Fateful Choices: Ten Decision That Changed the World 1940-1941 by Ian Kershaw

Ian Kershaw’s Fateful Choices: Ten Decision That Changed the World 1940-1941 is an outstanding history of a time of immensely influential but not necessarily obvious decisions made by dictatorships and democracies. There are many dangers in the study and writing of history, such as navigating the risk of hindsight bias—of course, someone acted in such and such a way because of this and that reason compelled the decision. We better understand the reasons and compulsions that affected the decision-makers because we know how the decisions turned out and we can know the simultaneous acts of others that affect the outcome. On the other hand, when titanic forces are on the move, the importance—even the reality—of individual decisions can become mere chimeras in comparison to the great impersonal forces that shape the course of events. Kershaw’s book shows how historians can understand and appreciate the decisions of actors in the face of profound change and uncertainty. Individual decisions do make a difference, although all human decisions are constrained. The constraints may arise from within the individual, such as his [sic] values, goals, and beliefs (true and false); from the effects of other actors in a strategic game; or from the effects of Nature’s whims. The historian—and I think I’m following Collingwood here, as I believe Kershaw implicitly does—must “re-enact” (Collingwood’s term) the thoughts (and perceptions) of the actors as they sought to act in their worlds. Of course, such as undertaking of “re-enactment” is at best partial and incomplete. Any representation of reality, no matter how concurrent it may be, must always result in “reality-lite” in any re-telling. Yet, despite the limitations, some efforts are more successful, more edifying, that others and Kershaw’s work fits this description.

The ten decisions that Kershaw addresses were momentous and did change the course of history (if we can say that history has a course; perhaps we should say that it unfolds willy-nilly like the weather—somewhat predictable only in the shortest run). For instance, Kershaw opens with the decision of the British cabinet to continue the war against Hitler even as France is falling. Here, of course, we see the importance of a single individual, Winston Churchill, who has only just assumed the post of Prime Minister. Under the lead of Lord Halifax, the British contemplated cutting a deal with Hitler that some hoped would preserve the Empire and guaranty of freedom of the seas for them. Indeed, Hitler hoped that Britain would take just such a course. In this account—also brilliantly relayed in John Lukacs’s Five Days in London: May 1940—Kershaw reveals the uncertainty, yet underlying value, of the reasoned arguments required by the British parliamentary democracy. In contrast, for instance, consider another decision that Kershaw recounts: that of Stalin to ignore the numerous sources that warned him of Hitler’s impending attack. Stalin’s refusal to act on the warnings he received allowed the Soviet Union to come perilously close to falling in the face German onslaught. (The fascinating question is what combination of wishful thinking, outright denial, or strategic miscalculation (Stalin thought Hitler wouldn’t dare open a second front with the British fighting on) took place in Stalin’s mind, but Kershaw is not, nor is any historian, a mind-reader.)

Kershaw also includes chapters on the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor and engage the U.S. in a war in the Pacific; Mussolini’s reckless and ill-fated decision to enter actively into the war; and the evolution of the Final Solution from the circumstances of the conquest of Eastern Europe with its huge Jewish population. For Americans, Kershaw details Roosevelt’s decisions to come—slowly, hesitantly—to Britain’s aid, and then his eventual decision to risk war in the North Atlantic by engaging German U-boats. In another chapter, Hitler, a couple of days after Pearl Harbor, declares war on the U.S., relieving Roosevelt from the need to make a case for a war in both Europe and the Pacific. Kershaw details the rationality of this decision that might, at first glance, seem quite irrational.

Whether one is a student of WWII history (as I am) or just an occasional history reader, this is a first-class work of history that will entertain (well, if you like narratives of political decisions) and instruct. We all see through a glass darkly, but some put on darker glasses than others. Kershaw helps us see more clearly. 

Natural Born Heroes by Christopher McDougall

What do the following have in common?

