Friday, July 9, 2021

The Constitution of Knowledge: A Defense of Truth by Jonathan Rauch

 

2021 publication

Prelude: I ended up writing this review over a longer period of time than I normally take. I reviewed my highlights quite thoroughly. Because of this, I can provide you an executive summary of my review if you're pressed for time. You should read this book! Everyone should read this book! It's terrific. It's timely. In the end, my review says this: I enthusiastically endorse what this author has written. He's confirmed many of my beliefs and hunches. And he's sharpened my thinking. He's gotten me excited about fighting the good (informed) fight. Given the nature of Rauch's argument, I should perhaps be more measured in my tone. I could be wrong. But he wouldn't have written this book if he thought its arguments wrong, and I wouldn't praise it if I found Rauch headed down the wrong track. If anyone thinks he (and I) are wrong about his contentions, but all means say so. But first, read the damned book! 

If Oprah or the American Library Association or some such, were to make a book recommendation for a  national civics lesson, The Constitution of Knowledge would be a perfect choice. This book is well researched and moves along quickly with the benefit of a flowing narrative voice that is insightful but not pedantic. Rauch carefully constructs a case for liberal (as in open and learned) institutions. Rauch argues that like the U.S. Constitution, knowledge, as discovered and developed by law, science, journalism, and government, depends upon a constitution, albeit unwritten. This constitution of knowledge governs the discovery and creation of knowledge based on facts. This constitution allows the creation of a measure of reliable truth. Could there be a more important topic for us (around the world) to stop to ponder and appreciate? 

In 2020, former President Barack Obama stated the matter starkly: “If we do not have the capacity to distinguish what’s true from what’s false, then by definition the marketplace of ideas doesn’t work. And by definition our democracy doesn’t work. We are entering into an epistemological crisis.” Loc. 249, Kindle edition.

Rauch opens his book with a consideration of the sorry state of the state of knowledge and truth in public discourse. As Rauch notes--and as anyone paying the least bit of attention knows--the quality (as accuracy and truthfulness) of our public discourse has been in free-fall for a long time. (And it certainly was never all that good.) With the rise of the man from Mar-a-Lago, disinformation, lies, and fantasies received the imprimatur of authority that followers and minions soon aped. In a sense, this assessment of our sorry state is needed. I doubt that anyone reading this book doesn't know all of this already, but to frame what follows Rauch needs to state the obvious and thereby ground his message and his concerns. 

After his opening assessment of our current sorry state of affairs, Rauch begins building his argument by looking a what we might call our native set of dispositions. Drawing upon history and social science, which he quotes and cites without getting lost in academic jargon or excessive detail, Rauch establishes that we humans are given to tribal conformities and limited frames of knowledge that often serve immediate needs and ends but that don't readily facilitate sophisticated ideas about knowledge and society. Primitive humans existed in small groups that operated with limited horizons and limited forms of technology. For instance, agriculture is only ten-to-twelve thousand years old. As agriculture, cities, trade, and conquest developed, more reliable and sophisticated forms of knowledge were required to meet the needs arising from the challenges associated with expanding horizons of activity. But still, humans have this anchor in archaic experiences that we can't shake, including, perhaps most importantly, the need to maintain good relations with our group, our tribe. As social scientist Jonathan Haidt puts it, we humans are "groupish." 

