity were deemed unacceptable because they lacked a strong vision of the transcendent—a form of ultimate meaning that is more important than the needs of the individual self.
Compare to the first Ophuls quote above.

Physical energy is the obvious source of power in biological organisms and human economies, but consciousness, and the agreements that constitute human culture, are not physical or material. While the domain of culture is closely connected to physical things and transactions in the exterior objective world, like consciousness itself, culture is largely an interior phenomenon which can only be fully known by participating in the subjective agreements that give it life.
Also compare to the first Ophuls quote. Our culture needs a metanoia.

If a “community of rational interests and values” existed on the domestic front, then why not in the international community as well?
Because, [Hans] Morgenthau answered, there was no such thing as an international community. Domestic disputes could be resolved—not solved—through discussion and negotiations, or when negotiation failed, by appeals to the sovereignty of the state and the authority of the law. In the relatively benign context of the Western democracies, even those who disagreed with particular outcomes were willing to accept them so that they could live to dispute another day. Only small, knuckle-dragging minorities resorted to violence, and they were vastly outnumbered by the overwhelming law-abiding majority. Consensus was possible because within national borders people agreed to disagree. This was the very meaning of “legitimacy.” “Disputants could not fail to realize that what they had in common was more important than what they were fighting about. They met, indeed, on the common ground of liberal rationality, and their conflicts, since they arose under the conditions and within the framework of the liberal society, could all be settled through the instrumentalities of liberal rationality.”
Query: per this re-statement of Morgenthau's contention, can we say that current American politics, government, and law have lost their legitimacy--at least among Trumpists who are more than ready to overthrow democracy to remain in power?

The experience [of losing a great deal of money in the stock market] left a deep impression on Keynes. Financial markets, he had discovered, were very different from the clean, ordered entities economists presented in textbooks. The fluctuations of market prices did not express the accumulated wisdom of rational actors pursuing their own self-interest but the judgments of flawed men attempting to navigate an uncertain future. Market stability depended not so much on supply and demand finding an equilibrium as it did on political power maintaining order, legitimacy, and confidence.
My conclusion: all economics (or at least macroeconomics) is political economics. "The economy" (a major league abstraction) is a function of groups, individuals, mores, interests, beliefs, culture, institutions, etc., and not a neat system of intersecting curves.

Europe, it appears, offered the perfect degree of environmental difficulty, challenging its inhabitants to rise to greater civilizational heights, even as it still lay in the northern temperate zone, fairly proximate to Africa, the Middle East, the Eurasian steppe, and North America; thus its peoples were able to take full advantage of trade patterns as they burgeoned in the course of centuries of technological advancements in navigation and other spheres.

It comes back, then, to the question of the self-image. Miseries, humiliations, embarrassments, accidents, have the effect of creating partial self-images—self-images which, since they present themselves as complete, are bound to be false.  Consciousness narrows, and my self-image becomes as false and distorted as if I was seeing myself in a trick mirror at a fairground. But a trick mirror at least shows you your whole self, from head to foot; the partial self-image is a pocket-size distorting mirror.

I propose that Michael Pollan’s seven words for healthy eating ["Eat food, not too much, mostly plants"] can be re-stipulated into these six words: 1) protect the liver, 2) feed the gut. This includes animals.

Thursday, October 28, 2021

Thoughts: 28 October 2021

 

The great danger of equality is atomization. If we’re all side by side on the same level and constantly in motion, there’s no fixed relation between us. “Aristocracy links everybody, from peasant to king, in one long chain,” Tocqueville wrote. “Democracy breaks the chain and frees each link.” Equal and independent people will satisfy their own desires with no obligation to others outside their narrow circle. The chance to be anything or anyone gives them the idea that they don’t owe anything to anyone. They grow indifferent to the common good and withdraw from others into the pursuit of personal happiness, especially wealth. Tocqueville called this “individualism.” It explains how the American passion for equality can lead to extreme inequality, even a new aristocracy, but one without links between people.
This quote and the following one from William Ophuls direct our attention to the shadow side of democracy, it's inherent defects that must receive our continuing attention and course corrections. Also, consider this quote in light of our failure to take actions for the common good in response to the pandemic.


As in a Greek tragedy, democracy’s virtue is also a fatal flaw. For it is in the nature of democratic polity to foster increased freedom, and as freedoms compound they eventually produce an unstable, ungovernable society in which anything goes.

Our politics, religion, news, athletics, education and commerce have been transformed into congenial adjuncts of show business, largely without protest or even much popular notice. The result is that we are a people on the verge of amusing ourselves to death.
Consider in light of the preceding quotes from Packer & Ophuls. Since Postman published this book in the early 1980s, the American people (never a majority) voted in sufficient numbers to elect an utterly unqualified, undignified rich kid (old at the time, but still . . .) made most famous by "reality" (staged) TV. How prescient--sadly.

The real cycle you’re working on is a cycle called yourself. The machine that appears to be “out there” and the person that appears to be “in here” are not two separate things. They grow toward Quality or fall away from Quality together.