·         LeBron James

·         Brazil

·         Arthur Evans

·         Patrick Leigh Fermor

·         Tom Myers

·         Fairbairn & Sykes

·         Shanghai

·         Pankration (Greek)

·         George Hebert

·         Norina Bentzel

·         Xan Fielding

·         The Minotaur

·         Wing Chun

·         Steve Maxwell

·         The Arizona desert

·         John Pendleberry

·         a glass eye

·         Fritz Schubert, a/k/a “the Turk”

·         Erwan Le Corre

·         Friedrich-Wilhelm Müller

·         Dr. Phil Maffetone

·         Dwight Howard

·         William Banting

·         Hitler

·         Churchill

·         Crete

If you had a difficult time discerning connections, don’t feel badly about it (although the last three items provide a strong indication of one topic). These topics—among dozens of other possible examples—are tied together in the two books written by Chris McDougall as one book: Natural Born Heroes: How a Daring Band of Misfits Mastered the Lost Secrets of Strength and Endurance (2015). In this book, McDougall examines the German invasion and subsequent resistance movement on Crete during WWII. British Special Operations Executive (SOE) agents aided the Cretans during the occupation. These tales provide the central core of the book. Around this central core—fascinating and cinematic in its own right--McDougall constructs a second book about human performance from ancient Minoan culture to contemporary Parkour. In lesser hands this could have resulted in a mess, but as McDougall displayed in another favorite book of mine, Born to Run, he can weave and integrate stories as a master. The end result is a delightfully fun and entertaining book. 

Christopher McDougall. Notice the bare feet

The story of the invasion of Crete and the Cretan resistance probably isn’t well known among Americans, but it includes some incredible tales. Certainly the most astonishing feat—anywhere—involved successfully kidnapping a German general. The heist was conducted by British agents, led by Patrick Leigh Fermor, and Cretan resistance-fighters (and a largely sympathetic populace). Some may recognize Fermor as among the best English prose stylists of the 20^th century. His books include an account of his walk across Europe starting in 1933 (as a teenager) as well as accounts of Greece, monastic life, and the Caribbean. But one topic that he did not write at length about (other than in official reports) was his part in successfully kidnapping the German general and getting the general off the island of Crete to Egypt. (If you think that this begs for a movie, it spawned one long ago: “Ill Met ByMoonlight” (or “Night Ambush”), starring Dirk Bogarde as Fermor. Bogarde, by the way, was a dashing British film star of his era. Billy Moss, one of Fermor’s accomplices in the exploit, wrote the book.)

The film version with Bogarde as Fermor

The actual kidnappers of General Kreipe: Georgios Tyrakis, William Stanley Moss, Leigh Fermor, Emmanouil Paterakis and Antonios Papaleonidas

 But McDougall wanted to write a book about human performance, also. And so in recounting this tale of adventure—with lots of James Bond-like suave from the Brits—he also dives into the issue of how these men, Cretans and Britons, could have mastered such as harsh terrain while eluding capture by the forces of “The Butcher”, the other German general on the island. This tale of extraordinary human performance allows McDougall to tell about Brits learning to survive in the harsh Shanghai underworld of the early 20^th century; about how the Frenchman George Hebert developed and trained people to survive and thrive using nature as a training ground; about how Erwan Le Corre resurrected Hebert’s genius and brought it into the 21^st century; about how Tom Myers revealed that the fascia (connective tissue) provides the architecture and elastic energy that powers the human body; and about how Parkour demonstrates practical application of Myers’s insights about the elastic energy of the fascia. McDougall also hunted down the reclusive Phil Maffetone to learn about how he revolutionized diet and training techniques for distance runners like Stu Mittleman along lines that Paleo/Primal adherents will recognize as kindred thinking. And McDougall relates how distance running guru Dr. Timothy Noakes, the high priest of high-carb for distance runners, underwent a conversion of Pauline-like intensity to embrace a low-carb, high-fat “Banting” diet. (“I was quite wrong. Sorry, everyone.”) 

I could go on at great length about this book because it contains so many different angles, so many intriguing side-stories. But I will stop here to and sum it all up by saying that I found the book great fun. It provided well-told stories about fascinating stuff (WWII history and human performance are among my favorite topics), but even if you don’t’ share my predilections, I believe that most readers would enjoy this book. 

Side note: Because I didn’t read Born to Run but listened to it twice, I decide to listen to Natural Born Heroes. Alas, the listening experience was not as good. Mostly because the reader attempted—rather poorly—too many accents: British, Greek, American, French, and so on. He mastered none. Perhaps you’d have to get Meryl Streep or resurrect Olivier to do it right. In addition, because there was so much information, so much learning, I bought the book for my Kindle for my second and later readings.