Rauch draws on Plato's Socratic dialogue with Theaetetus to mark the beginning of a careful, patterned tradition of thought about the nature and reliability of knowledge. (Note that Rauch here and in the remainder of his book draws only upon the Western tradition, beginning with Plato. Other civilizations certainly have gone through a similar process but this book isn't a comparative intellectual history, and, for better and for worse, the Western traditions of thinking about science, technology, and industry as well as about how to organize societies have established a dominance throughout the world.) Rauch moves on quickly from Plato to the early modern age and its thinkers who give us liberal politics, market economics, and scientific thinking. Thinkers like Montaigne and Francis Bacon, make appearances, as do later thinkers about the scientific enterprise, such as the founder of American pragmatism, Charles Sanders Pierce, and the Austrian native Karl Popper. Each of these thinkers refines our understanding and appreciation (of the strengths and weaknesses) of the scientific enterprise. But the highest places of honor in Rauch's pantheon go to the triumvirate of John Locke, Adam Smith, and James Madison. Smith for this appreciation of the operation of markets; Locke for his identification and promotion of epistemic virtues (including his defense of tolerance), his emphasis on politically protected liberties, and the idea that government depends upon the consent of the governed; and Madison for his design of a political system that seeks to check the arbitrary use of power and to promote a government based upon a system of checks and balances that weed out distorting interests and faulty claims of knowledge. 

After reviewing the history of these novel institutions for creating knowledge and making decisions, Rauch delves more deeply into the values and principles that make these institutions unique in history. Openness to new ideas, limitations on authority, dedication to the principle of fallibilism (any claim of knowledge could later prove wrong), and the widespread sharing of knowledge mark this new way of generating knowledge. Note, however, that Rauch realizes that these ideals often break down in practice; therefore, the "constitution of knowledge" isn't a machine that would go of itself. It needs a constant commitment from those who constitute the institutions. Also, Rauch emphasizes that these are social organizations (law, science, government, and journalism) and subject to the foibles that he describes at the beginning of the book. Also underpinning these institutions and the liberal order is a shared aversion to coercion. A level of conflict attendant with openness is a hallmark of the liberal order. Disagreements, over physics and well as politics will occur but should be resolved through words, not weapons. 

That we must pay close attention to our institutions for creating knowledge and refining it arises from the attack that this regime, which Rauch has dubbed the "reality-based community,"* has undergone in our time. Of course, forces of authority (from above) and ignorance (from below) have always battered liberal regimes. But current attacks have once again gotten worse (although the mid-twentieth century probably still takes the cake). Rauch delves into these contemporary attacks that eminate from both the political (extreme) right and the political (extreme) left. From the extreme right, we get a flood of information, mostly via social media, that's either false, misleading, or distracting. This involves a "firehose of falsehood" (Rand corporation's term) or as Steve Bannon described his strategy: “The Democrats don’t matter. The real opposition is the media. And the way to deal with them is to flood the zone with shit.” (Location 3061). Princeton philosopher Harry Frankfurt provides another apt description of a method for degrading knowledge in his work On Bullshit (the title says it all, doesn't it?). Needless to say, the examples Rauch provides are legion and start at the top in the U.S. during the last presidential administration. I'd hoped that we'd lanced this boil with the absurdist yet dire attack of January 6, but as that event recedes in the rearview mirror, I fear that the boil remains. 

The attack from the other side comes primarily from the "woke" left, the so-called "progressives," or at least the most radical elements of this group. In this section, Rauch addresses the issue of "cancel culture," which is simply a new name, attendant with social media, for ostracisation as a tool for the coercion of opinions. As Rauch notes, the problem of social coercion to seek to establish opinions to conform to a norm is not new to democratic societies. Both Alexis De Tocqueville in his Democracy in America and John Stuart Mill identify a trend toward conformity of opinion in democratic societies (that were relatively new at the time--if we exclude ancient Athens). The drive for purity and against pluralism seems to be a phenomenon more on the political and cultural left than on the right. When we look at history from the French Revolution to Lenin and Stalin's regime to the reign of Mao and his Cultural Revolution we see a demand for purity and conformity that results in deaths, imprisonments, and disgrace. (Note that the extreme right is not without sin: the right tends to deal with dissent with more dispatch; to wit, with more preemptory violence, skipping show trials and efforts at "re-education.") Nothing in the U.S. has reached these extremes, but it's a gnawing concern. I have to admit that I've tended to brush off concerns of this sort in the past as merely a passing fad among some college students, who are given to excess. (I know; I once was one, and I lived and practiced law in a college towns for over 30 years.) But the level of fear of being called out among students and professors for some imagined transgression has increased greatly. Rauch makes a case that those who are sympathetic to progressive values and goals have to work to separate the gold of liberation from the dross of social coercion. 