This truth—a-lÄ“theia, that which is disclosed (Heidegger)—can be conceived only as another “appearance,” another phenomenon originally hidden but of a supposedly higher order, thus signifying the lasting predominance of appearance. Our mental apparatus, though it can withdraw from present appearances, remains geared to Appearance. The mind, no less than the senses, in its search—Hegel’s Anstrengung des Begriffs—expects that something will appear to it.

Heidegger’s philosophical vision may have been cogent and powerful, but it was time-bound and partial, and so too was his notion of humanity itself—which [Leo] Strauss called “narrow.” There was neither tenderness to his thought, nor a consideration of love or charity, or any of the other finer impulses in humanity. Heidegger appealed to anyone who embraced a “tragic sense of life” as the only, or at least the most sophisticated, outlook, but he had nothing to say, Strauss observed, about “laughter and the things which deserved to be laughed at.”
One doesn't read Heidegger (if at all) for laughs, for humor, for kindness, or a sense of human warmth. A sound critique from Leo Strauss.

Calculations done by scientists from Fred Hoyle to F. B. Salisbury consistently show that twelve billion years isn’t even enough to produce a single enzyme by chance.

A simple first-pass way to define intuitions is to say that they are judgments (or decisions, which can also be quite intuitive) that we make and take to be justified without knowledge of the reasons that justifies them. Intuition is often characterized as “knowing without knowing how one knows.” Our conscious train of thought is, to a large extent, a “train of intuitions.” Intuitions play a central role in our personal experience and also in the way we think and talk about the mind in general, our “folk psychology.”

“Once man loses his faculty of indifference he becomes a potential murderer; once he transforms his idea into a god the consequences are incalculable. We kill only in the name of a god or of his counterfeits: the excesses provoked by the goddess Reason, by the concept of nation, class, or race are akin to those of the Inquisition or of the Reformation”
Cioran was a mid-20th century Romanian writer.

The student of historical method will hardly find it worth his while, therefore, to go closely into the rules of evidence, as these are recognized in courts of law. For the historian is under no obligation to make up his mind within any stated time. Nothing matters to him except that his decision, when he reaches it, shall be right: which means, for him, that it shall follow inevitably from the evidence.
So long as this is borne in mind, however, the analogy between legal methods and historical methods is of some value for the understanding of history; of sufficient value, I think, to justify my having put before the reader in outline the above sample of a literary genre which in the absence of any such motive it would, of course, be beneath his dignity to notice.
An intriguing point if one is, like me, a lawyer and a student of history. I find a lot of overlap. Both deal with the past when the lawyer is involved in resolving--as opposed to trying to avoid--disputes.

Wednesday, October 27, 2021

Thoughts: 27 October 2021

 

A fall 2021 publication: history of the very recent--and in some sense--ongoing present

But two basic elements were missing from the original fascist equation in America in 2020. One is total war. Americans remember the Civil War and imagine future civil wars to come. They have recently engaged in expeditionary wars that have blown back on American society in militarized policing and paramilitary fantasies. But total war reconfigures society in quite a different way. It constitutes a mass body, not the individualized commandos of 2020.
The other missing ingredient in the classic fascist equation, which is more central to this book, is social antagonism, a threat, whether imagined or real, to the social and economic status quo.
I'm skeptical of "Trumpism=fascism" contentions even by some of the more cautious thinkers who've made this assertion. ("Fascism" was a form of illiberalismthat arose in mid-20th century Europe.) And the first element mentioned by Tooze is (happily) missing. Bu the second element, "social antagonism," seems to me to be lurking around us. Threats "real or imagined," abound: immigration, de-industrialization, and changing cultural norms pop to mind But the changes that climate change will force upon us will ratchet-up social pressures and antagonisms, even if we act as wisely and expeditiously as we can. So much change! And if we don't act in a way to avoid the worst and seek the best, won't all hell break loose?

Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live.
The above is the ground of politics: our equality ("we are all the same") and our plurality ("nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live"). Add birth and death, and you have the human condition. Some would do away with politics. Don't let them.

Clearly “the Bible has no place for a tyrannical anthropocentrism unconcerned for other creatures.”
I will trust that Pope Francis is correct about this. And if not correct, it should be.


Psychologists suspected that the emphasis on feeling safe grew from a parenting culture which increasingly “prepared the road for the child, not the child for the road,” as Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt argued in their 2018 book, The Coddling of the American Mind.

Roman civilisation provides evidence of an advance towards ever more rigidly systematised ways of thinking, suggestive of the left hemisphere working alone. In Greece, the Apollonian was never separate from the Dionysian, though latterly the Apollonian may have got the upper hand.
This contention set off my "overgeneralization!" alarm, but then consider Hannah Arendt's contention that St. Augustine (of the declining empire) was the only true philosopher the Romans ever had. (Sorry you Stoics and Epicureans!)