News from Berlin by Otto de Kat

When I began News from Berlin I expected something along the lines of Alan Furst (whom I’ve enjoyed), but it turned out to be something slightly different and a bit richer, too. I read this book because de Kat participated in the Jaipur Literature Festival. I’m glad I did. 

Unlike Furst, who follows a central character through the perils of time immediately before and at the beginning of the Second World War, in this novel de Kat focuses on a family. The father is a Dutch diplomat in Switzerland, the wife volunteers at a hospital in London, and their adult daughter is married to a member of the German Foreign Ministry. The son-in-law is not a Nazi; in fact, he’s unsympathetic to the Nazi regime and certainly watched by the Gestapo. The novel begins in early June 1941. The war has begun. France fell quickly; Britain just barely survived. The U.S. remains officially on the sidelines while Hitler and Stalin have a non-aggression pact. For the family, life seems balanced if tenuous. But then the daughter passes on a secret to her father about a major German action coming soon. The knowledge becomes like an infectious disease passed (intentionally) from daughter to father to mother, endangering the thin tissue of each receiver’s existence and relationships without reducing (as hoped) the burden on the person passing  on the moral and practical demands that the secret requires of them.

De Kat’s focus, however, is more than espionage and the moral dilemmas of wartime. It also focuses on the members of the family, their relationships with each other and those closest to them. The delicate balance of relationships changes as each comes into contact with the other. New realities reveal themselves and confound the characters perhaps as much as their burdensome secret. History in the family, as in life, intrudes and shapes the present in ways that the characters can’t escape and can only vaguely comprehend. 

Writers like Graham Greene, Eric Amber (I’m now reading another Ambler), and Alan Furst have written a great deal set in this time period. While titanic military and political forces met in epic struggles, individuals and families—at least those lucky enough to live—continue to try to live and maintain a semblance of ordinary life when the time is not ordinary at all. To me, that's what makes this period so fruitful for novelists and historians (such as John Lukacs) and why I’m so drawn to it. Now I add Otto de Kat to the honor role of writers who explore this dark and frightening time not so long ago.

D-Day: The Battle for Normandy by Antony Beevor

After reading D-Day for several days, I began to feel like Patton, General Leclerc, and their soldiers: I became increasingly eager to reach Paris and thereby liberate myself from this book. Because it was boring or poorly written? Not at all! In fact, Beevor's account of the ferocious battles in Normandy takes the reader into the fray about as well as I expect a book can. The death, destruction, and brutality--with a few fleeting glimpses of kindness--are all there. Just as soldiers wanted to be done with battle and return home and the generals wanted to achieve their glory, so the reader, after only this hint of what it would have been like, wants to conclude the matter. This is a sign of the author's success, not failure. 

I wrote a bit about this book in a recent post, but there's a lot more that can be said about the book. Beevor explains what was happening from Churchill to Norman residents, from the troops to the generals. He does an excellent job of mixing these perspectives. His mix of perspectives also serves to break up the alphabet soup military designations and descriptions of movements on the map. Such descriptions and maps are crucial for understanding the military moves, but such descriptions can sometimes overwhelm a layman like me. 

So in addition to my earlier comments and the comments made above, here are some random notes and thoughts generated by this book: 