Toward the end of the book, Rauch becomes more personal. He counsels an imaginary young college student, whom he dubs "Theaetetus," in honor of Plato's young inquirer in his dialogue of that name. Rauch provides sound counsel to the young inquirer about when to hold 'em and when to fold 'em; when to confront purveyors of falsehoods and those who seek to coerce conformity. Rauch is a gay man now in his early 60s who's experienced life from the closet to Stonewall to the acceptance of gay marriage (about which he published an influential book in 2005). He knows the value of liberation, the disparagement dished out to gay people (now, one hopes, a dwindling occurrence), and he knows the importance of standing one's ground by making rational, coherent arguments for one's cause even in the face of seemingly intractable resistance. It's in this section that Rauch goes beyond impressing me with his skills as a journalist who reports with depth and insight about the fundamentals and history of science and thought and who has a breadth and depth of insights into contemporary events. Here I perceive Rauch as a wise man who can give counsel to those in need based on a depth of knowledge and experience. Fighting the good fight by the rules. 

Now, go back a read my opening paragraph (in italics). What should you do? 

*One slight bit of dissent: Rauch's use of the term "reality-based community" as a short-hand for those who adhere to the principles of the constitution of knowledge. He later notes that one can be a member of the "reality-based community" and, for instance, go to church. Many aspects of life aren't governed by the conventions of the reality-based community, such as personal experience, feelings, spiritual experiences, and so on. A lot of life! The negative pregnant here is that these experiences (personal, non-replicable, private, hidden) aren't real, or at least that they are so subjective as to beyond community recognition. I agree that there exists a reality-based community if we're talking about a certain sphere of knowledge, let's call it "Nature." Thus, I always appreciate Dr. Samuel Johnson's contribution to the reality-based" viewpoint:

After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, "I refute it thus."

— James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson 

However, logicians will note the fallacy of Dr. Johnson's response, and that as to non-material issues, we have no such easy recourse. Thus, it might be more accurate for Rauch to say that this is the "basic" or "material" or "scientific" reality-based community. "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” And I should also note here that Rauch recognizes the importance and validity of arguments over topics such as which is the better play between Shakespeares's Timon of Athens and his Hamlet. No commentator argues Timon the superior play. This too, I argue, is a "reality-based" assessment. 


 

Thursday, July 8, 2021

Thoughts for the Day: Thursday 8 July 2021

 


The reality-based community would not have endured and expanded for four centuries unless it possessed formidable strengths: its institutional depth, its vast networks, its reserves of integrity. It can use those strengths to build resilience and resistance, and, after initially reeling from the shocks of the Trump era, it set about doing so.


In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton warned of the dangers posed by men with “talents for low intrigue and the little arts of popularity”—men who commence as demagogues and end as tyrants. Later, in a letter to President Washington, Hamilton warned that the “only path to a subversion of the republican system of the country” is by way of the ruthless demagogue who uses fear and flattery to “throw things into confusion [so] that he may ‘ride the storm and direct the whirlwind.’ (Location 2930) 

Have you ever read such an apt description of . . . .? [Fill in the blank.] (I didn't have to think twice about my answer, although he has many imitators now waiting in the wings.)


I have not yet made clear what I mean with our two terms: civilization and culture. For the sake of not imposing a major philosophical position, let us simply say civilization gets the job done as best it can. Culture is song, the song that breaks out in the midst of the job. Civilization needs tools and passes them forward. Civilization looks back to learn. Culture pops up, sprouts in a petri dish. It can be helped or hindered by civilization, but culture can also be utterly autonomous. Culture is surprising, inexplicable, unpredictable, and largely unlearned. Culture breaks into civilization and is often assimilated by it — even the counterculture, avant-garde art, street fashion, pop music and dance, slang — become appropriated by civilization.