“The one fundamental science” of the Renaissance, according to one authoritative scholar, was “knowledge of the soul.” This was what Ficinian Neoplatonism was all about. (And if this be so, then why, O why, I ask you, my Italian colleagues who have the Renaissance on which all Europe lives to this day, in the blood of your psyche, do you turn to us up north for psychology, to Marxism and Existentialism, to Adorno and Marcuse, to Freud, or even Jung — to say nothing of Mao or the Hindu gurus — all these secondary substitutes, when an extraordinary psychology is buried in your own soil?)
Great question.

Few recognized it in the spring of 1944, but Hayek’s attack on the political implications of Keynesian economics would be a turning point in twentieth-century thought. Within months of his book tour, Hayek was accepting meetings with deep-pocketed donors eager to defend freedom and seeking guidance for how best to spend their money.
Lesson: never underestimate the power of organized money. In the post-war era, neo-liberals out-spend and our-organized the rest of the pack. The Mount Pellerin Society was not wanting for funds, whatever the quality of its thinkers.

As Leibniz does later, [Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz was born in Madrid in 1606] regards the flaw in Aristotle as his dealing only in strictly universal propositions. His logic is thus inapplicable to matters of fact in law and ethics, in which universal propositions, like “All men tell the truth,” or “Caramuel never hallucinates,” are not to be had. So he proposes a logic with more quantifiers that treats such propositions as morally universal, or most vehement: for example, “Almost all mothers love their sons”; and ones of usual force: “Around half of mothers love their sons.”
If you doubt this contention by Caramuel, practice trial law.

His [H.L. Mencken's] sallies relied on more than spleen. He read and wrote a study on his favorite thinker, Nietzsche. Like George Orwell and Victor Klemperer, Mencken grasped the politics of the words we choose. In The American Language (1921), he defended the inventiveness and demotic vitality of American speech against the stuffiness of “proper usage.” Yet Mencken himself threw damaging words about with abandon.
An intriguing figure whom I've never properly explored. Speaking of over-generalizations, it often seems conservatives are more complex and at time paradoxical than champions of liberalism.

Tuesday, October 26, 2021

Thoughts: 26 October 2021



Curious, he [Hans Morgenthau] attended the meeting, where he “had one of the most profound experiences of my life.” Hitler spoke passionately and eloquently, telling the crowd “exactly what it wanted to hear.” And Morgenthau himself? He said he felt a “paralysis of will” even though he didn’t believe a word of Hitler’s speech.
How do Hitler and other demagogues (you know who I'm thinking of) mesmerize their audiences? This is no mean skill; it's a dangerous power. How do we inhibit those with this potentially evil talent without ending discourse that rouses us to justice or righteous action? Are the various instances of diverse discourses easily discernable?

Personal mastery is the discipline of continually clarifying and deepening our personal vision, of focusing our energies, of developing patience, and of seeing reality objectively. As such, it is an essential cornerstone of the learning organization—the learning organization’s spiritual foundation.
And I posit that you can have a "learning organization" of one.

If you tried to bunch together thousands of  chimpanzees  into Tiananmen Square, Wall Street, the Vatican or the headquarters of the United Nations, the result would be pandemonium. By contrast, Sapiens regularly gather by the thousands in such places. Together, they create orderly patterns – such as trade networks, mass celebrations and political institutions – that they could never have created in isolation. The real difference between us and  chimpanzees  is the mythical glue that binds together large numbers of individuals, families and groups. This glue has made us the masters of creation.
So, have we Americans descended to the level of chimps in our increasing disinclination to listen to one another and to act for the common good? One might feel that way.

Seeing things this way, it’s an obvious mistake to ask whether football should be competitive or co-operative. Competition and co-operation are inextricably entangled in the game, each defining the other.
A key point. See Steve MacIntosh's Developmental Politics for a discussion of "polarity theory" that discusses the interplay between competition and cooperation and other similar dichotomies.

In a landmark 2017 paper called “Is the First Amendment Obsolete?” the legal scholar Tim Wu argued that traditional censorship assumed that information and access to audiences were scarce and could be blockaded or bottlenecked. In the digital era, however, information (good and bad) is abundant; attention is what is scarce. So instead of blockading information, why not blockade attention? If you flood the zone with distractions and deceptions and just plain garbage, people’s attention would be diverted and exhausted and overwhelmed. “Flooding can be just as effective as more traditional forms of censorship,” Wu wrote. Traditional free-speech protections, such as America’s First Amendment, could do nothing about it.
In other words, flood the zone with bull shit (a technical term per philosopher Harry Frankfurt). Alas, this tactic seems to work.

Our modern rationalist’s fragmentation has resulted in a specialization without universal ideas and a psychology without soul. Deprived of this background Jung seems to stand alone and peculiar; we do not see his roots. Then, interpreters of Jung go astray by trying to fit him into a context of contemporaries who rise from the secular and material view of man and not via the Romantic one. One chief difficulty in coming to terms with Jung’s thought and style has been this very lack of context.
But while high connectivity might boost innovation, high uniformity often doesn’t, because it can lower the likelihood of new combinations.
And "uniformity," like an agricultural monoculture, lacks resilience and thus becomes more vulnerable to changes in the environment.