• General Montgomery (Monty) was as big a horse's ass as I've heard him to be from other sources. Indeed, many Brits were as displeased with him as the Americans were. He really seems to have taken the cake as a prima dona. 
• General Patton was no slouch when it comes to ego, either. The portrait composed by Beevor, done in small bits, conforms to the impression I have from George C. Scott's biopic, Patton. But in this theatre, Patton, after serving as a decoy, proved helpful. 
• Normandy's sacrifice saved the rest of France a great deal of trauma, but the Normans suffered mightily, perhaps too much from Allied bombing. 
• The politics of the French; to wit, De Gaulle and the Communists, was a real mess. FDR didn't trust DeGaulle, nor should he have, but there was no other choice. The French were proud, although essentially defeated (1940 was a complete collapse of the French) until the Liberation of Paris. It looked like post-war France could erupt in civil war. The Communists, quite important in the Resistance, were putting out pamphlets in Paris to send people "to the barricades" The politics of France at that time remained a mess, and the race to Paris became a necessary ingredient in the campaign. 
• Women in France accused of collaboration horizontale suffered shaved-heads or worse. As Beevor notes, however, much of this consisted of witch-hunting for the benefit males deflecting their non-resistance and enacting their jealousy. Beevor writes: “It was jealousy masquerading as moral outrage. The jealousy was mainly provoked by the food that they [the women] had received as a result of their conduct.” (450). Mob justice is an oxymoron, and there was a lot of it. 
• Americans, arriving in Paris after the grueling battles to take Normandy, treated Paris as a one big carnival, leaving a bad taste in many of the French. Instead of thanks for liberating France, the French remember the gluttony, drunkenness, and whoring. 
• It appears to me (and I don't recall Beevor directly addressing this) that without the almost unchallenged air superiority of the Allies (RAF and Americans), the ground forces may have been outmatched by the Germans. 
• Although not as important in the end, Allied naval superiority allowed the Allies to arrive and establish a beachhead unchallenged from the sea as well as the air. 
• The lack of coordination between ground and air forces often caused a large number of friendly fire casualties. 
• There could be no better demonstration that Clausewitz was right about the reality of the "friction" in war and the reality of “the fog of war”.
• The brutality and carnage on both sides can sometimes leave one shaking one's head. If reading a book doesn't stamp "war is hell" onto your brain, then you'd better check your sense of humanity. This wasn't a "good war"--there is no such thing. 

QT: Was the Bomb Necessary?

New scholarship about the Japanese and how WWII came to an end in the Pacific. Maybe the A-bomb wasn't the key factor, in which case . . . . Such constant probing and questioning really can challenge our conventional thinking, and that's a very good thing. An intriguing article.

June 1941: Hitler & Stalin by John Lukacs

Published in 2006 and weighing in at only 164 pages, this is another John Lukacs gem. While in a recent post I pondered the incredible evil of these two totalitarian dictators and how difficult it would be to weigh the relative evils of themselves and their systems, this book provides a different perspective. Lukacs notes that both men were "statesmen," not in a laudatory sense, but in the sense that each of them ran great states that had goals of securing and aggrandizing their positions. They each had goals, and they cooperated in dividing Poland between them in 1939. Then, in June 1941, Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, invading the Soviet Union. Stalin, who had received numerous warnings from varied sources, refused to believe the warnings. He nearly suffered a nervous breakdown when the invasion began and German forces cut through the Soviet defenses like a hot knife through warm butter.

Lukacs recounts the events with his usual skill, and he draws upon recently released Soviet archives. The relationship between the two leaders and their regimes is a complex one. Of course, Hitler's National Socialism was vehemently anti-Communist (and garnered some support from abroad for this), and Stalin's regime was anti-fascist (a term they used loosely). But in 1939, rather hastily, the two regimes entered into a "friendship" pact that promoted trade, mostly raw materials flowing into Germany to help meet its economic needs. Another pact, secret, was also agreed to at that time that divided Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe between the two regimes. The Second World War broke out a few days after the pact was signed. The pact shocked partisans of each regime as well as embassies around the globe. Stalin was delighted. He believed that the Red Army, which he'd recently decimated with purges, wouldn't be ready to fight the Germans until 1943, so peace, for now, was welcome, in addition to gaining the cash from trade and some territory. Hitler, on his part, slapped his thigh in delight upon learning that the pact had been approved. Hitler had his eye on the territories of the Soviet Union, but his immediate aim was Poland, and this gave him a virtual cart blanche. (Great Britain and France protested and went to war against the Nazi regime's conquest of Poland, but to no effect on the invasion and division of Poland or the Nazi-Soviet relationship.)

As the war proceeded, very much in favor of Hitler's regime, events came to the point, after the relatively easy conquest of France, that only Churchill-led Britain stood against Nazi domination of Europe. Hitler knew that the Soviet Union was a British hope, along with America, for finding an ally to counter the Germans. This, along with Hitler's obsession with lebensraum (living room) allowed Hitler to turn his attention to attacking the Soviet Union after it became clear that he could not successfully conquer Britain by an invasion. In  mid-1940 Hitler informed his generals of his intention to invade the Soviet Union, and plans were shaped near the end of that year. Originally planned for May 1941, the invasion began on 22 June of that year. 