Western scholars have complained that when Socrates says that knowledge is virtue he asserts “the conjunction of two logically distinct things, an intellectual state (knowing …something), and an emotional one (one in which there is affective backing for doing the thing one knows one ought to do).”

The origin of the word ‘humble’ traces back to ‘humus’—it means of the earth, feminine, unsophisticated. This reminds us of the biblical injunction, “Except ye become as a little child, ye cannot enter the Kingdom of Heaven.”

The philosophical origin of [Wittgenstein's] Tractatus lies in an unsharable experience, given as a gift, rather than an argument that could somehow be reconstructed with transparent clarity.

Propositions cannot contradict one another unless they are answers to the same question.


Wednesday, July 7, 2021

Thoughts for the Day: Wednesday 7 July 2021

 

Book of the day, you may say

N.B. Today is a variation from my normal format in that I'm taking quotes only from a single work instead of my computer-generated random selections from books that I've read. I do this because I'm writing a review of The Constitution of Knowledge and in reviewing my highlights I found so many insightful and provocative quotes that I decided to share a bunch of them in lieu of the normal potpourri. Enjoy. 


As for the power of reason, it is the servant of what today we call confirmation bias, an idea Montaigne impressively anticipated. “Men’s opinions are accepted in the train of ancient beliefs, by authority and on credit, as if they were religion and law. They accept as by rote what is commonly held about it.… On the contrary, everyone competes in plastering up and confirming this accepted belief, with all the power of their reason, which is a supple tool, pliable, and adaptable to any form. Thus the world is filled and soaked with twaddle and lies.”
. . . .

“Not that it is impossible that some true knowledge may dwell in us: but if it does, it does so by accident. And since by the same road, the same manner and process, errors are received into our soul, it has no way to distinguish them or to pick out truth from falsehood.” [Montaigne]

. . . .

“We would need someone exempt from all these qualities [of bias and passion], so that with an unprejudiced judgment he might judge of these propositions as of things indifferent to him; and by that score we would need a judge that never was.” [Montaigne]


The knowledge problem centers not on what you know or what I know, but on what we know.


“Nothing can be so dangerous as principles thus taken up without questioning or examination; especially if they be such as concern morality, which influence men’s lives, and give a bias to all their actions.” [John Locke]


Epistemic rights, like political rights, belong to all of us; empiricism is the duty of all of us. No exceptions for priests, princes, or partisans.


In the nineteenth century, skepticism—the idea that if certainty is impossible, knowledge must be impossible—was elbowed aside by a related but quite different idea, that of fallibilism, a term coined by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. “On the whole,” he wrote, “we cannot in any way reach perfect certitude nor exactitude. We can never be absolutely sure of anything,” at least when any matter involves facts and statements about objective reality. “The scientific spirit,” said Peirce, “requires a man to be at all times ready to dump his whole cartload of beliefs, the moment experience is against them.”


[Karl] Popper said, knowledge in all its glory, like the biosphere in all its glory, comes from that most unglamorous of all methods: trial and error. Science’s genius is its ability to both make errors quickly and find errors quickly. It kicks the evolution of knowledge into warp drive.


Perhaps his [Charles Sander Pierce's] most impressive contribution, however, was to lay the groundwork for network epistemology, which conceptualizes scientific knowledge not merely as the product of individual or even group effort but as an emergent property of interactions across a social network. His insights were so far ahead of his time. . . . [H]e saw more clearly than anyone before him, and also more clearly than almost everyone today, that the concept of objective knowledge is inherently social. “It will appear,” he wrote, “that individualism and falsity are one and the same. Meantime, we know that man is not whole as long as he is single, that he is essentially a possible member of society. Especially, one man’s experience is nothing if it stands alone. If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination. It is not ‘my’ experience but ‘our’ experience that has to be thought of; and this ‘us’ has indefinite possibilities.”


“Unless truth be recognized as public—as that of which any person would come to be convinced if he carried his inquiry, his sincere search for immovable belief, far enough—then there will be nothing to prevent each one of us from adopting an utterly futile belief of his own which all the rest will disbelieve. . . .” [Charles Sanders Pierce]


“The real, then,” explained Peirce, “is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge.”



Tuesday, July 6, 2021

Thoughts for the Day: Tuesday 6 July 2021

 

2021 publication


America’s founders—Adams, Washington, Franklin, Madison, and others—all warned that no constitution is worth the paper it is written on if it is not also inscribed in people’s hearts and grounded in public virtue. “Avarice, ambition, revenge, or gallantry would break the strongest cords of our Constitution as a whale goes through a net,” John Adams said. “Our Constitution is designed only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate for any other.”


Retrospective and Prospective Uses of Reasons Sometimes people use reasons to explain or to justify decisions already taken and beliefs already held. This is a retrospective use of reasons. Sometimes people use reasons as arguments in favor of new decisions or new beliefs. This is a prospective use of reasons.

What makes people fight each other? I was especially intrigued by the processes behind “group-identity” conflicts, which involve a stark distinction between “us” and “them.” This category includes violence that centers on nationalist, ethnic, racial, or other ethnocentric identities.

Together, lots of interactions and feedbacks among the parts of a system produce what complexity scientists call “disproportionate causation.” This means there’s often no clear relationship in the system between the size of a cause and the size of its effect.

Drawing on his research on the psychological effects of the fear of nuclear war, famed US psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton discusses the “psychic numbing” that the threat of climate change can induce in people. Lifton, The Climate Swerve: Reflections on Mind, Hope, and Survival (New York: New Press, 2017).

Consciousness depends upon imagination and imagination holds a central place in the soul. “Imagination is the terminus ad quem of all properly human conscious experience; it is that faculty of man without which there can be no conscious experience.” (E.W. Warren)

A succession of thinkers in subsequent decades and centuries were to build upon these three basic revolutions of thought, redefining liberty as the liberation of humans from established authority, emancipation from arbitrary culture and tradition, and the expansion of human power and dominion over nature through advancing scientific discovery and economic prosperity.





Sunday, July 4, 2021

Thoughts for the Day: Sunday the Fourth of July, 2021! Happy Independence Day!

 


The science of epidemiology evolved to make sense of infectious diseases, not common chronic diseases like heart disease. Though the tools of epidemiology—comparisons of populations with and without the disease—had proved effective in establishing that a disease such as cholera is caused by the presence of micro-organisms in contaminated water, as the British physician John Snow demonstrated in 1854, it is a much more complicated endeavor to employ those same tools to elucidate the subtler causes of chronic disease. They can certainly contribute to the case against the most conspicuous determinants of noninfectious diseases—that cigarettes cause lung cancer, for example.

What makes it worth uttering is not its truth (the fact that something is true is never a sufficient reason for saying it), but the fact of its being the one truth which is important in the present situation.

Under English law, the House of Commons took the term “misdemeanor” to refer to distinctly public misconduct, including but not limited to actual crimes.6 Thus “high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” the standard basis for impeachment, represented “a category of political crimes against the state.”

Blake too knew that we become what we behold, that we, as Barfield would say, participate in it.

“Like the initiate of a secret society that has broken free from the undifferentiated collectivity,” Jung wrote, “the individual on his lonely path needs a secret which for various reasons he may not or cannot reveal. Such a secret reinforces him in the isolation of his individual aims.” Without this secret, Jung argues, we too easily fall into the herd-mind of the mass and lose our individuality.”

Saturday, July 3, 2021

Thoughts for the Day: Saturday 3 July 2021

 



But to the president [FDR], who was “unfamiliar” with Keynes’ theoretical academic work, Keynes was an impractical mystic. Though he insisted to Frankfurter that he and Keynes had a “grand talk” together and that he “liked” the British economist “immensely,” the truth was that FDR had been annoyed by the haze of high theory in which Keynes had enshrouded their conversation.