But one can't plan and stage a major invasion without others noticing, and many did. Warnings were sent to Stalin by his own spies and by foreign nations, including G.B. and the U.S. But Stalin refused to heed these warnings, always finding an excuse to discount them. Even as German reconnaissance flights into Soviet territory increased in frequency and intrusiveness, Stalin told his commanders to do nothing to provoke the Germans.

Lukacs does not directly answer the question of why Stalin refused all of the warnings. Perhaps no one can. It seems a matter of wishful thinking more than rational calculation. Stalin didn't believe that Hitler would begin a two-front war, which has some reason behind it, but it pales in comparison to all of the growing evidence to the contrary that was provided to him.  But the failure to find a definitive explanation is one that is likely to elude historians forever. Who can truly fathom the workings of another's mind, especially one as dark and secretive as that of Stalin?

This is a compelling account of the two leaders who cooperated and then crossed one another as told by a master historian. Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union led to his eventual downfall. What if he had succeeded? He came close to winning the Second World War. On the other hand, Stalin succeeded eventually (with the aid of G.B. and the U.S.) and ended up controlling virtually all of Eastern Europe for nearly 36 years. Great forces may set the stage for history, but individual human decisions still create the action.

NB: This review was originally posted on 24 September 2011 after I first (?) read the book. I have edited and expanded it a bit after reading it again in April 2017. While discussing local history, C asked why Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. This sent me back to this book and Ian Kershaw's excellent Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World 1940-1941 and its chapter on the formulation of Hitler's plan to invade the Soviet Union and another about Stalin's response to reports of an upcoming attack. 

Norman Davies: No Simple Victory: WWII in Europe 1939-1945

We can think of WWII as well picked-over territory. Persons my age grew up with it in books, films, and television. If, like me, you're a history buff, it makes for easy pickings. However, I think that there's more to this event than simply easy access and relatively recent memory. Less than 10 years before I was born, when my parents were in the prime of their youth, the world was a hell in large measure. Why and how this could be? How leaders deal with the stark facts of the age? These questions are not easily answered, and their continuing consideration by historians remains an area of fascination. Anyway, this is just a prelude to why I listened to this book and read others like it.

This particular book is fascinating because Norman Davies, is primarily a historian of Eastern Europe, and he places his emphasis on events that occurred on the eastern front. WWII, in Europe, was decided in the east, with the Americans and the Brits and their allies in the west playing an ancillary role. The Soviet army, with guns at their backs from the commissars, as well as in their faces from the Nazi's, defeated the Third Reich. Davies makes all of this clear. In addition, he raised in my mind a further question: was Hitler worse than Stalin, our ally? I'm not so sure, and that's not because I think any less of the Nazi regime. The art of comparative terror and evil is perhaps beyond comprehension, but if we attempt it, we see that we did indeed "supp with the devil" (Churchill on the alliance with Stalin). We did not know the full extent of Stalin's evils at the time, but now we do. Davies makes all of this clear. That politics--and war--makes strange bedfellows is a truism, but for all of it's truth, when one stops and examines it, it nonetheless boggles the mind.

If your looking for a history of WWII (excluding the Pacific theater), you would certainly do well with this effort. I know that there are some newer ones and more comprehensive histories, but this does open one's eyes to the horror and craziness of it all. I recommend it highly.

Munich, 1938: Appeasement & WWII by David Faber

David Faber's book (2008, 437 p.) focuses on the events leading up to the Munich Conference of 1937 wherein Neville Chamberlain and the French (with Mussolini looking on) bargained away parts of Czechoslovakia to Hitler in return for "peace in our time". Well, it didn't work. In fact, Faber's book, which focuses primarily on Hitler's actions (and luck) and British diplomatic efforts, shows how Hitler ran the table of Austria and most of Czechoslovakia without firing a shot. Chamberlain does seem clueless in the face of Hitler. Faber's narrative is detailed and interesting, but I would have appreciated more background on the primary players, like Chamberlain & Halifax, and those in the Foreign Office, in addition to Eden, who questioned appeasement. The diplomatic efforts were intense, but no one in power was willing to call Hitler's bluff, if it was a bluff (an interesting historical question). An interesting book, but not one to approach without a firm background knowledge. (I believe my background knowledge to have been adequate but I would have benefited, as I mentioned, from more scene and character setting.)