No doubt, “violence pays,” but the trouble is that it pays indiscriminately, for “soul courses” and instruction in Swahili as well as for real re-forms. And since the tactics of violence and disruption make sense only for short-term goals, it is even more likely, as was recently the case in the United States, that the established power will yield to nonsensical and obviously damaging demands—such as admitting students without the necessary qualifications and instructing them in nonexistent subjects—if only such “reforms” can be made with comparative ease, than that violence will be effective with respect to the relatively long-term objective of structural change.


To be illuminated is to not-forget. With this parable [of the cave], Plato introduces us to the essential opening through which we must pass to enter into perennial philosophy. This doorway opens into the recognition, the re-cognition that there is truth, and that we can perceive it for ourselves.

Kissinger made a choice for stoicism, not pessimism, a willingness to endure no matter what obstacles were placed in his path, though with no ultimate ends to aim for, nothing beyond the affirmation of existence itself and the perpetuation of the United States.




Friday, July 2, 2021

Thoughts for the Day: Friday 2 July 2021

 


Even though they [the subtlest discursive thoughts, mental dialogues, images, memories, desires, and emotions] go undetected, they may strongly influence our minds and behavior. Unconscious mental processes, as Freud discovered centuries after Buddhist contemplatives, can actually exert deep and lasting influences in our mental lives. This practice is a path of self-knowledge, as subconscious influences are gradually identified via increasingly refined qualitative vividness.


History, largely experienced previously as a series of natural disasters, could now be seen as a movement in which everyone could potentially enlist. Intellectuals and artists rose as a class for the first time to lend a hand in the making of history, and locate the meaning of life in politics and art rather than traditional religion. The balance in European culture shifted from the religious to the secular – a momentous process that is still ongoing in many parts of the world.

For whatever the historian calls an end, the end of a period or a tradition or a whole civilization, is a new beginning for those who are alive.

From the beginning, the clear, decisive, directed thinking that we associate with rationality is linked to aggression and force.

The tricky part . . . is how to do two very difficult things: one, to reasonably decide just what are the major differences between the male and female value spheres (à la Gilligan), and then, two, to learn ways to value them more or less equally. Not to make them the same, but to value them equally.


Thursday, July 1, 2021

Thoughts for the Day: Thursday 1 July 2021

 


Because we’re unaccustomed to it, we don’t usually see that there’s a third possible logical term equal to yes and no which is capable of expanding our understanding in an unrecognized direction. We don’t even have a term for it, so I’ll have to use the Japanese mu. Mu means “no thing.” Like “Quality” it points outside the process of dualistic discrimination. Mu simply says, “No class; not one, not zero, not yes, not no.” It states that the context of the question is such that a yes or no answer is in error and should not be given. “Unask the question” is what it says.

More knowledge, more material goods, and more leisure did not, [Georges Sorel] wrote at the end of Illusions of Progress, reliably make people happier. The mistake of thinking that they did was inherited from enlightened eighteenth -century reformers. It arose from a soft “ethic of consumption.” Happiness, Sorel suggested in a brief passage that echoed Mill’s own bow to immemorial wisdom on the topic, depended heavily on being active and having satisfying work.


[T]he paralysis induced by thinking is twofold: it is inherent in the stop and think, the interruption of all other activities—psychologically, one may indeed define a “problem” as a “situation which for some reason appreciably holds up an organism in its effort to reach a goal”—and it also may have a dazing after-effect, when you come out of it, feeling unsure of what seemed to you beyond doubt while you were unthinkingly engaged in whatever you were doing.

In the totalitarian interpretation, all laws become . . . laws of movement. Nature and History are no longer stabilizing sources of authority for laws governing the actions of mortal men, but are themselves movements. Their laws, therefore, though one might need intelligence to perceive or understand them, have nothing to do with reason or permanence.

Of the hedonic substances found in food, only alcohol, caffeine, and sugar are addictive—and these are food additives, not foods in themselves.

The first principle” of science, as the Nobel laureate physicist Richard Feynman put it so aptly, “is that you must not fool yourself and you’re the easiest person to fool.”)